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Abstract 
In my thesis, I aim to develop a systematic and philosophically coherent thesis of 
ultimate reality for Ibn Arabi. In this pursuit, I adopt the style of analytic philosophy, 
seeking to employ and utilise some of its methods and theories. The philosophical 
aspects of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine are in dire need of conceptual clarification and 
systematic analysis with a closer focus on argumentation. The analytic tradition will 
prove most helpful in this regard. 
In my thesis, I begin by tracing Ibn Arabi’s related views and concepts as they 
are dispersed throughout his writings. I then clarify, sharpen and, in many cases, 
develop these views and concepts into fully constructed forms. Finally, I weave the 
developed concepts and views into a systematic thesis or set of sub-theses. Where 
necessary, I provide my own (or borrowed) arguments and concepts to help 
substantiate and strengthen the structure of Ibn Arabi’s thesis. 
I propose that Ibn Arabi’s various, and sometimes apparently inconsistent, 
views are best presented in terms of three main concepts: the concept of ultimate 
reality as existence (wujud), which has long been known as Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the 
oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud); the concept of ultimate reality as the Divine 
Self (dhat); and the concept of ultimate reality as God (ilah). The three concepts 
neither represent different ultimate realities nor different perspectives of the same 
ultimate reality. Instead, they represent the same ultimate reality but each one has its 
own unique scope and encompassment. The three concepts are aimed at 
encompassing Ibn Arabi’s various views and concepts of ultimate reality in a 
consistent and systematic manner. 
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 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Ibn Arabi: A Brief Biography 
 
The Islamic mystic Muhyddin Abu Bakr Mohammed bin Ali Ibn Arabi al-Ta’i al-
Hatami (known as Ibn Arabi or Ibn al-Arabi) is among the key influential figures in 
Islamic history. He was born in 1165 AD (569 AH) in Murcia in al-Andalus, a 
medieval Islamic territory incorporating at its peak most of modern-day Spain and 
Portugal. 
Ibn Arabi descends from a great Arabic tribe, the Tay’a, in which he seems to 
take great pride, particularly in being a great grandson of the tribe’s most renowned 
figure Hatam al-Ta’i, who died a few years before the advent of Islam in the seventh 
century AD. Hatam is well-known in Arabic culture and literature for his legendary 
hospitality and generosity, two of the most cherished and valued virtues among Arabs 
historically. Such virtues were vital to the people of the Arabian Peninsula during a 
time when many of them were forced to travel frequently through the predominantly 
dry and treeless desert. Thus, Arabs have always taken great honour in hosting guests 
and travellers passing by, especially those unknown to them. However, Ibn Arabi’s 
grandfather exceeds most in this matter. He has always been considered the ideal of 
Arabic generosity and hospitality; hence, the well-established phrase ‘he is as 
generous as Hatem’ is often employed to praise someone who demonstrates the 
absolute best of hospitality.  
Ibn Arabi grew up in a well-regarded upper-middle class family. His father, 
Ali, first worked for the ruler of Mercia city, Mohammed bin Sa’id bin Mardanish,1 
                                                        
1 Mohammed bin Sa’id bin Mardanish came to power in the time between the al-
Murabit and Almohad caliphates. 
 2 
later moving on to work for the Almohad caliphate.2 His father’s position allowed Ibn 
Arabi to receive a proper education and to form relationships with some of the key 
figures of his time, including the famous Islamic philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes) 
(1126–1198). As a child, his mother would take him to learn from some of the mystic 
women with whom she was acquainted. None of the members of his small family was 
a mystic; however, two of his maternal uncles were spiritual and religious, and Ibn 
Arabi seemed to admire them. One of the uncles was Yahya bin Yughan, who, 
according to Ibn Arabi, renounced his kingdom of Tlemcen to dedicate himself to 
worship and religion. 
In the very early stages of his life, Ibn Arabi claimed to have mystical 
illuminations, which were the reason behind his meeting with Ibn Rushd (Averroes) 
when he was young.3 However, in his adolescence and young manhood, for a short 
while he seemed to engage in a lifestyle more typical of non-devoted young men. 
During this period, he was – perhaps like many other middle class young men of his 
time – not particularly concerned with anything beyond the basic religious practices 
(which are expected of all Muslims). It is also likely that, at this stage, he was not 
subject to the mystical illuminations that he claimed to have had in his childhood. 
Afterwards, however, he made the abrupt decision to become a devoted Muslim and 
to absorb himself fully in mysticism. According to Stephen Hirtenstein, Ibn Arabi 
made this decision around June 1184, at the age of eighteen (1999, p. 60). He 
passionately pursued this path until the end of his life.  
Ibn Arabi repeatedly asserts that he represents an unusual case with regard to 
mystical illuminations and religious experience. Mysticism, as Ibn Arabi says, usually 
                                                        
2 The Almohad caliphate is a Berber Muslim tribe and movement that ruled some of 
the North African countries and parts of al-Andalus between 1121 AD and 1269 AD. 
3 I will discuss this meeting and its significance in Chapter Nine. 
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requires long and systematic religious study, practices and retreats, typically under a 
master; however, this was not the case with him. He claims that he was suddenly 
blessed with mystical illuminations, without any prior preparations, which he seems 
to attribute to his high standing within the mystical hierarchy. Regardless, after having 
those religious experiences, Ibn Arabi undertook systematic mystical study and 
practice under a number of mystical masters and teachers, whom he accompanied for 
various periods of time. These masters include his first mystical master Abu al-Abbas 
al-‘Uryani, Ibn Mujahid and Musa bin Imran al-Mirtali. Further, Abu Madyan, an 
influential Sufi master at the time, seemed to affect Ibn Arabi greatly as he is often 
referenced in the writing of Ibn Arabi, despite the two never having met in person. Ibn 
Arabi’s acquaintance with Abu Madyan’s heritage was primarily facilitated through 
Abu Madyan’s students, particularly Abu Ya’qub and Yusif al-Kumi (Addas, 1993, p. 
60). 
Prior to 1201 AD, Ibn Arabi’s years were spent between al-Andulus and 
Morocco, where he met his mystical masters. However, after the death of his parents, 
he decided to leave the West and head east, where he spent the rest of his life. During 
his long journey to the East he travelled widely, visiting Tunis, Egypt and Palestine; 
during these trips, he met a number of friends and wrote some books. In 1202, Ibn 
Arabi arrived at Makkah, the final destination of his journey to the East, where he 
married Fatima bint Yunus bin Yusuf Amir al-Haramayn.4 Some textual evidence 
indicates that he had two sons with her, both named Mohammed (Ibid., p. 86), and a 
daughter named Zaynab. 
                                                        
4 He seems to have had another wife before Fatima, whom he perhaps married when 
he was in al-Andalus; her name is Maryam bint Mohammed bin Abdun al-Baji. He 
might also have had other wives at different times of his life. 
 4 
In 1204, he began another long journey lasting approximately twelve years, 
during which he visited many regions and cities of the East and met a number of 
important people, including the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad, al-Nasir li Din Allah 
(1158–1225). Here, he also wrote a number of his books and treatises before settling 
down in Damascus in 1223, where he spent the final years of his life. At the age of 
seventy-five in 1240 AD (638 AH), Ibn Arabi passed away in Damascus leaving 
behind him a magnificent and highly controversial legacy. 
Ibn Arabi wrote numerous books and treatises. According to one count, the 
total number of writings is 700, though more than half of these are missing (Chittick, 
2007, p. 7). However, two of his works in particular have special significance and 
value, as they detail his doctrine. 5  One is Fusus al-Hikam, which has received 
considerable attention, even to this day. This book is considered by many to provide a 
summary of a number of Ibn Arabi’s key views and concepts. However, one would 
find it difficult, if not impossible, to grasp the different aspects of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine 
if one were to rely on this book too much. The other text is al-Futuhat al-Makkiyyah, 
which, I maintain, is Ibn Arabi’s most important book. It is a lengthy work that has 
been printed (in some editions) in nine volumes, and in it Ibn Arabi discusses most of 
his views and concepts in great detail. He seems to have taken exceptional care with 
this book in particular, as he spent several years writing it, going on to revise it once 
more before his death.6 
 
                                                        
5 Throughout my thesis, I use the phrase ‘Ibn Arabi’s doctrine’ when I refer to Ibn 
Arabi’s overall system, which incorporates all of his theories, views and concepts on a 
variety of subjects. Further, I use the phrase ‘Ibn Arabi’s thesis’ when I refer to  his 
specific thesis within his overall system. I pay particular attention to his theses of 
ultimate reality and of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). 
6 In writing this brief biography I have mainly drawn upon Ibn Arabi’s al-Futuhat al-
Makkiyyah (2011), Addas’s Quest for the Red Sulphur (1993) and Hirtenstein’s The 
Unlimited Mercifier (1999). 
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1.2 Ibn Arabi and Sufism 
 
Sufism is the mystical tradition of Islam. It is a vast tradition that incorporates 
various, perhaps even incompatible, systems, schools and figures. The roots of the 
tradition can be traced back to the time of the Prophet Mohammed and the early 
generations of Muslims. At these early stages, it simply indicated piety, self-discipline 
and moderate forms of asceticism. The people who could be considered the great 
grandfathers of Sufism were not clearly distinct from the rest of the companions of the 
Prophet Mohammed or other later Islamic scholars, and they were certainly not seen 
as a distinct unified group or sect in and of themselves. They were individuals whose 
piousness and devoutness attracted the attention and admiration of the rest of the 
society. 
 Sufism evolved over the course of time and what was once considered an 
individual matter came to take on a more systematic and organised form a few 
centuries later. Thus, around two hundred years after the death of the Prophet 
Mohammed, there emerged a number of books on Sufism providing guidance on how 
to achieve self-discipline and piety. This indicates that at that time Sufism had started 
to become something more systematic. A few centuries later (around 1100 AD 500 
AH), we begin to actually see organised Sufi schools and orders (turuq), each with its 
own distinct ways, pedagogies and methods to teach its followers how to achieve 
piousness and mystical illuminations. Each school or order (tariqah) typically 
required a head or a founder, who would usually have invented some new method of 
Sufism. At this stage, Sufism became a distinct and independent subject that stood in 
contrast with other Islamic subjects, especially that of Islamic jurisprudence. 
 Decades later, a new trend in Sufism emerges, which a number of 
contemporary scholars see as a form of theosophy (see for example: Landau, 1959; 
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Corbin, 1983; Arberry, 2008; Zarrabi-Zadeh, 2016). This trend takes its mature form 
in the hands of Ibn Arabi. It seems that the distinguishing mark of this trend is the 
introduction of the thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud), whose 
foremost advocate and theorist is seen to be Ibn Arabi. Other key figures to whom this 
trend has been attributed include Ibn al-Faridh (1181–1235), Ibn Sab’in (1217–1269) 
and al-Afif al-Telem’msani (1213–1291). Contrary to mainstream scholars, however, 
I maintain that even though the advocates of wahdat al-wujud may all agree that 
existence is one, they differ in their interpretations of this claim. Some affirm 
pantheism, while others advocate other positions such as acosmism or panentheism.
 However, it is not clear whether the theosophy trend (the trend of the wahdat 
al-wujud) should be considered part of Sufism per se. While most people in the Sufi 
schools seem to be mainly in agreement with traditional theism with regard to the 
metaphysics of existence and its relationship to God, the theosophists have long 
debated with traditional theists in relation to the details of these issues. For instance, 
while Sufis maintain a dual reality of God on the one hand and the world on the other, 
theosophists defend the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). Therefore, 
theosophists have received harsh criticism from many Islamic theologians and 
jurisprudence scholars. Yet, despite the philosophical differences between the trend of 
wahdat al-wujud and most of the Sufi orders (turuq), the two are similar in practice. 
Both appeal to and depend upon the same or similar spiritual rituals, such as retreats, 
prayers and God’s remembrance (dhikr).7 
In light of this, I maintain that Ibn Arabi should not be considered a Sufi if one 
has in mind the common interpretation of most Sufi schools and orders (turuq). In 
                                                        
7 For Further discussion of Sufism see: W. Stoddart (1976); M. J. Sedgwick (2000); J. 
Michon and R. Gaetani (2006); A. T. Karamustafa (2007); Ohlander, E. S (2011) and 
C. W. Ernst (2011).  
 7 
particular, Ibn Arabi is distinct from many Sufi theologians and jurisprudence 
scholars, who follow the ways of al-Ghazali (1058–1111). Al-Ghazali is known in 
Islamic literature as a ‘Sunni Sufi’, the most influential advocate of a form of Sufism 
that seeks to carefully follow the teachings of the Islamic scriptures. Ibn Arabi, 
however, could be considered part of Sufism in a loose sense, which encompasses 
Islamic mysticism in general (including the wahdat al-wujud trend). 
 Ibn Arabi does not seem to consider his doctrine a part of Sufism per se (Ibn 
Arabi, 2011, Vol. 5, pp. 51, 52). For him, Islamic mysticism is a much wider tradition, 
and Sufism only occupies one level in its hierarchy (a lower level, in fact). In 
indicating Islamic mysticism in general, Ibn Arabi tends to employ phrases such as 
sainthood or mysticism (wilayah) and calls its members saints or mystics (awliya) or 
the people of Allah (ahl Allah). Few Sufis, according to Ibn Arabi, succeed in 
climbing to the higher level of Islamic mysticism (Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 395). Of course, he 
probably believes that his trend of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) is that 
which obtains the highest level.8 
 In addition, Ibn Arabi seems to think that mysticism or sainthood (wilayah) in 
all religions is ultimately one unified tradition that began with the first Prophet, 
Adam. According to Ibn Arabi, there are as many mystical sub-traditions as there are 
prophets (or key prophets). The mystics from all religions throughout history are 
divided among the prophets’ mystical traditions (or sub-traditions). Thus, he tends to 
talk about those who follow, for instance, the mystical tradition of Moses, those who 
follow the mystical tradition of Jesus, and so on. The religion of each prophet is 
different from his mystical tradition. Belonging to a specific religious tradition does 
                                                        
8 I am not sure if considering Ibn Arabi’s doctrine a part of ‘the theosophy trend’ is 
accurate, as it seems to have its own unique metaphysical and epistemological 
framework that renders it a special doctrine in its own right, rather than being part of 
theosophy. 
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not prevent one from following the mystical tradition of prophets in other religious 
traditions. A Muslim mystic, for instance, could follow the mystical traditions of any 
of the previous prophets preceding Mohammed. However, Ibn Arabi places the 
mystical tradition of the Prophet Mohammed (i.e., the Mohammedian mystical 
tradition) at the top of all mystical traditions of other prophets. 
The Quran affirms that the Prophet Mohammed is the seal of prophets (33:40). 
Throughout Islamic history, this has been understood to indicate that he is the last 
prophet who would be sent by God with a new religion. For Ibn Arabi, however, 
being the seal of prophets also indicates the perfection and summation of all of the 
prophets that preceded him. Stephen Hirtenstein explains: ‘[T]here are then two 
aspects of being a seal: the first is temporal, the conclusion of a series, while the 
second is atemporal, the completion and fulfilment of a series’ (1999, p. 139). ‘The 
seal’, according to Ibn Arabi’s understanding, is perhaps comparable to the fruit of a 
tree; it is the last to emerge and is the aim and summation of all stages that precede it 
(Ibid.). 
 For Ibn Arabi, as much as Mohammed’s religion and prophet-hood is the 
summation and completion of all religions, so is the Mohammedian mystical tradition 
(al-wilayah al-muhammediyyah) (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 1, pp. 480–481). It, too, 
completes all mystical traditions of the previous prophets. Furthermore, Ibn Arabi 
seems to think of himself as the seal of the Mohammedian mystical tradition. Thus, as 
the Mohammedian mystical tradition sums and completes all of the mystical 
traditions, and he himself sums and completes the Mohammedian mystical tradition, 
he may think that he sums and completes the mystical traditions of all prophets (Ibid., 
Vol. 6, p. 317). Perhaps, then, this is why he sometimes refers to himself as ‘the seal 
of mysticism’ without restricting it to al-wilayah al-muhammediyyah (Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 
 9 
370). As the seal of the Mohammedian mystical tradition, all mystics who come after 
him would belong to the mystical traditions of other prophets, he affirms (Ibn Arabi, 
2011, Vol. 3, p. 15). It is interesting that he does not always explicitly affirm that he is 
the seal of al-wilayah al-muhammediyyah. On several occasions he talks about the 
seal in the third person; he describes him as a man descending from a great Arabic 
tribe and that he lives in the same era as Ibn Arabi. At one point, Ibn Arabi even 
claims he has met the seal (Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 63, 75). This is how Ibn Arabi sees and 
interprets mysticism and its relationship to Sufism, as well as his place in its 
hierarchy. 
   
1.3 Ibn Arabi and Traditional Sciences 
 
Ibn Arabi’s writings reveal a close relationship to the traditional sciences of his time. 
He was well trained in the Quran, Hadith, Islamic jurisprudence, theology, philosophy 
and other related sciences and subjects. Though he presents himself solely and 
constantly as a mystic, his writings, as Chittick notes, comprise a wide range of issues 
that have little or no connection with mysticism (Chittick, 2007, p. 2). In addition to 
manifesting his mastery of these subjects, his writings also reflect his novel 
contributions to them. 
He develops unique ways of interpreting the Quranic verses that appear, at 
times, to ignore the standard rules of tafsir (i.e., the science of Quran interpretation), 
some examples of which I will cite in Chapter Nine. He also develops unique views 
on the subject of Hadith. For instance, in judging the authenticity and reliability of the 
sayings that have been attributed to the Prophet Mohammed, Hadith scholars typically 
refer to four standard judgements: sahih, hasan, da’if or mudu’a. Sahih means 
 10 
authentic and reliable. Hasan is considered less reliable than the sahih, though the 
saying is considered acceptable and probably authentic. Da’if means weak and 
indicates that the authenticity of the saying is doubtful and cannot be confirmed. 
Finally, mudu’a means fake and indicates a confirmation of the inauthenticity of the 
saying. There are other classifications, as well as detailed rules and criteria for each 
type, discussed in an independent subject known as mustalah al-hadith. 
Ibn Arabi, however, proposes some novel criteria for judging the authenticity 
of the sayings attributed to the Prophet Mohammed. For instance, he claims that when 
a saying is considered weak (da’if), according to the standard criteria of mustalah al-
hadith, a mystic may confirm its authenticity and reliability with reference to some 
types of religious experience (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 1, p. 164); accordingly, the 
saying in question should instead be judged as authentic (sahih). 
Moreover, in jurisprudence, Ibn Arabi does not seem to adhere to any of the 
main four jurisprudential schools followed by most Islamic scholars (namely Hanafi, 
Malki, Shafi and Hanbali); instead, he develops his own school. Hundreds of pages in 
his most important book, al-Futuhat al-Makkiyyah, are dedicated to his jurisprudential 
views. 
Ibn Arabi also made some contributions to the foundation of jurisprudence 
(usul al-fiqh). Most Islamic scholars endorse four sources for Islamic jurisprudence: 
the Quran, the Hadith, the total consensus of Islamic scholars (ijma), and analogical 
deduction (qiyas). The term ‘analogical deduction’ (qiyas) refers to the Islamic 
jurisprudential practice of determining the legal value—e.g., ‘prohibited’ (haram), 
‘permitted’ (mubah), etc.—of a given situation that is not addressed in the scriptures 
by comparing it with a similar situation that is addressed. Contrary to the bulk of 
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mainstream Islamic scholarship, Ibn Arabi rejects analogical deduction (qiyas) as a 
source for Islamic jurisprudence (Ibn Arabi, Vol. 3, pp. 243, 247).  
1.4 Ibn Arabi and Philosophy 
 
It is widely believed that philosophy inevitably conflicts with mysticism. While the 
former depends heavily upon logical investigation and reasoning, the latter appears to 
undermine such methods in favour of subjective and experiential data. According to 
many scholars, Ibn Arabi was no exception in this regard; Chittick, for example, states 
that ‘philosophy was not [Ibn Arabi’s] concern’ (1989, p. 3).  
However, I posit that the presence of philosophy in Ibn Arabi’s writings takes 
two forms, and he seems to adopt a different outlook and engagement on each of 
them. The first is what is known as Islamic (and Greek) philosophy. Islamic 
philosophy is an umbrella term that incorporates a number of philosophers, including 
al-Farabi (872–950), Ibn Sina (Avicenna) (980–1037), Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (1126–
1198) and several others. These philosophers may be said to have a fairly common 
underlying metaphysics and epistemology with a common terminology and 
methodology.9 This tradition in particular is what Ibn Arabi means when he employs 
the terms ‘philosophy’ and ‘philosophers’ in his writings, which, in fact, reveals his 
mastery of the subject, its terminology and methodology. 
Contrary to what some may expect, Ibn Arabi thinks highly of philosophers 
and their discipline; he expresses his admiration for philosophers’ ‘profoundness’ (Ibn 
Arabi, 2011, Vol. 5, p. 54). He also places philosophers on a higher level than 
theologians, since philosophers, he contends, are closer to the truth with regard to the 
                                                        
9 For detailed discussion of Islamic philosophy see: O. Leaman (2004, 2009); P. 
Adamson and R. C. Taylor (2005); S. H. Nasr (2006); R. C. Taylor and L. X. Lopez-
Farjeat  (2016); P. Adamson (2016) and K. El-rouayheb and S. Schmidtke (2017).   
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knowledge of God (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 1, p. 364). However, philosophers, 
according to Ibn Arabi, still occupy a level below mystics, especially in relation to the 
knowledge of God (Ibid). 
 Ibn Arabi nonetheless expresses reservations about Islamic philosophy, most 
of which are concerned with the epistemological aspects of the discipline. Though he 
usually endorses reasoning, logic and intellectual investigation as a legitimate method 
for acquiring knowledge, he condemns the philosophers’ tendency to depend solely 
upon the rational faculty, as well as their tendency to prioritise this faculty over and 
above other channels of knowledge, such as Islamic scriptures. I will discuss this 
issue in more detail in Chapter Nine. There seems to be some obscurity, though, in his 
understanding of what logic, or the rational faculty (aql), means. For instance, he 
suggests that the scriptures should not be interpreted figuratively, even if literal 
interpretation is logically impossible (musthil aqlan). When Ibn Arabi describes 
something as rationally or logically impossible, he is not necessarily, as one may 
expect, referring to what infringes the laws of logic; instead, he may attribute this 
description to anything that theologians and philosophers would resist for 
philosophical reasons. For example, when commenting on a saying attributed to the 
Prophet Mohammed stating that ‘death’ will be brought in the afterlife in the shape of 
a sheep and will be slaughtered, Ibn Arabi states that the prophet’s assertion must be 
endorsed even though it is ‘logically (or rationally) impossible’ (Ibid., Vol. 4, pp. 331, 
332). It is not clear that the content of the prophetic saying is indeed logically 
impossible per se. He seems to mean that theologians and philosophers may choose to 
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resist the literal meaning of the prophetic saying, which would actually be based not 
on logic, but on other metaphysical and, most likely, theological grounds.10 
Second, as mentioned above, in Ibn Arabi’s writings the term ‘philosophy’ 
was only used to indicate Islamic and Greek philosophy. However, philosophy is not 
limited to these two particular traditions. If we use the term philosophy, as it is mainly 
used today, to indicate a wide range of subjects – including metaphysics, 
epistemology, the philosophy of religion, and so on – then one could confirm that 
philosophy has a significant presence in Ibn Arabi’s doctrine. His writings contain 
original and novel contributions to several philosophical subjects. 
There are four characteristics of Ibn Arabi’s involvement with philosophy in 
this wider sense. Firstly, he does not develop any systematic theses on any 
philosophical subject, but rather provides varied, sometimes seemingly incompatible, 
views and concepts scattered throughout his writings; he may not have always been 
aware of the underlying connections between them. Nonetheless, one could explore, 
analyse and synthesise these views and concepts in order to construct novel and 
philosophically coherent theses on his behalf across the subjects that he addresses. 
Secondly, Ibn Arabi was not aware of his contribution to and involvement 
with philosophy per se, as the term ‘philosophy’ was at the time synonymous with 
Islamic and Greek philosophy (as mentioned above). This has unintentionally 
contributed to the originality of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine. In constructing his views and 
concepts, Ibn Arabi did not operate within the metaphysical, epistemological and 
methodological frameworks of Islamic and Greek philosophy, which were at times 
unnecessarily limiting. As a result, he provides us with unique and novel 
                                                        
10 Ibn Arabi was probably not alone in misconceiving the phrase ‘logically 
impossible’ (mustahil aqlan), as this phrase has sometimes been used in the 
traditional Islamic literature to describe things that are not clearly so. 
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philosophical concepts and views across the fields of metaphysics, epistemology and 
philosophy of religion.  
Thirdly, as he was likely unaware of his contribution to philosophy, Ibn Arabi 
was not particularly concerned with developing philosophical arguments for his 
views, and where he does attempt to develop them, he has little success.11  
Fourthly, when discussing his claims and concepts on various subjects, Ibn 
Arabi constantly attempts to connect them with mysticism, even if the connection is 
unclear. He always seeks to add a mystical or a religious dimension to virtually any 
concept on any subject. For instance, as mentioned previously, he undertook lengthy 
discussions concerning Islamic jurisprudence. However, in doing so he introduced 
something new to the discussion that was not common in the traditional literature. 
After examining an issue of jurisprudence, Ibn Arabi tends to add a special comment 
addressing the mystical dimension of that issue under the title ‘reflection’ (itbar). 
Sometimes the comment provides a mystical explanation that is aimed to settle a 
disagreement between scholars of jurisprudence. On other occasions, however, the 
connection between his mystical explanations and the jurisprudential view is unclear 
(see for instance, Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 2). 
The same may be seen with some of his concepts belonging to philosophical 
subjects. For instance, in discussing his metaphysical concept of merely possible 
entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah), Ibn Arabi adopts a similar approach. He attempts to 
connect the concept of merely possible entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah) to the divine 
names (al-asmaa al-ilahiyyah), sometimes insinuating that divine names cause or 
produce merely possible entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah) (Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 165). At other 
times, however, he seems to suggest that the ‘preparedness’ of merely possible entities 
                                                        
11 See for example Ibn Arabi’s argument against treating existence as a property of the 
object examined in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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(al-a’yan al-thabitah) causes the divine names (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 1, p. 333; Vol. 
4, p. 217). Despite the obscurity and apparent inconsistency of Ibn Arabi’s statements 
on the matter, it is clear that he assumes a relationship between the divine names and 
merely possible entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah). The relationship, I postulate, is not a 
metaphysical one. Rather, it seems to be an attempt by Ibn Arabi to add a religious 
dimension to some aspects of his metaphysics; it aims to show that there is divinity 
within every possible thing. As such, sometimes he uses phrases like ‘traces of the 
divine names upon merely possible entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah)’ to explain the 
relationship between the two (Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 149). 
I believe, however, that many of the subjects Ibn Arabi addresses in his 
writings, particularly the philosophical ones, should be grasped independently from 
the mystical dimensions that he sometimes forces on them. In fact, stripping 
mysticism from his philosophical concepts and views could be sometimes helpful in 
making them clearer and more coherent without losing any of their intended 
philosophical substance. 
1.5 Approaches to Ibn Arabi’s Doctrine 
 
Ibn Arabi is considered one of the most controversial figures in Islamic history and 
his views continue to polarise Islamic scholars and theologians. Some consider him a 
great mystic and a friend of Allah, while others consider him a heretic and an infidel. 
His writings divided even the opinions of Orthodox Islamic scholars (including some 
jurisprudence scholars and theologians) who, in most cases, are unified in their 
position on mystics. Indeed, there has been a heated debate surrounding Ibn Arabi’s 
doctrine within the circles of Islamic scholarship, which is evidenced in some of the 
titles of their works: Alerting the Stupid to the Infidelity of Ibn Arabi, and a response 
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titled Alerting the Stupid to the Innocence of Ibn Arabi (the former by Burhan al-din 
al-Buqa’i (1406–1480) and the latter by Jalal al-Din al-Soyuti (1445–1505), both of 
whom were key Islamic scholars). 
In addition to these theologically critical readings, most of the traditional 
writings on Ibn Arabi’s doctrine are commentaries on his works. Most of these have 
focused on his Fusus al-Hikam, with the aim of explaining Ibn Arabi’s views and 
concepts according to the Sufi dogmas, some of which may have been developed after 
his time. 
 Additionally, Ibn Arabi seems to be one of the Islamic figures who attracts the 
most attention and interest of Western scholarship. Accordingly, there have been 
numerous writings on Ibn Arabi’s doctrine over the past hundred years or so. 
Focusing on those in the English language,12 we could divide these writings into four 
approaches: 
1. The Translations: Some of the English works on Ibn Arabi are translations 
of his works. Examples include Ibn Arabi’s key work Fusus al-Hikam, which has 
been translated by R. W. J. Austin (1980), and Caner K. Dagli (2004), and Tarjuman 
al-Ashwaq, which has been translated by Reynold A. Nicholson (1911). In addition, 
William C. Chittick’s two major works on Ibn Arabi, The Sufi Path of Knowledge 
(1989) and The Self-Disclosure of God (1998), comprise mainly translated paragraphs 
of Ibn Arabi’s book al-Futuhat al-Makkiyyah. 
2. The Explanatory Approach: Some of the Western works on Ibn Arabi are 
aimed at introducing and explaining his doctrine to the Western reader. Some of these 
works attempt to understand Ibn Arabi primarily through his own writings, and 
through the understanding of the followers of the Akbarian tradition (this is a Sufi 
                                                        
12 This includes those originally written in English, as well as some works that have 
been translated into English from other European languages. 
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tradition named after Ibn Arabi who is known in some Sufi circles as al-Shaikh al-
Akbar). Examples of these works include Toshihiko Izutsu’s important work Sufism 
and Taoism (1983), Michael Chodkiewicz’s An Ocean Without Shore (1993) and The 
Seal of the Saints (1993), and William C. Chittick’s Imaginal Worlds (1994) and Ibn 
‘Arabi: Heir to the Prophets (2007). It is important, however, to note that the 
Akbarian tradition has also been reformed and developed by its other key masters. Ibn 
Arabi’s views were explained in some of the above works in light of these later 
reformulations and developments of the tradition and perhaps in light of other Sufi 
traditions as well. 
3. The Biographies: Some of the key Western works on Ibn Arabi are 
biographies. These include Claude Addas’s Quest For the Red Sulphur (1993), which 
is probably the most comprehensive biography of Ibn Arabi, and her other shorter 
work Ibn 'Arabi: The Voyage of No Return (2000) as well as Stephen Hirtenstein’s 
The Unlimited Mercifier (1999). 
4. The Philosophical Approach: Several Western writings seek to understand 
Ibn Arabi’s concepts by employing the methods and terminology of Islamic 
philosophy and theology, such as Salman H. Bashir’s Ibn al-Arabi’s Barzakh (2004). 
Another example is A. E. Affifi’s pioneering work The Mystical Philosophy of 
Muhyiddin Ibnul Arabi (1964) in which he considers Ibn Arabi’s doctrine through 
both Islamic philosophy and Western traditional philosophy. At times Affifi’s work 
appears to be concerned with reducing Ibn Arabi’s doctrine to other philosophical and 
theological schools instead of investigating Ibn Arabi’s own original philosophical 
contribution. 
Ibn Arabi’s doctrine has also been approached from the viewpoint of 
continental philosophy. Such approaches include Ian Almond’s Sufism and 
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Deconstruction: A Comparative Study of Derrida and Ibn 'Arabi (2004) and ‘The 
Meaning of Infinity in Sufi and Deconstructive Hermeneutics: When Is an Empty 
Text an Infinite One?’ (2004). 
1.6 The Aim of this Thesis and a Chapter Outline 
 
Above, I mentioned that when using the term ‘philosophy’ in today’s sense, one could 
confidently say that Ibn Arabi provides novel yet obscure and unsystematic 
philosophical views and concepts. In my thesis, I aim to develop a systematic and 
philosophically coherent thesis of ultimate reality for Ibn Arabi by analysing these 
views and concepts. In this pursuit, I adopt the style of analytic philosophy, seeking to 
employ and utilise some of its methods and theories. The philosophical aspects of Ibn 
Arabi’s doctrine are in dire need of conceptual clarification and systematic analysis 
with a closer focus on argumentation. The analytic tradition will prove most helpful in 
this regard. 
In my thesis, I trace Ibn Arabi’s related views and concepts as they are 
dispersed throughout his writings. I then clarify, sharpen and, in many cases, develop 
these views and concepts into fully constructed forms. Finally, I weave the developed 
concepts and views into a systematic thesis or set of sub-theses. Where necessary, I 
provide my own (or borrowed) arguments and concepts to help substantiate and 
strengthen the structure of his thesis. 
Ibn Arabi’s doctrine has scarcely been approached analytically; in fact, there 
has been very little relationship noted between Islamic philosophy, theology and 
mysticism on the one hand, and analytic philosophy on the other. Apart from al-
Ghazali’s kalam cosmological argument and Ibn Sina’s ‘floating man’ thought 
experiment, very few aspects of Islamic philosophy have been discussed within the 
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analytic tradition.13 I believe that an interaction between the analytic tradition and 
Islamic philosophy, theology and mysticism would yield interesting philosophical 
outcomes. To this end, my thesis aims to make a contribution in this direction. In the 
remainder of this introductory section, I offer summaries of the other eight chapters of 
the thesis. 
In Chapter Two, I examine Ibn Arabi’s idiosyncratic style with which he 
presents the thesis of ultimate reality in relation to four levels of comprehension, to 
speak to the various understandings of his audience. I argue that Ibn Arabi’s style of 
presentation is highly problematic, since the views of the different levels are, at times, 
incompatible with one another, and yet Ibn Arabi presents them in the first person, or 
approvingly. Accordingly, I make some proposals to help designate Ibn Arabi’s own 
views among the distinct levels and traditions he addresses. I argue that the only 
views that constitute his doctrine are those he attributes to the mystical tradition, or 
those he presents in a positive light, without attributing them to any particular school. 
No other views and concepts should be regarded as part of his doctrine, even if he 
appears to adopt them. 
 In Chapter Three, I examine two of the prominent approaches to Ibn Arabi’s 
doctrine: one developed by Toshihiko Izutsu, and the other by William C. Chittick. In 
his interpretive approach, Izutsu proposes that Ibn Arabi’s ontology is fully explained 
by his concept of the divine self-manifestation (tajalli). I argue, however, that Izutsu’s 
approach is based upon a misunderstanding of Ibn Arabi’s concept of divine self-
manifestation (tajalli) and its role in Ibn Arabi’s doctrine. In addition, I examine 
Chittick’s interpretive approach to Ibn Arabi’s doctrine. Chittick attempts to reduce 
Ibn Arabi’s ontology to mysticism and epistemology by targeting Ibn Arabi’s key 
                                                        
13 Ibn Arabi has only been mentioned a few times, usually as an example of an 
Islamic pantheist (or panentheist) and pluralist. 
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concept of wujud, which has almost unanimously been translated as ‘existence’. 
Consequently, many parts of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine, particularly his ontology and 
conception of ultimate reality, have long been considered matters of metaphysics. 
Chittick, however, argues that Ibn Arabi’s concept of wujud might also be translated 
as ‘finding’ (God through religion and mysticism). Hence, according to Chittick’s 
interpretation, many parts of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine, which have long been considered 
metaphysical, would now be considered mystical. I argue that Chittick’s interpretive 
approach is linguistically problematic and that it is contradicted by Ibn Arabi’s own 
usage of the term, which in many cases precludes Chittick’s proposed interpretation.  
 In Chapter Four, I examine a number of apparent inconsistencies in Ibn 
Arabi’s presentation of his conception of ultimate reality. First, I introduce some of 
his apparently incompatible views concerning the concept of God in which he seems 
to defend simultaneously a theistic concept of God and a non-dualistic concept of 
ultimate reality. According to the former, there is God as a personal Being, as 
described in the Islamic scriptures. According to the latter, however, there is ultimate 
reality as sheer and unlimited existence. Second, I examine Ibn Arabi’s inconsistent 
views concerning the reality of the world. Sometimes he affirms the reality of the 
world, while at other times he stresses the non-existence of the world. Moreover, at 
yet other times he claims that the world represents both existence and non-existence. 
Third, I also address Ibn Arabi’s apparent inconsistency in his discussion of the 
relationship between God and the world. Sometimes he appears to defend a theistic 
position in which God is considered to be the absolute Creator and Sustainer of the 
world. Yet at other times, he explicitly claims that existence is one and identical with 
ultimate reality. His statements here seem to represent God, not as the Creator per se, 
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but as the ultimate metaphysical ground from which the world cannot be 
distinguished.  
 In Chapter Five, I start to develop my own interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s thesis 
of ultimate reality. I propose that Ibn Arabi’s various, and sometimes apparently 
inconsistent, views on the matter are best presented across three main concepts: the 
concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud), which has long been seen as Ibn 
Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud); the concept of ultimate 
reality as the Divine Self (dhat); and the concept of ultimate reality as God (ilah). The 
three concepts, in my interpretation, are aimed at encompassing Ibn Arabi’s various 
views and concepts of ultimate reality, some of which are presented in Chapter Three. 
I go on to critically examine two interpretations of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of 
existence (wahdat al-wujud), namely those developed by Ibn Taymiyyah and Affifi, 
respectively. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, by maintaining that existence is identical 
with ultimate reality, Ibn Arabi subscribes to a form of pantheism. According to 
Izutsu, however, Ibn Arabi defends a form of acosmism. I argue that both 
interpretations are exegetically problematic. 
In Chapter Six, I develop my own interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s concept of 
ultimate reality as existence (wujud). According to my interpretation, there are three 
components that comprise Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-
wujud): the first is the metaphysical nature of ultimate reality as existence (wujud); 
the second is the metaphysical nature of the world; and the third is the relationship 
between ultimate reality as existence (wujud) and the world. The first component 
incorporates Ibn Arabi’s claim that existence is necessary and the ultimate 
metaphysical state of affairs for reality, as well as his claim that existence is not a 
property of the object. By establishing that existence is necessary, Ibn Arabi justifies 
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his identification between ultimate reality and existence. In addition, Ibn Arabi’s 
claim that existence is not something other than the existent object suggests that in his 
identification of ultimate reality with existence, Ibn Arabi thinks of ultimate reality as 
an individual existent rather than a sea of being as some of his statements may imply.  
 The second component – the metaphysical nature of the world – incorporates 
Ibn Arabi’s three metaphysical concepts: possible entities (al-mumkinat); the world 
(al-a’lam); and merely possible entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah). According to my 
interpretation, Ibn Arabi maintains that there is no metaphysical difference between 
what is actual and what is merely possible. Actuality and mere possibility, are not 
intrinsic and metaphysical, but rather relative and, for a considerable part, epistemic.  
The third component – the relationship between ultimate reality as existence 
(wujud) and the world – encompasses the claim that the totality of possible entities 
should be identified with God’s knowledge of the world in order to overcome the 
apparent duality within existence in Ibn Arabi’s ontology. The identification, 
furthermore, provides a plausible model for representing God’s knowledge as perfect, 
complete and infallible. 
In Chapter Seven, I examine four of the potential and actual objections to Ibn 
Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud). The first objection was 
developed by Ibn Taymiyyah and concerns the relationship between God and the 
world. Ibn Taymiyyah complains that in his thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat 
al-wujud), Ibn Arabi identifies God with the world, which is a form of heresy, and 
that the relationship between al-a’yan al-thabitah and God’s knowledge in Ibn 
Arabi’s thesis undermines God’s omnipotence and omniscience. The second objection 
addresses the problem of the one and the many in Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of 
existence (wahdat al-wujud). In presenting an ontology that endorses reality as both 
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one and many at the same time, Ibn Arabi’s thesis runs the risk of becoming 
incoherent, the objection stresses. In addition, the fact that people only experience 
existence as many indicates that reality is probably so. The third objection tackles the 
problem of evil in Ibn Arabi’s thesis. It states that, if existence is identical with God, 
no aspect of it should be vulnerable to evil. The fourth objection addresses the 
problem of the unfaithfulness of Islam. It states that in his thesis of the oneness of 
existence (wahdat al-wujud), Ibn Arabi contradicts established Islamic concepts and 
beliefs.  
In Chapter Eight, I examine the second concept in my interpretation of Ibn 
Arabi’s thesis of ultimate reality, the concept of ultimate reality as the Divine Self 
(dhat). Ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat) indicates God in Himself with no 
reference or relationship to anything else. Contrary to the claims of some of Ibn 
Arabi’s scholars, I argue that the concept of ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat) 
is not identical with the Aristotelian concept of substance or Ibn Arabi’s own concept 
of ultimate reality as existence (wujud). Dhat indicates God’s own Self, which is only 
knowable and known to Himself. The only thing that is knowable for people in 
relation to the Divine Self (dhat) is its relationship to the concept of ilah. 
In Chapter Nine, I examine Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as God 
(ilah). In Ibn Arabi’s thesis of ultimate reality, the concept of God (ilah) refers to 
ultimate reality in relation to the world. godness (uluhah), according to Ibn Arabi, 
does not indicate divine nature, but rather a position (with roles) that ultimate reality 
occupies. The concept of God (ilah) implies the existence of the Divine Self (dhat) 
that holds this title and ‘that which is godded over’, i.e. the world. Similarly, the title 
‘king’ implies the existence of both a kingdom and a person who holds this title. Ibn 
Arabi provides three channels through which one could obtain knowledge of ultimate 
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reality as God (ilah): the rational faculty; the Islamic scriptures; and religious 
experiences. Ibn Arabi also advances that ultimate reality as God (ilah) is the object 
of religious belief and practice. Religious concepts of God, according to him, are 
various portraits and formations, which aim to represent ultimate reality as God (ilah), 
here a metaphysical entity. He argues that only the Islamic concept of God 
corresponds perfectly to the metaphysical God (ilah). However, he defends a form of 
religious inclusivism according to which holders of inaccurate concepts of God will 
be forgiven and saved. Yet, on several occasions, Ibn Arabi appears to develop 
another thesis for religious concepts of God, which seems incompatible with his 
inclusivism. In this thesis, he maintains a version of aspectual pluralism in which he 
claims that the religious concepts of God are not different portraits of the 
metaphysical God (ilah), but actual manifestations of ultimate reality to different 
religions. 
It is important to note that in this thesis I do not aim to establish that Ibn 
Arabi’s detailed views are correct. All I aim to show is that we can represent his 
apparently inconsistent views and concepts related to ultimate reality in a systematic, 
coherent and unified manner. 
Before I close this introduction, I would like to mention two points regarding 
my reference to Ibn Arabi’s ultimate reality. First, throughout my thesis, I will use the 
terms ultimate reality and God interchangeably. I will use the term ‘God’ specifically, 
however, when I refer to Ibn Arabi’s concept ilah, which is clearly an Arabic 
equivalent of the English word ‘God’. 
  The second is concerned with the use of the pronoun ‘He’, as opposed to ‘It’, 
to address ultimate reality. In Arabic, there are only two singular pronouns: the 
masculine pronoun huwa, which Ibn Arabi uses to refer God, and the feminine 
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pronoun hiyya. Huwa is typically translated as ‘he’ and hiyya is typically translated as 
‘she’. However, the words huwa and hiyya also incorporate the English pronoun ‘it’ 
in relevant situations. I avoid using ‘It’ to refer to Ibn Arabi’s ultimate reality because, 
contrary to what some scholars (e.g., Izutsu) claim, I maintain that Ibn Arabi does not 
defend an impersonal concept of ultimate reality. It should also be noted that in the 
Arabic language, gender can be attributed to both objects and words. Even 
though most Islamic scholars throughout history have refrained from attributing 
gender (in an ontological, rather than purely grammatical, sense) to Allah, translators 
of the Quran and other Arabic texts use the masculine pronoun ‘He’ to refer to Allah. 
Also, Arabic linguists usually consider the words ‘Allah’ and ‘God’ to be masculine 
from a grammatical point of view. In keeping with the mainstream scholarship, I will 
use, throughout this thesis, the pronoun ‘He’ to address Ibn Arabi's ultimate reality.  
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Chapter 2: The Problem of Ibn Arabi’s 
Presentation of the Conception of 
Ultimate Reality: Speaking on 
Different Levels 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Ibn Arabi presents one of the most unique and complex conceptions of ultimate 
reality in Islamic philosophy and mysticism. In great detail he discusses the 
metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of religion that surrounds the conception. 
As Seyyed Hossein Nasr (2007) notes, ‘[w]ith Ibn ‘Arabi we […] encounter a 
complete metaphysical and cosmological, as well as psychological and 
anthropological, doctrine of monumental dimensions’ (p. 90). Unfortunately, 
however, Ibn Arabi’s presentation and discussion are ambiguous in many places. It 
can at times be confusing or even seem contradictory or incoherent. His writings have 
always been considered one of the most difficult in Islamic literature (Chittick, 2007, 
p. 1). A. E. Affifi affirms that Ibn Arabi’s writing ‘generally speaking, may be 
described as rampant, discursive and badly lacking form and cohesion’ (1964, p. xix), 
while Nasr complains that Ibn Arabi’s metaphysical writings are ‘highly condensed 
and elliptical’ (2007, p. 90). 
  In this chapter, I will examine one of the main factors underlying the obscurity 
of Ibn Arabi’s conception of ultimate reality, in particular related to its presentation. 
In his discussion of ultimate reality, Ibn Arabi occasionally adopts an idiosyncratic 
form of presentation in which he speaks on different levels in order to meet different 
levels of comprehension of ultimate reality. 
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   In section 2.2, I introduce Ibn Arabi’s unique way of discussing the topic of 
ultimate reality at different levels. Ibn Arabi places Muslims (as well as Islamic 
schools and traditions) on four levels according to their ability to comprehend the 
conception of ultimate reality: common Muslims, theologians, the elite people of 
Allah, and the highest elite. Correspondingly, Ibn Arabi presents the conception of 
ultimate reality according to these levels. In section 2.3 I outline two reasons why Ibn 
Arabi’s form of presentation is problematic. The first is that Ibn Arabi presents the 
different levels from a first-person point of view and (or) in approving language, 
which makes identifying his own doctrine very difficult. The second is that there is an 
apparent conflict between the distinct levels of comprehension provided by Ibn Arabi, 
yet in the text he appears to adopt all of them. In section 2.4 I maintain that Ibn 
Arabi’s inclusive theory offers a philosophical justification for his multi-level 
presentation. In section 2.5 I propose some guidelines for distinguishing Ibn Arabi’s 
own unique views on ultimate reality from those that belong to the different levels and 
schools that are presented in his writings. 
2.2 Four Levels of Discourse 
Ibn Arabi upholds that people (as well as schools and traditions) vary in the way they 
comprehend the topic of ultimate reality. Accordingly, Ibn Arabi speaks on four 
different levels in introducing the topic of ultimate reality. The four-level scale is 
presented in the introduction to Ibn Arabi’s monumental book al-Futuhat al-
Makkiyya. After introducing what appear to be his own personal Islamic beliefs, Ibn 
Arabi (2011) says: 
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This is the creed [aqidah] of the common Muslims [the first level] […]. Then, 
I will introduce, Allah willing, the creed of the nashi’ah and shadiah [the 
creed of the theologians—the second level] […]. After that I [will introduce] 
the creed of the elite people of Allah [the third level] […]. However, with 
regard to the creed of the highest elite [the fourth level], it is above all of that. 
I have scattered the views belonging to this creed [implicitly] in various places 
within [the pages of] this book. [Because of its profoundness,] most minds fail 
to comprehend it (Vol. 1, p.65). 
 
It is important to note that the four-level categorisation discussed above is not the only 
one developed by Ibn Arabi with regard to the different levels of comprehending the 
conception of ultimate reality. In fact, he talks about other categorisations and offers 
other, rather unclear, methods of classification. For instance, the categorisation 
considered here does not seem to include Islamic philosophers, whom Ibn Arabi on 
other occasions appears to place on a higher level than the theologians regarding some 
ideas about the concept of God, yet lower than the mystics (Ibid., p. 364). In addition, 
in the categorisation above, Ibn Arabi divides the mystics into two levels (the third 
and the fourth); however, in other categorisations, he divides them into three (Ibid., 
p.100) and sometimes into four different levels (Ibid., p.181). Here I wish to focus on 
the four-level scale as Ibn Arabi endorses this in the introduction of his book and 
discusses it in detail. In addition, it is probably the most comprehensive scale and is 
sufficient in serving the aims of this chapter. 
 In what follows, I introduce the four levels to show how Ibn Arabi presents the 
topic of ultimate reality in these terms. 
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2.2.1. The First Level: The Level of Common Muslims  
The first level that Ibn Arabi discusses with regard to the conception of God is 
probably, more or less, identical to the creed of the early generations of 
Islampeople who have been called, in the Islamic literature, the righteous 
predecessors (al-salaf al-salih), and their followers; most notably the scholars of 
Hadith (muhaddithin). This level is also thought of as the creed of common and 
simple Muslims. 
The creed of the righteous predecessors (al-salaf al-salih) and the scholars of 
Hadith (muhaddithin) is typically distinguished by its unconcern with the theological 
questions regarding the coherence of some of the aspects of the Islamic concept of 
God. This school is known for its unconditional acceptance of what is said in the 
Quran and Hadith about God, and for its adherence to the literal and immediate 
meanings of the scriptures. For example, divine laughing, divine happiness, and 
divine descending to the Lowest Heaven every night, along with others are attributes 
of Allah according to the Quran and Hadith. Advocates of this school hold that one 
needs to believe in these attributes without the need to know how exactly God laughs 
or descends to the Lowest Heaven, and without feeling the need to justify or explain 
the coherence of (and systematic relations among) these attributes. Ibn Arabi claims 
that the righteous predecessors (al-salaf al-salih) and the scholars of Hadith 
(muhaddithin) maintain tafwid in relationship to the divine attributes, in which one 
ascribes the divine attributes to Allah, yet consign the howness (takyif) and the exact 
meanings of the attributes to Him alone. The advocates of tafwid uphold that people 
cannot understand the meanings of these attributes because any meaning we, human 
beings, could comprehend leads to seeing God as similar to people, and this threatens 
the incomparability and transcendence of God, which has also been firmly asserted in 
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the scriptures (Ibn Arabi, 2011, p. 139). I will discuss this theological doctrine further 
in Chapter Nine. 
Ibn Arabi assumes this level in several places in al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya 
that is, he speaks from this level himself. We can see this, for instance, when he 
discusses some of the divine attributes. In these cases, he sometimes espouses the 
beliefs of common Muslims or the beliefs of the righteous predecessors (al-salaf al-
salih). In one place, after referring to some of Allah’s attributes as stated in the 
scriptures, Ibn Arabi says: ‘All of this every Muslim must believe in. And, the mind 
[i.e. intellect], here, [must] not ask how or why. But rather it surrenders, submits, 
believes, without indulging in takyif’ (Ibid., Vol. 5 p. 85). He then states that ‘this was 
the way of the righteous predecessors [al-salaf al-salih], may Allah, by his grace, 
make us their successors’ (Ibid., p. 85). It is important to note that here Ibn Arabi 
appears to advocate the creed of the righteous predecessors (al-salaf al-salih) and 
even prays to Allah to make him their rightful successor. 
2.2.2. The Second Level: The Level of the Theologians  
The second level, according to the four-level scale, is the level of the theologians. 
There have been a number of different Islamic theological schools throughout history. 
The two prominent schools were those of Ash’arite and Mu’tazila. 14  These two 
schools are known to have endorsed the science of discourse (ilm al-kalam), a system 
of logic and reasoning in which Islamic theologians attempt to defend, justify, and 
rationalise some Islamic beliefs, primarily the Islamic concept of God. 15  
                                                        
14 For more discussions of Ash’arite and the Mu’tazila theological schools see: R. M. 
Frank (1978); O. Leaman (1985); P. Adamson (2003); G. Hourani (2007) and M. 
Campanini (2012).  
15 For further discussion of kalam and Islamic theology in general see: D. B. 
Macdonald (1903); P. Morewedge (1979); W. Montgomery Watt (1985); W. 
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Accordingly, they have a different attitude to how to understand the concept of God 
and divine attributes mentioned above as compared to the first level. I will examine 
their approaches to the Islamic concept of God and divine attributes further in Chapter 
Nine. 
 In presenting the topic of ultimate reality on the level of theologians, Ibn Arabi 
sometimes appears to adopt some of their theological views, methodology and 
terminology. In the introduction to al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya, for example, he offers a 
treatise that presents the concept of God according to one of the Islamic theological 
discourses (probably according to the Ash’arite school), immediately after presenting 
the concept of God according to the creed of common Muslims (i.e., first level) (Ibn 
Arabi, 2011, Vol. 1, pp. 65–68). In addition, when he addresses in his writings some 
of the theological debates among the Islamic theological schools, which he frequently 
does, he occasionally appears to support the views of one school over another; for 
instance, contrary to the Ash’arite school, he sides with the Mu’tazila school, which 
claims that the divine attributes are not something additional to the Divine Self (dhat) 
(Ibid., pp. 248–249). 
2.2.3. The Third Level: The Level of the Elite People of Allah 
Ibn Arabi maintains that the third and fourth levels represent the views of the Islamic 
mystical tradition. On the third level, he presents the thesis of ultimate reality 
according to what he calls ‘the elite people of Allah’ (Ibid., pp. 68–78). Here, he 
introduces unique views on metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of religion 
with regard to the conception of ultimate reality. In particular, we encounter some of 
the key concepts in his thesis of ultimate reality, such as the concept of the Divine 
                                                                                                                                                              
Madelung (1985); J. Pavlin (1996); M. Abdel Haleem (2001); A. J. Wensinck (2008) 
and O. Leaman (2011). 
 32 
Self (dhat) and the concept of God (ilah). Both of these will be examined in detail in 
Chapters Eight and Nine. We also encounter in this level (or the fourth level) Ibn 
Arabi’s well-known thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). I examine 
this thesis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Note, however, that Ibn Arabi discusses 
many views of the mystical tradition in detail throughout his writings, but it is not 
easy to determine which views should be ascribed to this level (i.e., the level of the 
elite people of Allah) as opposed to the fourth level (i.e., the level of the highest elite). 
The two levels seem to overlap rather frequently. 
2.2.4. The Fourth Level: The Level of the Highest Elite 
The views belonging to the fourth level are given in ambiguous language and are 
dispersed throughout Ibn Arabi’s al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya (and other works), as Ibn 
Arabi confirms (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 1, p. 65). Yet we can arguably detect views 
presented on this level by identifying passages of his book that are expressed in a 
typical mystical language or introduce typical mystical ideas. For example, in one of 
his mystical poems Ibn Arabi states: ‘If I say: I am, but a god and He is me, [then] He 
will be unknown. Because I am ignorant of who I am, and He is me; so, what [should] 
we do?’ (Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 526). In another context, he writes: ‘If it had not been for the 
existence of the Real [al- haqq] within creation, there would not have been anything’ 
(Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 393). He then comments: 
 
This is the level of unification that no one is [ever] free from, especially the 
knowers of Allah who know the situation as it is, yet still they [explicitly] state 
what they know […] However, the people of reasoning [i.e. philosophers] say 
this is impossible because the two selves [dhatayn] would have been one, 
which [they claim] is impossible. [However] we [mystics or saints], and 
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people like us, see [in existence only] one Self [and] not two. (Ibn Arabi, 
2011, Vol. 6, p. 393). 
 
One should note that, as mentioned above, it is not easy to distinguish the views of the 
third level from that of the fourth as they frequently overlap. In addition, when it is 
possible to distinguish the two levels from each other, they, unlike the two first levels, 
appear in most cases complementary and compatible. It seems though that most of the 
metaphysical views and concepts belonging to the mystical tradition are presented in 
the third level, while most of its mystical views and concepts are presented in the 
fourth level. 
2.3 A Problematic Style 
Ibn Arabi’s multi-level presentation of the topic of ultimate reality can be problematic 
and even obscure because of two reasons. First, Ibn Arabi tends to present the views 
of all the levels in first person and (or) in approving language, so much so that one 
could conclude from isolated quotes that Ibn Arabi belongs to all of the four levels 
and the schools and traditions he addresses. In fact, some scholars have wrongly 
concluded that Ibn Arabi belongs to the Ash’arite school, such as the great historian 
Salah al-Din Khalil ibn Aybak al-Safadi (1297–1363) who states that ‘[h]e [i.e., Ibn 
Arabi] introduced his creed [in the introduction of al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya] and I 
found it from the beginning to the end [to be identical with] Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari’s 
creed’ (2000, Vol. 4, p. 125). However, most of the schools which Ibn Arabi might 
appear to embody (the Ash’arite school included) do not actually represent his own 
unique views on ultimate reality, as will be explained below. Hence, Ibn Arabi’s 
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adoption of these views in his discussions makes his presentation difficult and 
misleading.  
In addition, in some places, Ibn Arabi does not even mention the fact that he 
speaks on different levels. Occasionally, he will assume one level or another without 
mentioning the existence of others, sometimes for practical purposes and at other 
times for reasons that are less clear. In one place, for example, he asserts that if an 
Islamic philosopher were to ask him a particular question, he would answer him in a 
way that suits the philosopher (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 3, p. 185). After this he states a 
potential answer to the Islamic philosopher, saying that ‘this is the way to answer 
such a questioner. As for each questioner, there is an appropriate answer for him [in 
particular]’ (Ibid., p. 185). We may note that Ibn Arabi considers the level of the 
person who asks a question when determining the level of discourse he will adopt in 
his answer to him, and never gives away that his answer, as such, is only relative and 
one among many other possible answers. In another place, Ibn Arabi discusses a 
matter relating to the topic of ultimate reality and provides a mystical answer. He 
states that he was asked about the same issue by the mufti of Hijaz (the region that 
includes Mecca and Medina), but that he gave the mufti a different answer. He 
explains: ‘We did not tell him [the mystical answer] because he would not have borne 
it […] and it would have bewildered him. […] Therefore, we showed him facets [of 
the issue] that suited his cognitive abilities’ (Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 217). Again, Ibn Arabi 
changes the answer to meet the needs and cognitive abilities of the one who asks. 
Hence, two people might be given two completely different, probably incompatible, 
answers to the same question; both of which come from Ibn Arabi on different 
occasions. Each one may thus conclude that the answer given to him represents Ibn 
Arabi’s own stance on the subject. 
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It might have been practical for Ibn Arabi to adopt different levels of speech to 
reach out to different types of audience. But this habit means that his own unique 
thesis of ultimate reality is at best unclear.  
The second reason for seeing Ibn Arabi’s method of adopting different levels 
of discourse as problematic is that the different views that he assumes appear to 
contradict each other at times. For instance, the Mu’tazilah’s doctrine on the concept 
of God (the second level) contrasts in several respects with the doctrine of the 
righteous predecessors (al-salaf al-salih)— the first level. However, Ibn Arabi does 
not seem to be concerned with solving these inconsistencies and the reader is left with 
several contrasting doctrines presented on the different levels. Although he appears at 
times to favour views of one or more level over the others, this is not always the case 
and he never says that the others are incorrect. On the contrary, his distinctive habit of 
adopting the views of all the schools indicates that he actually embraces them. 
2.4. Ibn Arabi’s Justification for Speaking on Different 
Levels 
 
Ibn Arabi’s justification for his idiosyncratic form of presentation stems from his 
stance that all Islamic traditions and creeds on ultimate reality are correct in one sense 
or another. We encountered above the story of the mufti whom Ibn Arabi answers in a 
way that ‘suits the mufti’s cognitive abilities’, which was different from Ibn Arabi’s 
mystical answer to the same question. He justifies this as follows: ‘[The given 
answer] is correct [as well]. There is no facet [when it comes to the beliefs of God] 
that is not correct (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 7, p. 217). Elsewhere, after a theological 
discussion of some views on an aspect of the Ash’arite theology, he says: 
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Our way is not based on this; I mean [not] on objecting to or disputing [the 
theologians]. Instead, our way [aims] to show [from whence] a school [gets its 
views] […] and what was manifested to it, and whether that would affect its 
salvation or not […] So, we [the people of Allah] do not occupy ourselves 
with objecting to any one of the servants of Allah. On the contrary, we might 
develop excuse[s] for them based on the divine vastness (Ibn Arabi, 2011, 
Vol. 1, pp. 309–310). 
 
Ibn Arabi’s tolerance of the views of different traditions with regard to ultimate 
reality is based upon two underlying aspects of his doctrine, one metaphysical and the 
other epistemic. 
 Metaphysically speaking, Ibn Arabi’s all-embracing attitude is based upon his 
view of the divine vastness, which has room for the beliefs of all the Islamic 
traditions. God is so vast that each of the different Islamic doctrines represented by 
the different philosophical, theological and mystical schools reflects but only one 
aspect of Him. Thus, ‘there is no facet [when it comes to the beliefs of God] that is 
not true’ (Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 217). 
 Epistemically speaking, on the other hand, knowing the Real (al- haqq)and 
knowing in generalfor Ibn Arabi depends heavily on the mean or the channel 
through which knowledge is obtained. Knowledge of ultimate reality hence varies as a 
consequence of the epistemological differences between the routes to gaining 
knowledge; the conceptions of Him held by different Islamic schools and traditions 
partially reflect this variation. I will discuss this issue further in Chapter Nine. So, Ibn 
Arabi’s own underlying metaphysics and epistemology of ultimate reality warrant his 
tolerance and respect for the validity and truth of all the Islamic schools and sects.  
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Ibn Arabi’s stance here, I maintain, is better interpreted as a form of 
inclusivism within Islam as a contrast to his intra-inclusivism, which will be 
introduced in Chapter Nine. In using the phrase ‘inclusivism within Islam’, I wish to 
indicate Ibn Arabi’s stance towards the different Islamic sects and schools. By ‘intra-
inclusivism’ I mean Ibn Arabi’s stance towards other religions and religious 
traditions.  
There are four reasons that Ibn Arabi’s stance towards other Islamic schools 
and sects can be called inclusivism. First, Ibn Arabi displays tolerance and acceptance 
towards the different Islamic traditions. He seems to believe that salvation can be 
obtained through any of the Islamic traditions. Second, despite his tolerance towards 
the different Islamic schools and sects he still prioritises the doctrine of the mystical 
tradition over any and all other schools. He unequivocally favours the mystical 
tradition when it comes to the truthfulness and amount of knowledge of God, of 
which the mystical tradition obtains the highest and most accurate, according to him 
(Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 1, pp. 139–140). Third, despite his occasional endorsement of 
the views of other Islamic schools, Ibn Arabi always places himself within the 
mystical tradition, as he introduces himself solely as a mystic or a saint (wali). Fourth, 
besides giving precedence to the mystical tradition, Ibn Arabi occasionally 
undermines and dismisses the views of other Islamic schools and traditions as inferior 
to the mystical tradition. He sometimes criticises the theological and philosophical 
schools openly and rather harshly (see for example, Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 5, p. 120). 
He dismisses their knowledge of God as defective (Ibid., 2011, Vol. 4, p. 227), and 
says that it is only true relatively, if at all (Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 309–310). Even the 
knowledge of a follower of the creed of the righteous predecessors (al-salaf al-salih), 
whose views Ibn Arabi seems to be very tolerant towards, is inferior compared to the 
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knowledge of mystics (Ibn Arabi, Vol. 1, pp. 139–140). All these four points seems to 
suggest that Ibn Arabi’s stance is a form of inclusivism. 
 To sum up, Ibn Arabi belongs to the mystical tradition, which he claims holds 
the most accurate knowledge of ultimate reality. The knowledge of the other Islamic 
schools and traditions, though less valuable than the knowledge of the mystical 
tradition, remains, at least relatively, true.  
 
2.5. Ibn Arabi’s Own Doctrine: A Practical Guide 
In the midst of these various levels and schools found in Ibn Arabi’s writings, 
additional to his problematic style of presentation, one might wonder which of the 
views and levels is Ibn Arabi’s own. A reader who is not familiar with Ibn Arabi’s 
way of writing might find it difficult to distinguish his own views on a given 
subjectIn fact, even his experts can feel lost or confused at times. Affifi rightly states 
that ‘[o]ne has to do so much hunting through other books by Ibnul ‘Arabi besides the 
Fusus, so much analysing and synthesising and gathering relevant points scattered 
haphazardly amongst masses of trivial or irrelevant details, before one can arrive at 
anything like a system’ (1964, p. xi). In this section, hence, I propose some guidelines 
to help in determining Ibn Arabi’s own views on ultimate reality from those of the 
schools and traditions he appears to endorse (and even occasionally adopt) to help in 
the endeavour to construct a systematic interpretation of his thesis of ultimate reality. 
 Once we see that Ibn Arabi is an inclusivist who belongs to the mystical 
tradition in particular, we are better placed to identify his own views. To begin with, 
one should consider the views that Ibn Arabi attributes to the mystical tradition as his 
own. Here, of course, I mean the views of the mystical tradition that he either 
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develops in approving language or presents as his own in the first person. Among 
other things, Ibn Arabi calls the mystical tradition ‘the tradition’ or ‘the sect’ (al-
ta’ifah) (see for example, Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 2, p. 283) and its followers the people 
of Allah (ahl Allah), the mystics or saints (al-awliya), or our companions (ashabuna) 
(see for example: Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 421, 230, 395). Furthermore, by the mystical 
tradition I mean the main tradition (i.e., the sainthood tradition, wilayah) and not the 
small mystical sub-sects and groups that he identifies using their unique names. 
   Occasionally, Ibn Arabi would introduce the view of the mystical tradition on 
a given issue in opposition to the views of other schools and traditions. For example, 
he would say that the view of the theologians in this matter is such and such, and the 
view of the mystics is such and such. In these cases, his own view, of course, should 
be the one he attributes to the mystics. However, this is not always the case. He 
sometimes mentions disagreements or differences within the mystical tradition, or 
different levels within the mystical tradition. On one occasion he even states that ‘the 
people of Allah’ (a term he typically uses to indicate the mystics) agree with him on 
an issue (Ibid., p. 208), which insinuates that his own doctrine is not entirely identical 
with the tradition of ‘the people of Allah’. So how can we determine his own views 
on such occasions? 
 When he highlights some disagreement or exposes differences among the 
views of the mystics, he tends to add either his endorsement of one view over the 
others or his independent personal view on the matter. There are some helpful 
indicators on such occasions. Notably, he tends to use some particular phrases that 
indicate his own position as opposed to other positions within the mystical tradition. 
For example, he may use the phrase ‘as for our doctrine’ (madhhabuna) or ‘as for us’ 
to oppose the views of other mystics. Furthermore, when he presents contrasting 
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views on different levels, all of which attributed to the mystics, his view is most 
probably the one that belongs to the highest level, as he always places himself (among 
very few other mystics) at the highest level of mysticism.  
It is important, however, to note that distinguishing Ibn Arabi’s own views 
from the views of other mystics is not always so straightforward. Sometimes he only 
provides one view and attributes it to the mystical tradition without mentioning any 
disagreement among the mystics on the matter. The reader might naturally conclude 
that this view is Ibn Arabi’s own (considering that it is the view of the mystical 
tradition). However, Ibn Arabi may consider other views of the mystical tradition on 
the same matter elsewhere. This challenges even experienced readers. For instance, 
with regard to the divine attributes, he repeatedly affirms that they are ‘relationships’ 
(nisab), and attributes this view to the mystical tradition without mentioning any other 
views held by the mystics on the matter (see for example, Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 1, p. 
71). Hence, one might reach the conclusion that Ibn Arabi himself advocates this 
position. However, on another occasion Ibn Arabi displays dislike for this view and 
proposes that divine attributes should be called ‘divine names’ instead, following the 
scriptures, which never uses the term ‘relationships’ (nisab) (Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 14). 
Hence, in attempting to identify Ibn Arabi’s own views, one should be careful and 
thorough to make sure that he does not introduce other views belonging to the 
mystical tradition somewhere else. 
  Furthermore, Ibn Arabi’s inclusivism warrants that, in order to identify his 
own views, one should dismiss views that belong to other traditions and schools when 
they differ from the mystical tradition. This remains the case even if he appears to 
adopt those views. Of course, his tendency to use the first person and approving 
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language when discussing the views of other schools or traditions is purely for 
practical reasons, as we have seen. 
Finally, there are other views that Ibn Arabi does not explicitly attribute to the 
mystical tradition or the dismissed schools and sects. Nevertheless, he introduces 
these views in approving language and defends them as his own in the first person. A 
good example is his assertion that existence is not a property of the object. He defends 
this position firmly, and yet does not attribute this view to the mystical tradition or to 
any other school or tradition that he considers (Ibn Arabi, 2009b, pp. 140–141). Thus, 
it seems reasonable to attribute such views to Ibn Arabi’s doctrine. Again, one should 
be careful, however, in identifying Ibn Arabi’s views as such, because he might not 
attribute a view to a particular school every time he discusses it. Occasionally, he may 
choose to present a view with no attribution, even though he attributes it to a 
particular school elsewhere. For instance, in discussing the Ash’arite position on the 
ontology of the divine attributes (i.e., that the divine attributes are additional entities 
to the Divine Self), he sometimes explicitly attributes this position to the Ash’arite 
school (see for instance, Ibn Arabi 2011, Vol. 1, pp. 70–71). However, at other times 
he presents the same position without attributing it to any school in particular (see for 
instance, Ibid., pp. 213–214). Hence, when one identifies a view that Ibn Arabi does 
not accredit to any school, before attributing it to Ibn Arabi it should be clear that he 
does not attribute it to a particular school elsewhere. 
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2.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined Ibn Arabi’s idiosyncratic way of speaking on 
different levels. I introduced the four levels according to which he presents the 
conception of ultimate reality. They are the level of common Muslims; the level of 
theologians; the level of the elite people of Allah and the level of the highest elite. I 
argued that his way of speaking on different levels is highly problematic because the 
views of the different levels are at times incompatible with each other, and yet he 
presents all of them from a first-person point of view and (or) in approving language. 
I also highlighted some potential justifications for Ibn Arabi’s mode of presentation. I 
claimed that his theory of inclusivism towards the different Islamic schools and sects 
might justify his style. Finally, I proposed that in order to identify Ibn Arabi’s own 
views on any given topic and on the conception of ultimate reality in particular, one 
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should follow four steps. First, one should begin by considering any view that he 
attributes to the mystical tradition as Ibn Arabi’s own view on the subject. Second, 
when there is a dispute within the mystical tradition one should look for the views that 
he endorses or his personal view that he develops with the help of some keywords 
such as, ‘as for our doctrine’ (madhhabuna) and ‘as for us’. Third, unless they are 
identical with the views of the mystical tradition, one should discard all the views that 
Ibn Arabi attributes to any other Islamic school or sect. Fourth, where he develops a 
view from a first-person point of view and (or) in an approving language and never 
attributes it to any school or tradition, one should consider such views Ibn Arabi’s 
own views. 
In the following chapter, I critically examine two prominent approaches to Ibn 
Arabi’s doctrine, those developed by Toshihiko Izutsu and William C. Chittick. In his 
interpretive approach, Izutsu argues that Ibn Arabi’s ontology is entirely explained in 
terms of his concept of divine self-manifestation (tajalli). On the other hand, Chittick 
attempts to reduce Ibn Arabi’s ontology to mysticism and epistemology. I argue, 
however, that both interpretations are unsuccessful as they are exegetically inaccurate. 
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Chapter 3: A Critical Evaluation of 
Izutsu and Chittick’s Overall 
Approaches to Ibn Arabi’s Doctrine 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined Ibn Arabi’s idiosyncratic style when introducing 
the conception of ultimate reality. As we have seen, Ibn Arabi tends to speak on 
different levels to represent a variety of understandings of ultimate reality. I argued, 
however, that of the different schools and levels that he adopts in his writings, only 
the mystical tradition actually represents Ibn Arabi’s own doctrine. He adopts views 
that belong to the various other schools and levels only for practical purposes. Ibn 
Arabi’s seemingly peculiar style of presentation is philosophically justified by his 
theory of inclusivism within Islam. Furthermore, towards the end of the last chapter, I 
proposed some guidelines to help distinguish Ibn Arabi’s personal views from those 
that belong to other schools and traditions found in his writings. 
Many scholars throughout history have developed various interpretations of 
Ibn Arabi’s views. This chapter will critically examine two of the prominent 
contemporary interpretations of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine, one developed by Toshihiko 
Izutsu and the other by William C. Chittick.  
Section 3.2 consists of an examination of Izutsu’s interpretive approach to Ibn 
Arabi’s doctrine; this interpretation refers primarily to Ibn Arabi’s concept of divine 
self-manifestation (tajalli). According to Izutsu, Ibn Arabi’s ontology is fully 
incorporated in terms of this concept (i.e. tajalli); everything that exists is divided 
between the unmanifested Absolute on the one hand and its self-manifestations on the 
other. However, I argue that Izutsu’s understanding of Ibn Arabi’s concept of self-
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manifestation (tajalli), and its relationship to Ibn Arabi’s ontology, is inaccurate. I 
assert that the concept of divine self-manifestation indicates a relationship between 
two parties rather than a one-sided process. There is an epistemic aspect, essential to 
the concept, which is noticeably absent from Izutsu’s presentation. Furthermore, 
contrary to Izutsu’s claim, Ibn Arabi’s ontology cannot be fully incorporated into the 
concept of self-manifestation (tajalli). Thus, considering that he depends almost 
solely on this concept in his interpretation, Izutsu omits a number of Ibn Arabi’s 
important concepts and theories.  
 Section 3.3, examines Chittick’s main approach to Ibn Arabi’s doctrine. 
Chittick, in his major writings, is reluctant to propose any interpretation of Ibn Arabi 
and strives to present him as he presents himself. However, one could argue that he 
has failed to avoid interpretation, as he attempts to reduce Ibn Arabi’s ontology to 
mysticism and epistemology, which seems a form of interpretation. He does this by 
targeting Ibn Arabi’s concept of wujud, which is probably the most important and 
influential concept in Ibn Arabi’s doctrine.  I argue, however, that Chittick’s 
interpretation is based upon a semantic error and is exegetically problematic. Contrary 
to Chittick’s claim, ‘existence’ is the literal and everyday meaning of the Arabic term 
wujud, and is the most relevant interpretation with regard to Ibn Arabi’s usage of the 
term.  
 My focus in this chapter is on the overall interpretive approaches of Izutsu and 
Chittick. There are a number of other issues within their interpretations that might be 
considered problematic, and some of these will be addressed in other chapters. 
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3.2 Against Izutsu’s Interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s Doctrine 
 
3.2.1. Izutsu’s Interpretive Approach  
 
In his celebrated book Sufism and Taoism: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical 
Concepts (1984), Toshihiko Izutsu develops a seminal interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s 
doctrine, focusing on his ontology in particular. Izutsu bases his whole interpretation 
on Ibn Arabi’s concept of ‘divine self-manifestation’ (tajalli). He states:  
 
[T]ajalli [i.e., divine self-manifestation] is the pivotal point of Ibn Arabi’s 
thought. Indeed the concept of tajalli is the very basis of his world-view. All his 
thinking about the ontological structure of the world turns around this axis, and 
by so doing develops into the grand-scale cosmic system. No part of his world-
view is understandable without reference to this central concept. His entire 
philosophy is, in short, a theory of tajalli (p. 152). 
 
Accordingly, he proposes the following structure of Ibn Arabi’s ontology. On the one 
hand, there is the Absolute in its absoluteness, prior to any manifestation. On the 
other, there are its four self-manifestations: the Absolute manifested as God; the 
Absolute manifested as Lord; the Absolute manifested as half-spiritual/half-material; 
and the Absolute manifested as the sensible world (Ibid., p. 20). 16 
Izutsu maintains that the Absolute in its absoluteness is encapsulated by Ibn 
Arabi’s concepts of dhat (which Izutsu translates as ‘essence’). He describes the 
Absolute as sheer and unlimited existence, ‘Being qua Being’, unknown and 
unknowable, the source of all manifestations and the ultimate metaphysical ground of 
                                                        
16 Because I am discussing Izutsu’s interpretation here, in this section I follow Izutsu 
in referring to Ibn Arabi’s ultimate reality with the pronoun ‘it’ instead of ‘He’.  
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everything there is (Izutsu, 1984, pp. 20, 23, 25). Its four self-manifestations 
encompass everything else, including the spiritual and material, the visible and 
invisible.  
For Izutsu, Ibn Arabi’s concept of God should not be considered identical with 
his concept of ultimate reality per se, but instead should be seen as a manifestation of 
ultimate reality. He states: 
 
That is why even God (Allah) itself which in Islam generally maintains its 
uncontested position is given here only a secondary place. As we shall see 
presently, God is a ‘phenomenal’, i.e., self-manifesting, form assumed by 
Something still more primordial, the Absolute Being (Izutsu, 1984, p. 19). 
 
Izutsu maintains that the only significance of ultimate reality manifested as God over 
the other manifestations is that God as such is a very early manifestation. Hence, the 
manifestation of God is close to the Absolute in its absoluteness when compared to 
the other manifestations. Izutsu states that ‘[p]roperly speaking, in the name of Allah 
[i.e., the concept of God] we should see the self-manifestation (tajalli) of this Mystery 
[the Absolute in its absoluteness] already at work, although, to be sure it is the first 
beginning of the process’ (Ibid., p. 27).  
 
3.2.2. Problems with Izutsu’s Interpretation 
 
There are two main problems with Izutsu’s interpretive approach to Ibn Arabi’s 
doctrine. The first problem is Izutsu’s misunderstanding of Ibn Arabi’s concept of 
divine self-manifestations (tajalli) and the second problem concerns the narrowness of 
Izutsu’s interpretive approach to Ibn Arabi’s wider doctrine.  
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 Izutsu claims that Ibn Arabi’s concept of divine self-manifestation (tajalli) 
indicates the phenomenon in which the Absolute leaves its absoluteness and enters 
into limitation and determination to formulate itself as one of the various limited 
forms that exist (Izutsu, 1984, p. 152). According to him, all divine self-
manifestations (tajalli) are no more than various forms of self-determination, 
irrespective of any other external factor. He states: 
 
Tajalli is the process by which the Absolute, which is absolutely unknowable 
in itself, goes on manifesting itself in ever more concrete forms. Since this 
self-manifestation of the Absolute can not be actualized except through 
particular, determined forms, the self- manifestation of the Absolute is nothing 
other than a self-determination or self-delamination of the Absolute (Ibid., p. 
152).  
 
This, I maintain, does not accurately represent Ibn Arabi’s own conception of divine 
self-manifestation (tajalli). For Ibn Arabi, tajalli indicates a relationship rather than a 
one-sided process (i.e., self-determination); it is the relationship between the ultimate 
reality that reveals Himself and the one who perceives this revelation. Ibn Arabi 
explicitly affirms that self-manifestation (tajalli) requires two sides (2011, Vol. 2, p. 
452). The two sides, I maintain, correspond to two aspects of the divine self-
manifestation (tajalli); one is ontological, and the other is epistemic. Izutsu’s 
interpretation correctly represents the ontological aspect, which indicates the self-
determination of ultimate reality. The epistemic aspect, on the other hand, represents 
the perception of the divine self-determination. Each of the two aspects are necessary 
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conditions for any divine self-manifestation (tajalli); together, however, they form the 
sufficient conditions for a divine self-manifestation (tajalli). 
Hence, Ibn Arabi tends to associate his concept of divine self-manifestation 
(tajalli) with another epistemic concept: shuhud (or mushahadah), which indicates the 
religious and mystical witnessing of God. It seems that self-manifestation (tajalli) and 
witnessing (shuhud) are two sides of the same phenomenon (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 2, 
p. 339). The phenomenon in question is both a self-manifestation (when considered 
from God’s perspective) and witnessing (when considered from the human 
perspective). Whenever there is a self-manifestation (tajalli), there is witnessing 
(shuhud), and vice versa. Epistemology, therefore, is essential to the concept of divine 
self-manifestation (tajalli) rather than just an accidental outcome of it or a motivation 
for it. Izutsu seems to fail to recognise this.17  
It is not accurate, then, to claim, as Izutsu does, that any limited existent (e.g., 
physical world) is necessarily and unconditionally a divine self-manifestation 
regardless of all else. It is only a divine self-manifestation if there is someone to 
witness (shuhud) God through it. Limited existents are not divine self-manifestations 
to anyone who does not witness God through them. That said, considering that 
ultimate reality is identical to existence, according to Ibn Arabi, He may be witnessed 
(shuhud) in everything, including the physical world. This idea can be illustrated 
using the following analogy: let us say that a friend of mine is lost in the forest and a 
search party is formed to find him. During the search, I notice a particular rock under 
a tree placed in a particular position. Let us say that because of an old game we used 
                                                        
17  Izutsu believes that even though divine self-manifestation (tajalli) is a purely 
ontological matter, there is an epistemic motivation behind it. The reason for this is 
that ultimate reality wants to be known. He states that ‘[s]ince, according to the 
Tradition, the hidden treasure’ unveils itself because it ‘desires to be known’, self-
manifestation must mean nothing other than the absolute becoming knowable and 
known’ (1984, p. 32).   
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to play I know that it is the missing friend who has placed the rock in this way in 
order to help me find him. Ontologically speaking, this rock is intrinsically a physical 
item to everyone in the search party. However, epistemically speaking, only I can 
obtain specific information from seeing this rock. Its epistemic significance is 
conceived only by me. In other words, my missing friend is manifesting himself to me 
alone through this rock. The rock is not a manifestation of my friend to anyone else in 
the search party.  
A similar thing could be said about the physical world, for instance, in terms 
of God’s self-manifestations (tajalliat, sing. tajalli). Ontologically speaking, the 
physical world is intrinsically physical to everyone. However, epistemically speaking, 
and according to Ibn Arabi, God manifests Himself through it to specific people. 
Witnessing (mushahadah) God through the physical world, Ibn Arabi notes, is not 
very common as it is mostly mystics who witness God through possible entities (Ibn 
Arabi, 2011, Vol. 6, p. 357).  
Izutsu fails to acknowledge the epistemic aspect that is necessary for the 
concept of divine self-manifestation, leaving his interpretation incomplete. Apparently 
this mistake led Izutsu to his inaccurate representation of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine in 
which he has treated every entity in in Ibn Arabi’s ontology as a manifestation. 
 Even if we ignore the inaccuracy of Izutsu’s understanding of Ibn Arabi’s 
concept of divine self-manifestation (tajalli), his approach still appears to be 
problematic. His interpretation attempts to force Ibn Arabi’s whole doctrine into his 
concept of divine self-manifestation (tajalli). This causes two difficulties. First, 
despite great efforts to make his interpretive scheme exhaustive, Izutsu necessarily 
omits many elements of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine. Ibn Arabi’s doctrine is far more 
comprehensive than his concept of self-manifestation (tajalli). For instance, Izutsu’s 
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interpretation fails to do justice to Ibn Arabi’s theories of the metaphysics of the 
world. Among many other related topics, Ibn Arabi discusses the metaphysics of 
merely possible entities and actual entities, and he describes the relationships among 
them and between them and God. This is examined in detail in Chapter Six of this 
thesis. It is implausible that such topics as these can be examined thoroughly when 
one maintains that Ibn Arabi’s whole ontology is merely that of divine self-
manifestations (tajalli). It is inconceivable to structure Ibn Arabi’s varied ontological 
views and theories as sub-categories of tajalli.  
Second, Izutsu seems to include in his interpretation a number of issues which 
do not clearly belong to the concept of divine self-manifestation (tajalli) per se. For 
instance, he claims that the theistic concept of God indicates a divine self-
manifestation in which ultimate reality manifests itself to itself. This divine self-
manifestation means the self-awareness of ultimate reality (Izutsu, 1984, p. 154). 
This, however, is inaccurate. Ibn Arabi explicitly affirms that a thing cannot manifest 
itself to itself (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 2, p. 338). This is in line with my interpretation 
of Ibn Arabi’s concept of divine self-manifestation (tajalli) presented above. As I 
have explained, Ibn Arabi emphasises that self-manifestation (tajalli) is a relationship 
that requires two parties. Accordingly, without someone to witness God’s self-
determination, there cannot be any self-manifestation (tajalli). In addition, contrary to 
Izutsu’s claim, Ibn Arabi states that ultimate reality’s self-awareness is obtained at the 
stage of ahdiyyah, which Izutsu identifies with the Absolute in its absoluteness prior 
to any manifestation (Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 227). Ultimate reality’s self-awareness is 
therefore not a manifestation according to Izutsu’s own interpretation of the concept.  
This should not be confused with Ibn Arabi’s occasional assertion that God 
never manifests Himself except to Himself (Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 102). On such occasions, 
 52 
Ibn Arabi is alluding to his thesis of the oneness of existence (which will be discussed 
in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven). According to this consideration, Ibn Arabi ignores 
the diversity and plurality of reality and focuses only upon what he claims to be the 
unity of existence, which is identical with ultimate reality. In this sense, ultimate 
reality cannot manifest Himself to anything other than Himself, as He is the whole 
existence. This is radically different from what Izutsu says about the concept of God 
as a manifestation.  
In short, Izutsu has based his interpretation on a misunderstanding of Ibn 
Arabi’s concept of divine self-manifestations (tajalli) and its place in his doctrine. 
Taking these issues into consideration, I conclude that Izutsu’s interpretation of Ibn 
Arabi’s doctrine is unsuccessful. 
It may be helpful to mention that the problems surrounding Izutsu’s 
interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine might be due to the fact that it is almost solely 
based on Fusus al-Hikam (and Abdul Razzaq al-Qashani’s illustrative comments on 
the book). Izutsu admits:  
 
In any case, the present work [i.e., Sufism and Taoism] consists exclusively of 
an analysis of the ‘Bezels of Wisdom’ [Fusus al-Hikam] except in a few 
places where I shall refer to one of the smaller works for elucidation of some 
of the important points (1984, p. 4).   
 
Although Fusus al-Hikam is one of Ibn Arabi’s most prominent works, it is relatively 
short. As mentioned in Chapter One, Ibn Arabi discusses his doctrine extensively in 
his other works, especially his book al-Futuhat al-Makkiyyah. It should be expected 
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that if one is limited in his interpretation to Fusus, key issues from Ibn Arabi’s 
doctrine will be neglected.  
This section has focused on Izutsu’s overall interpretive approach to Ibn 
Arabi. There are a number of other issues within his interpretation that may be 
considered problematic. Some of these will be examined over the course of the 
following chapters.  
 
3.3 Against Chittick’s Interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s Doctrine 
 
3.3.1. Chittick’s Interpretive Approach 
William C. Chittick is considered one of the leading contemporary scholars of Ibn 
Arabi. His two major works, Ibn al-‘Arabi’s Metaphysics of Imagination: The Sufi 
Path of Knowledge (1989) and The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-
‘Arabi's Cosmology (1998) are among the most influential works on Ibn Arabi’s 
doctrine in the English language today. 
 It is a matter of debate whether Chittick really offers an interpretation of Ibn 
Arabi’s doctrine, especially in the two texts mentioned above. As mentioned in 
Chapter One, these are primarily translations of parts of Ibn Arabi’s major work al-
Futuhat al-Makkiyyah. The Sufi Path of Knowledge alone includes translations of 
more than 600 passages from Ibn Arabi’s al-Futuhat, and many Ibn Arabi scholars in 
the English-speaking world today depend on these two texts as a source for Ibn 
Arabi’s own works.18 Presenting Ibn Arabi without engaging in any interpretation is 
actually Chittick’s intention, as he explains in the Introduction to The Sufi Path of 
                                                        
18 Many articles in JMIAS: Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society, for instance 
depend on parts of Chittick’s works as a translation of Ibn Arabi’s al-Futuhat.  
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Knowledge:  
 
In writing the book, I tried to avoid any preconceptions as to what Ibn al-
‘Arabi should be saying or what he has to offer. Instead, my goal was to 
translate or ‘carry over’ his teachings as they are actually found, mainly in the 
Futuhat [i.e., Ibn Arabi’s book, al-Futuhat al-Makkiyyah], into a language 
which does justice to his concerns, not our concerns (p. xx). 
 
As he is attempting to remain faithful to Ibn Arabi’s texts, reading Chittick’s text 
produces similar difficulties to reading Ibn Arabi directly. Some of these problems 
include the obscurity and apparent inconsistencies. For instance, in his discussion of 
the existence of the world, which Ibn Arabi defines as everything other than God, 
Chittick seems to defend on behalf of Ibn Arabi two inconsistent views on the subject.  
 On one occasion, Chittick assumes that Ibn Arabi advocates the non-existence 
of the world. He states: ‘[t]o say that the cosmos is “everything other than God” is to 
say that it is everything other than wujud [i.e., existence]’ (1998, p. 12). He goes on to 
say that anything in the cosmos could be considered mawjud (typically translated as 
‘existent’) only if one means that it is ‘found’ (another meaning of the Arabic term 
mawjud).  
 However, on another occasion Chittick appears to present the opposite view 
on behalf of Ibn Arabi. He states: 
 
In discussing Being and the various terms that are used to refer to the 
nonexistent and existent things […] we need to remind the reader that each 
thing other than God is a name of God. And since God is Being, every thing, 
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every entity, every possible thing is a name of Being (1989, p. 94)  
 
It seems that the two views are incompatible. On the one hand, Chittick seems to 
interpret that Ibn Arabi considers everything other than God to be non-existent, while 
on the other he seems to maintain that Ibn Arabi considers everything to be existent. 
This may not be totally Chittick’s fault as he perhaps endeavours to present Ibn Arabi 
as Ibn Arabi presents himself, without engaging in any attempt to resolve apparent 
inconsistencies. 
However, Chittick is not always successful in maintaining this objectivity—
refraining from interpreting Ibn Arabi’s texts. Indeed, he has developed a unique 
interpretive approach to Ibn Arabi’s doctrine. The main feature of this interpretation is 
his attempt to reduce Ibn Arabi’s ontology to mysticism and epistemology. There is 
no doubt that mysticism and epistemology are major topics in Ibn Arabi’s doctrine; 
however, Chittick does not limit himself to what are clearly, and have long been 
accepted to be, Ibn Arabi’s views regarding mysticism and epistemology. Instead, he 
asserts that Ibn Arabi is almost solely a mystic and that most of his views and 
concepts are ultimately mystical and epistemological, even those which have long 
been accepted to be metaphysical and philosophical. He states: 
  
Despite the hundreds of volumes on ontology that have been inspired by Ibn 
al-‘Arabi’s works, his main concern is not with the mental concept of being 
but with the experience of God’s Being, the tasting (dhawq) of Being, that 
‘finding’ which is at one and the same time to perceive and to be that which 
truly is (1989, p. 3). 
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In order to reduce Ibn Arabi’s ontology to mysticism and epistemology, Chittick 
targets one of the most important concepts in Ibn Arabi’s doctrine, namely the 
concept of wujud. This is a pivotal concept that concerns and colours almost every 
aspect of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine, in particular his ontology and conception of ultimate 
reality. Most of Ibn Arabi’s central theories and views are centred on his concept of 
wujud, not least his controversial and well-known thesis of wahdat al-wujud. 
Understanding this concept is crucial in understanding Ibn Arabi’s doctrine as a 
whole.  
 Ibn Arabi’s concept of wujud is most frequently translated as ‘existence’, 
which is how it is typically understood across Arabic literature. Consequently, many 
part of Ibn Arabi’s ontological doctrine and his conception of ultimate reality seem to 
centre on the concept of ‘existence’. His well-known thesis of wahdat al-wujud, for 
instance, is almost unanimously understood to mean ‘the oneness of existence’ or ‘the 
oneness of being’. Naturally, Ibn Arabi’s fundamental concepts related to wujud 
(existence) are generally considered to be primarily matters of metaphysics. 
 Chittick, however, proposes a different understanding of Ibn Arabi’s key 
concept of wujud and its derivatives. This creates a fundamentally different 
understanding of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine in general. Contrary to what is supposed by 
mainstream scholarship, he proposes that Ibn Arabi’s concept of wujud may be more 
accurately understood as ‘finding’. He maintains that ‘finding’ renders the Arabic 
term wujud perfectly as it is its literal and everyday meaning (Chittick, 2013, p. 916). 
Describing terms that Ibn Arabi adopts when talking of God, Chittick states: 
  
Probably the most important of these is wujud, which is typically translated as 
‘existence’ or ‘being’ but which literally means ‘finding’. If for English 
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speakers, ‘existence’ has no necessary connection with awareness, this is not 
the case for Ibn al-‘Arabi. To speak of wujud is to speak of finding and what is 
found (1998, p. xix). 
 
In another context, he states that ‘[i]n a second sense Ibn al-‘Arabi employs the word 
wujud when speaking about the substance or stuff or nature of God Himself. In one 
word, what is God? He is wujud. In this sense “finding” might better convoy the sense 
of the term’ (Chittcik, 1989, p. 6)19. Further, in his interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s 
understanding of the modal terms (i.e., necessary, possible, and impossible) he claims 
that ‘Ibn Arabi would formulate it, in all of the reality, what is it that must be found 
[i.e., the necessary], what is it that may be found [i.e., the possible], and what is it that 
cannot be found [i.e., the impossible]?’ (Chittick 2013, p. 917). In addition, he 
proposes that the same meaning (i.e., finding) should be applied to the derivatives of 
the term wujud. He translates one of God’s names in the Islamic tradition ‘al-Wajid’, 
employed by Ibn Arabi, as ‘the finder’ (Ibid., p. 916). Chittick even dares to suggest 
that Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) could be 
translated instead to the ‘oneness of finding’ (1989, p.4). 
Chittick does not refer to or depend on any linguistic sources (e.g., 
dictionaries) to substantiate his claims about the Arabic term wujud. However, Bakri 
Aladdin (2011), who seems to defend a similar position to that of Chittick with regard 
to wujud, refers to a quote from the Islamic theologian Fakhr al-din al-Razi (1209) to 
substantiate his view. Al-Razi asserts that the term wujud has two meanings: ‘finding’ 
and ‘existence’. He then claims that ‘finding’ was the first meaning for wujud. He 
argues that without finding the object, its existence would not be known. He suggests 
                                                        
19  Chittick states that Ibn Arabi may use the term wujud sometimes to indicate 
‘existence’, but not when he is talking about ultimate reality as wujud (1989, p. 6).  
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that this was how the meaning of the Arabic term wujud evolved, from initially 
indicating finding to indicating existence (al-Razi, 1981, Vol. 1, pp. 125–126).  
Translating wujud to ‘finding’ should not be considered a simple linguistic 
matter. As mentioned above, the way we understand Ibn Arabi’s concept of wujud 
determines the way we understand Ibn Arabi’s doctrine, or at least the parts of it 
considered among the most important. Our understanding of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine will 
be fundamentally different should we understand his concept of wujud as ‘finding’. 
Following Chittick’s proposition, Ibn Arabi’s doctrine would no longer concern the 
metaphysics of existence as it has long been understood and accepted. Instead, it 
would centre on ‘finding’ and ‘knowing’ God through mysticism and religion 
(Chittick, 1989, p. 3). Chittick sometimes even suggests that God is the ‘finding’ in 
Ibn Arabi’s doctrine (1989, p. 6). This is an obscure claim; it is not clear what he 
means by God being ‘finding’, or how this relates to Ibn Arabi’s other views 
concerning finding God through religion and mysticism.  
 
3.2.2. Chittick’s Interpretive Approach is Unwarranted 
 
In light of the above, it seems that Chittick has based his interpretive approach mainly 
on his claim that ‘existence’ is not the literal meaning for wujud and that Ibn Arabi 
never ignores the literal meaning—finding. From this he aims to undermine the 
typical interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s term in favour of his proposed interpretation. 
Before criticising this approach, it is important to recognise that in Arabic there is 
some overlap in terminology between the terms for ‘finding’ and ‘existence’. This 
may be clarified through the following three points. The first is that, besides 
indicating ‘existence’, the Arabic term wujud also indicates ‘finding’ in some 
contexts. The second is that the Arabic term wujdan indicates ‘finding’ but not 
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‘existence’, yet it shares the same root with wujud. Wujdan is more commonly used 
than wujud in Arabic traditional literature to indicate ‘finding’. The third is that the 
Arabic term mawujud means equally ‘existent’ and ‘found’. The debate now concerns 
whether, as Chittick claims, ‘finding’, and not ‘existence’, is the literal meaning of the 
Arabic term wujud, and whether ‘finding’ is what Ibn Arabi means when he uses the 
term. 
 Unfortunately, Chittick’s understanding of wujud is inaccurate, as it is both 
linguistically incorrect and opposed by Ibn Arabi’s own usage of the term. 
Linguistically speaking, and contrary to Chittick’s claims, ‘existence’ is both the 
literal meaning and the everyday usage of the Arabic term wujud. To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no official dictionary definition that considers ‘existence’ to be 
the metaphoric sense of the Arabic term wujud, as Chittick seems to suggest. 
Regarding al-Razi’s argument above, it is important to note that he is merely 
attempting to establish which of the two meanings was used first, not claiming that 
one is literal and the other metaphorical. Thus, even if it succeeds, al-Razi’s argument 
does not establish Chittick implicit claims that ‘existence’ can be treated as a 
metaphorical meaning for wujud. Nonetheless, al-Razi’s argument is not compelling 
and cannot conclusively determine which of the two meanings came first. It is 
important to note that al-Razi’s argument is a philosophical justification for his claim 
rather than a linguistic one.  If I were to use the same type of reasoning which al-Razi 
uses to defend the priority of the meaning ‘finding’ over ‘existence’, I could say that 
the existence of something precedes the finding of it, and hence, the meaning 
‘existence’ should be assumed to precede the meaning ‘finding’ with regard to the 
Arabic term wujud. However, I am not sure that this is a good way to settle the matter 
as to which meaning came first. There are a number of complex factors that might 
 60 
affect the evolution of the meaning, and I maintain that such issues should be settled 
through etymological research rather than philosophical argumentation. Thus, we may 
safely maintain that Chittick’s claims about translating wujud to ‘existence’ are 
semantically incorrect. The typical translation of wujud as ‘existence’ is indeed 
accurate. Other linguistic mistakes have been pointed out in Chittick’s translations of 
certain terms employed by Ibn Arabi relating to the Arabic word wujud. For instance, 
Chittick’s translation of God’s name, ‘al-Wajid’, as ‘the finder’ is inaccurate. Al-
Wajid literally means ‘the rich’ and is not derived from the Arabic word ‘wujud’, as 
Chittick seems to think, but instead from the word ‘wajd’, which indicates ‘wealth’. 
This is how Arabic dictionaries, and even theological schools, typically understand 
the divine name ‘al-Wajid’.  20  
Putting Chittick’s inaccurate claims regarding the term wujud to one side, one 
may wonder, since ‘finding’ is one of wujud’s meanings, is it possible that Ibn Arabi 
actually uses wujud in his writings in this meaning? If so, could Chittick’s epistemic 
approach still be saved? 
Determining which meaning Ibn Arabi intends when using the term wujud in 
his writings is not difficult. By examining the contexts in which he employs the term, 
one could affirm with almost no doubt that he intends it to mean ‘existence’ rather 
than ‘finding’. In many contexts, it would hardly be meaningful to interchange wujud 
with ‘finding’ (or with its derivatives). For instance, on many occasions Ibn Arabi 
uses the term wujud in contrast with non-existence (adam); it is far more plausible to 
acknowledge the contrast between existence and non-existence than between finding 
God and non-existence. Consequently, despite his claims, Chittick himself almost 
always translates wujud as ‘existence’, as the context does not frequently allow any 
                                                        
20 For more detail and discussion of the meaning of the terms wujud, wujdan, and 
wajid, please refer to the root wajad in Lisan al-Arab by Ibn Mandhur.  
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other translation. It is also noteworthy that Ibn Arabi follows the standard usage of 
traditional Arabic literature by employing the Arabic term wujdan, instead of wujud, 
when he wishes to indicate ‘finding’, and finding God in particular (see for example, 
Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 3, p. 443).  
 Once one demonstrates that Chittick’s claims of Ibn Arabi’s concept of wujud 
is inaccurate and opposed by Ibn Arabi’s own texts, his whole interpretation 
collapses. Consequently, Ibn Arabi’s ontology can never be reduced to mysticism and 
epistemology. The aspects of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine that centre on the concept of wujud 
remain, in the end, matters of metaphysics and ontology. Chittick’s reductionist 
approach to Ibn Arabi’s doctrine is, therefore, unsuccessful.  
Similarly in regard to Izutsu’s interpretation, in this section I have only 
focused on Chittick’s overall approach to Ibn Arabi. There are several other issues 
within his interpretation that may require further consideration, and some of these are 
examined in later chapters.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the two most prominent contemporary approaches to Ibn 
Arabi’s doctrine, one developed by Toshihiko Izutsu and the other by William C. 
Chittick. In section 3.2, a brief summary was provided of Izutsu’s interpretation, 
which depends heavily upon Ibn Arabi’s concept of divine self-manifestation (tajalli); 
I argued, however, that Izutsu misconceives this concept. Further, I argued that 
Izutsu’s interpretive approach is too narrow and therefore fails to incorporate crucial 
topics in Ibn Arabi’s doctrine. It was concluded, then, that Izutsu’s interpretive 
approach to Ibn Arabi has been unsuccessful.  
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In section 3.3, I examined the main interpretive approach that Chittick takes 
towards Ibn Arabi’s doctrine. Chittick attempts to reduce Ibn Arabi’s ontology to 
mysticism and epistemology by targeting Ibn Arabi’s concept of wujud, which is 
probably the most important concept in his doctrine. The term wujud has widely and 
almost unanimously been translated to ‘existence’. Consequently, many parts of Ibn 
Arabi’s doctrine have long been considered matters of metaphysics and philosophy. 
However, and contrary to the mainstream of Ibn Arabi scholarship, Chittick suggests 
that Ibn Arabi’s concept of wujud might be better translated as ‘finding’ rather than 
‘existence’, claiming that the former is actually the literal meaning of the Arabic term. 
By doing so, Chittick seeks to establish that Ibn Arabi’s doctrine is almost solely 
mystical. However, I argued that his interpretation is linguistically problematic and is 
contradicted by Ibn Arabi’s own texts. I concluded, therefore, that Chittick’s 
interpretive approach is also unsuccessful.  
In the following chapter, I will examine a number of apparent inconsistencies 
present in Ibn Arabi’s views and concepts of ultimate reality, particularly concerning 
the concept of God, the reality of the world, and the relationship between God and the 
world. I will also address some of the approaches upheld by a number of Ibn Arabi’s 
scholars to resolve this problem. I do not aim, in the following chapter, to dismiss Ibn 
Arabi’s thesis as incoherent. Instead, I merely seek to clearly outline and identify Ibn 
Arabi’s apparently incompatible views on the subject, in order to pave the way to my 
own interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s conception of ultimate reality. 
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Chapter 4: Ibn Arabi’s Apparently 
Inconsistent Views and Concepts on 
Ultimate Reality 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I critically examined two key contemporary overall 
approaches to Ibn Arabi’s doctrine one developed by Toshihiko Izutsu and the other 
by William C. Chittick. I argued that their analyses were unsuccessful in accurately 
representing Ibn Arabi’s doctrine.  
Throughout his writing, Ibn Arabi dispenses various views and concepts 
regarding the conception of ultimate reality. However, when one gathers and carefully 
examines these views, a number of inconsistencies seem to arise. In this chapter, I aim 
to clearly identify this issue in Ibn Arabi’s thesis of ultimate reality in order to pave 
the way for my interpretation of his thesis. This will be presented in subsequent 
chapters and aims to represent these various views and concepts, (among others) in a 
unified and philosophically coherent manner.      
 This chapter outlines the seemingly incompatible philosophical positions Ibn 
Arabi sets forth concerning three central issues: the concept of God, the reality of the 
world and the relationship between God and the world. In this chapter, I also address 
critical responses developed by some of Ibn Arabi’s scholars to these inconsistencies. 
In section 4.2, I outline Ibn Arabi’s apparently incompatible views concerning 
the concept of God. I clarify that he appears to simultaneously advocate a theistic 
concept of God and an impersonal concept of ultimate reality. According to the 
former he introduces God as a personal being who is a Hearer and a Seer, following 
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the Islamic scriptures. According to the latter he appears to introduce God in terms of 
a sheer and indeterminate existence.  
 In section 4.3, I introduce Ibn Arabi’s inconsistent views with regard to the 
reality of the world. In his writings, he sometimes accepts the existence of the world 
and at other times he firmly rejects this view. He also occasionally purports that the 
world is an intermediate state between existence and non-existence.  
 In section 4.4, I present some of the apparent inconsistencies in Ibn Arabi’s 
views concerning the relationship between God and the world. Some of his views 
seem to defend a typically theistic relationship between God and the world in which 
he introduces God as the absolute Creator and Sustainer of the world. Some of his 
other views, however, appear to represent a relationship in which the world is 
considered intrinsic to God’s existence. In this approach, he seems to introduce God 
not as the Creator of the world per se, but as the ultimate metaphysical ground of the 
world.  
4.2 Ibn Arabi’s Apparently Inconsistent Views on the 
Concept of God 
 
When examining Ibn Arabi’s statements on the concept of God, one will notice that 
he appears to defend two different and apparently incompatible concepts of deity: a 
theistic concept of God, and an impersonal concept of ultimate reality.  
In his theistic concept, Ibn Arabi presents God as a personal Being. His 
outlook in these instances represents God in line with the Abrahamic religions, as well 
as some Eastern religious traditions and philosophies such as Vishishtadvaita 
(qualified non-dualist) Vedanta, and Ramanuja (Hick, 2004, pp. 252–53; Fowler, 
2012, p. xxvii). What it means for God to be a person, however, is a matter for 
disagreement among philosophers and theologians. Richard Swinburne (1996), for 
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example, maintains that by the term ‘person’ he indicates an individual with the 
ability to act intentionally, namely one who is able to do something and mean to do it 
(p. 4). Peter van Inwagen (2008), on the other hand, states that he ‘mean[s] a being 
who may be in the most straightforward and literal sense, addressed—a being whom 
one may call “thou”’ (p. 20).  
Throughout his writings, Ibn Arabi appears to adopt the Islamic concept of 
God in particular. He discusses God as introduced in the Islamic scriptures as a 
Hearer and a Seer who wills, acts, punishes and forgives, among other attributes. In 
defence of the Islamic concept, and in accordance with the scriptures, Ibn Arabi says: 
 
No doubt that you agree with me that one must believe in all of the attributes 
of the Lord, High is He, stated in the authentic sayings of the prophet, God’s 
prayer, and peace be upon him, such as [divine] happiness [farah], [divine] 
laughter [dhahik], [divine] amazement [ta’jjub], [divine] joy [tabshbush], 
[divine] wrath and similar others (2011, Vol. 1, p. 303).  
 
However, on other occasions, Ibn Arabi seems to depart significantly from this 
concept. At these times, he appears to present an impersonal notion of ultimate reality 
which shares some similarities with many Eastern religions, traditions and 
philosophies such as Buddhism, Taoism and Advaita Vedanta (O'Grady, 2014, p. 83). 
According to this concept, God is presented in terms of unlimited, sheer and absolute 
existence. Ibn Arabi states that ‘there is only an absolute and sheer existence […] 
which is the existence of the Real [al-Haqq]’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 1, p. 141), and 
that ‘[He] who is the absolute existence is surrounding us’ (Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 21). These 
quotes seem to indicate an impersonal concept of ultimate reality, as a personal God is 
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perhaps more than an absolute and sheer existence. Indeed, Toshihiko Izutsu (1984), a 
prominent Ibn Arabi scholar, dedicates a whole book to a comparison of Ibn Arabi’s 
thesis with Taoism, a philosophy which proposes an impersonal concept of ultimate 
reality. Izutsu stresses that there are essential similarities between the metaphysics of 
Ibn Arabi’s doctrine and Taoism. He claims that ‘there can be no denying that Lao-
tzu’s metaphysics of Tao presents in its abysmal depth of thought a number of striking 
similarities to Ibn Arabi’s conception of Being’ (Izutsu, 1984, p. 2). He labels Ibn 
Arabi’s ultimate reality, as we saw in the previous chapter, ‘the Absolute in its 
absoluteness’ and considers it a concept shared by Ibn Arabi’s doctrine and Taoism 
(Ibid., p. 1). He introduces the Absolute in its absoluteness as unreachable, unknown 
and unknowable, and claims that it transcends all conditions, limitations and relations. 
It is ‘the most indeterminate of all indeterminates’ (Ibid, pp. 23, 25). He states: 
 
As the epithet ‘absolute’ indicates, it should not be taken in the sense of a 
limited and determined existent or existence; it means something beyond all 
existents that exists in a limited way […] something lying at the very source of 
all such existents existentiating them. It is Existence as the ultimate ground of 
everything (Ibid, p. 25).  
 
Izutsu, thus, espouses that Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality is indeed an 
impersonal concept of ultimate reality. A. E. Affifi also seems to maintain that Ibn 
Arabi defends an impersonal concept of ultimate reality. He states: ‘It is fundamental 
to bear in mind that there is a deity of some sort in it [Ibn Arabi’s doctrine,] and 
whatever else this deity may be, it is not the ethical and personal God of religion—no 
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pantheistic God ever is’ (1964, p. 58) This is obviously in stark contrast to Ibn Arabi’s 
discussions of the concept of the personal God as introduced above. 
 
4.3 Ibn Arabi’s Apparently Inconsistent Views on the 
Reality of the World 
 
In addition to his inconsistent views on the concept of God, Ibn Arabi presents 
apparently incompatible views concerning the reality of the world. In some of his 
texts, Ibn Arabi affirms that the world exists and he even essentially connects its 
existence to his concept of ultimate reality as God (ilah). He states: ‘[Otherwise], the 
world would not have existed, [but] it does [exist], [which means that] the position [of 
godness] has existed [first]’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 2, p. 94).  
On other occasions, however, Ibn Arabi denies the reality of the world and 
appears to subscribe to some form of acosmism. He dismisses everything other than 
ultimate reality as non-existent. He emphasises that ‘the Real (al-haqq) is existence, 
and creation is nothing’ (Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 44), and proclaims that ‘[nothing exists] but 
Allah, nothing else!’ (Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 426). In fact, at times he goes as far as to 
insinuate that the existence of anything other than God is impossible. He writes: ‘Oh 
my God, how could anything other than You know You? [Nay,] is there anything 
other than You? No, No and No. O my God, I cannot see myself but You. [As] how 
can I see […] the impossible?’ (Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 246). 
On other occasions, he introduces a third view in which Ibn Arabi advocates 
that the world is, in fact, a mixture of existence and non-existence. He claims that ‘the 
world is […] between existence and non-existence. It is neither a pure existence, nor a 
mere non-existence’ (Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 222). This view appears to be at odds with both 
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other perspectives. As with his introduction of the concept of God, then, it appears as 
if Ibn Arabi also is inconsistent in relation to the reality of the world.  
4.4 Ibn Arabi’s Apparently Inconsistent Views on the 
Relationship between God and the World 
 
As he introduces apparently inconsistent views with regard to the concept of God and 
the reality of the world, one would expect that Ibn Arabi would also have different 
views concerning the relationship between God and the world.  
Ibn Arabi seems to advocate a non-dual reality at times. He espouses that 
existence is necessarily one and that it is identical to ultimate reality. He explicitly 
states that ‘the essence of existence is one’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 4, p. 221), going on 
to argue that ‘it is impossible to have two existences’ (Ibid., p. 218). These quotes 
seem to suggest that there cannot be two distinct entities, i.e., God and the world. In 
fact, he explicitly proclaims that: ‘everything you see, that is Allah’ (Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 
235). On another occasion, he says: ‘[God] is the Seer and the seen [in the world]. 
The world is his picture, and He is the soul of the world. He is [indeed] the entire 
Cosmos’  (Ibn Arabi, 2009, p. 258). Further, he emphasises that the existence of all 
that exists is ultimately the existence of the Real [al-haqq] Himself (Ibn Arabi, 2011, 
Vol. 2, p. 93). Indeed, it is interesting to note that some Eastern religious texts 
defending a non-dualistic relationship between ultimate reality and the world 
resemble some of Ibn Arabi’s key views and ideas. For instance, Shankara (780–820), 
the Indian philosopher who developed the doctrine of Advaita Vedanta, introduces a 
number of ideas and views concerning ultimate reality that are strikingly similar to 
those one would encounter when reading Ibn Arabi. In his introduction to Brahman, 
Shankara states, 
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Brahman is the reality — the one existence, absolutely independent of human 
thought or idea. Because of the ignorance of our human minds, the universe 
seems to be composed of diverse forms. It is Brahman alone. A jar made of 
clay is not other than clay. It is clay essentially; the form of the jar has no 
independent existence. What, then, is the jar? Merely an invented name! The 
form of the jar can never be perceived apart from the clay. What then is the 
jar? An appearance! The reality is the clay itself […] ‘The universe is 
Brahman’ — so says the great seer of the Atharva Veda. The universe, 
therefore, is nothing but Brahman. It is superimposed upon Him. It has no 
separate existence, apart from its ground […] Brahman is supreme. He is the 
reality—the one without a second […] He transcends the appearance of the 
manifold (2007, pp. 171–72).  
 
Throughout his writings, Ibn Arabi also introduces ultimate reality as the 
metaphysical ground of reality, identical to existence and transcending all the 
multiplicity and appearances of the world. 
On the other hand, however, Ibn Arabi sometimes appears to abandon this 
non-dualistic thesis. In these cases, he defends a theistic relationship between God and 
the world. He adopts a position in support of a dual reality where God is on the one 
side and the world is on the other. He makes a clear distinction between the two; the 
latter he defines as ‘everything other than Allah’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 5, p. 99). He 
confirms: ‘Know, O the devoted mystic, that existence is divided between the 
worshipper and the worshipped […] [The worshipper] is the world […] And the 
worshipped is […] Allah; there is nothing else in existence’ (Ibid., pp. 113–14). In 
this thesis, he also introduces God as the Creator and the Sustainer of the world, 
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following the Islamic scriptures (Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 19). On one occasion, he explains 
the relationship between God and the world using the metaphor of the shadow, which 
insinuates a relationship between a cause and that which is caused. He states: ‘[The 
relationship of] […] the world, to the Real [al-haqq] is like [the relationship of the 
person’s] shadow to [that] person. [Hence, the world] is the shadow of Allah’ (Ibn 
Arabi, 2009, p. 228).  
Regarding the relationship between God and human beings in particular, Ibn 
Arabi engages in another apparent inconsistency. Sometimes he embraces the doctrine 
of the mystical union with God (ittihad). He states: ‘This is the level of [mystical] 
union [with God] [ittihad] that no one can avoid; especially, the scholars of Allah 
[i.e., mystics] who know the situation as it is’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 6, p. 393). Here, 
he attributes the doctrine of the mystical union with God (ittihad) to the mystics, 
among whom he always places himself. Furthermore, in one of his mystical poems, 
Ibn Arabi says: ‘you are a worshipper, and also, you are a Lord, and you are a Lord, 
and also, you are a worshipper’ (2009, p. 202). At one time he bewilderedly states: ‘if 
I say: I am but a god and He is me, [then] He will be unknown. Because I am ignorant 
of who I am, and He is me; so, what [should] we do?’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 2, p. 
526). 
On other times, however, he firmly rejects any kind of alleged union between 
God and human beings. He states that ‘the distinction between Allah and creation has 
occurred from eternity’ (Ibid., Vol. 4, p. 221) and that ‘just as the Lord cannot be a 
worshipper, the worshipper [as well] cannot be a Lord’ (Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 553). He even 
condemns the proponents of mystical union with God (ittihad) on one occasion, 
calling them ‘the people of deviation’ (ahl al-ilhad) (Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 129). These 
 71 
statements are clearly in stark contrast with his other statements mentioned above that 
embrace mystical union with God. 
The above discussion should, therefore, establish that Ibn Arabi appears to 
present incompatible views concerning the concept of God, the reality of the world, 
and the relationship between God and the world. Some of Ibn Arabi’s key scholars 
have noted his apparently inconsistent views and each seems to have a different 
attitude towards dealing with that inconsistency. Affifi, for instance, addresses the 
problem by maintaining that Ibn Arabi’s doctrine cannot be seen as coherent unless 
one overlooks Ibn Arabi’s constant attempt to reconcile his doctrine with Islam. He 
proposes hence that one should dismiss Ibn Arabi’s theistic concept of God and his 
views that confirm the reality of the world. He considers Ibn Arabi’s non-dualistic and 
acosmistic views on reality and his impersonal concept of God to be Ibn Arabi’s real 
doctrine. He states: ‘[Ibn Arabi] also may be said to be a consistent thinker, provided 
we do not attach too much importance to his verbal paradoxes and the way he often 
tries to reconcile Islamic dogma with philosophical principles’ (Affifi, 1964, p. xi). 
Izutsu also at times seems puzzled by Ibn Arabi’s apparently inconsistent 
views and seems to lean towards endorsing and prioritising Ibn Arabi’s non-dualistic 
views and concepts. In commenting on one of Ibn Arabi’s texts in which Ibn Arabi 
appears to defend a theistic concept of God, Izutsu states:  
 
It is remarkable that Ibn ‘Arabi, in the concluding sentence of the passage just 
quoted, explicitly identified the absolute Being with Allah, the Living, 
Omniscient, Omnipotent God of the Qoran [sic.]. It indicates that he has 
moved from the ontological level of discourse with which he began to the 
religious level of discourse peculiar to the living faith of the believer. As we 
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have remarked before, the Reality in its absoluteness is, in Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
metaphysical-ontological system, an absolutely unknowable Mystery that lies 
far beyond the reach of human cognition (1983, p. 27).  
 
Apparently, Izutsu presumes that Ibn Arabi’s non-dualistic concept of God is the one 
that truly represents his thesis; to the extent that he finds it curious that Ibn Arabi in 
this instance interchanges the theistic concept of God with the non-dualistic concept 
of ultimate reality.  
Rom Landau (1959) furthermore notes the same issue in Ibn Arabi’s writings 
but claims that Ibn Arabi succeeds in accepting ‘the uncompromising monotheism of 
the Quran’ and reconciles it with his non-dualism (p. 23). These differing positions 
among Ibn Arabi’s key scholars on the issue makes it clear that his doctrine, and his 
conception of ultimate reality in particular, are in dire need of serious philosophical 
analysis and clarification. It is important to affirm, though, that despite these 
apparently inconsistent views, I do not maintain that Ibn Arabi’s conception of 
ultimate reality is philosophically incoherent. In fact, following the majority of Ibn 
Arabi’s contemporary scholars, I postulate that a potentially original and coherent 
thesis underlies his perplexing style.21 In this chapter, I merely sought to reveal the 
apparent incompatibility within Ibn Arabi’s presentation of ultimate reality as clearly 
as possible. I have done this in order to facilitate the further philosophical 
examination in following chapters.  
                                                        
21 This is a general judgment. There are some potential inconsistencies within the 
detail of his thesis, some of which will be examined in chapter six 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined a number of Ibn Arabi’s key views concerning the 
conception of ultimate reality. I aimed to establish that in his presentation, Ibn Arabi 
occasionally appears inconsistent. Firstly, I outlined some of his apparently 
incompatible views concerning the concept of God, in which he seems to defend 
simultaneously a theistic personal concept of God and an impersonal concept of 
ultimate reality. At times, he seems to portray the personal God of the Abrahamic 
religion; at others he presents ultimate reality in terms of absolute and sheer existence. 
Secondly, I examined Ibn Arabi’s inconsistent views concerning the reality of the 
world. He sometimes appears to affirm the reality of the world, at other times the non-
existence of the world, and yet at others that the world incorporates both existence 
and non-existence. Thirdly, I introduced Ibn Arabi’s apparent inconsistency in his 
views concerning the relationship between God and the world. Sometimes he appears 
to defend a theistic doctrine in which God is considered to be the absolute Creator and 
Sustainer of the world. At other times, he represents God, not as the Creator per se, 
but as the ultimate metaphysical ground from which the world cannot be 
distinguished. Finally, I addressed the ways some of Ibn Arabi’s key scholars adopt to 
deal with this problem including Affifi, Izutsu and Landau. 
The following chapters will constitute my own interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s 
conception of ultimate reality. I seek to present his apparently inconsistent views and 
concepts on the matter in a unified and philosophically coherent manner. I uphold that 
Ibn Arabi’s thesis is best represented in terms of three main concepts: ultimate reality 
as existence (wujud), ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat) and ultimate reality as 
God (ilah).  
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 The following chapter marks the beginning of my interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s 
concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud), which is known as Ibn Arabi’s thesis 
of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). In the following chapter, I critically 
examine two of the prominent interpretations of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of wahdat al-
wujud, one developed by Ibn Taymiyyah and the other by Affifi. Ibn Taymiyyah 
claims that Ibn Arabi advocates pantheism in his thesis of the oneness of existence 
(wahdat al-wujud). According to Affifi on the other hand Ibn Arabi’s thesis is best 
interpreted in terms of acosmism. I argue however that both interpretations are 
unsuccessful as they are exegetically inaccurate.  
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Chapter 5: Ibn Arabi’s Concept of 
Ultimate Reality as Existence (wujud) 
(The Thesis of wahdat al-wujud) I: 
Two Interpretations 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I addressed some of the apparent inconsistencies in Ibn 
Arabi’s presentation of his conception of ultimate reality. I outlined a number of 
incompatible views concerning the concept of God, the reality of the world and the 
relationship between God and the world. I also introduced some approaches employed 
by Ibn Arabi’s scholars to deal with this problem.   
The focus of the current and following chapters is primarily based upon my 
own interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s conception of ultimate reality in which I analyse and 
develop his various views and concepts on the matter, and, subsequently, weave them 
into a unified thesis.  
In my interpretation, I propose that Ibn Arabi’s whole thesis of ultimate reality 
is best presented across the following three main concepts: (i) the concept of ultimate 
reality as existence (wujud); (ii) the concept of ultimate reality as the Divine Self 
(dhat); and (iii) the concept of ultimate reality as God (ilah). I maintain that the three 
concepts do not represent different ultimate realities, nor do they represent different 
perspectives of the same ultimate reality. In fact, these concepts should be seen to 
represent different encompassments or scopes of the same ultimate reality. They 
might be comparable to the pages of a building’s blueprint; if one goes through any 
typical set of blueprints, one will notice that some of the pages contain plans 
representing the same floor or room, yet each page has a unique encompassment or 
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scope of the space. One page, for instance, represents the space in terms of the frames 
plan, while another may represent the same area in terms of the electrical layout. A 
third may represent it in terms of its foundations. If one examines the three pages, it is 
clear that they represent the same space, though in different terms. A sum 
understanding of all pages entails a correct and complete architectural understanding 
of the space.  
This analogy can be applied to the above three notions of ultimate reality as 
each one represents Ibn Arabi’s ultimate reality in its own unique terms. Hence, 
ultimate reality is represented in terms of existence (wujud), in terms of the Divine 
Self (dhat), and in terms of God (ilah). Like the pages of a blueprint, they overlap at 
times but each tells us something different from the other two. It is also true that some 
of them might be more comprehensive than others or concern different people to 
different extents, just as the page that represents the floor in terms of its electricity 
layout concerns an electrician more than a plumber. In order to coherently grasp Ibn 
Arabi’s thesis on ultimate reality, one needs to fully comprehend all three concepts 
and how they interact to form a united outlook. Failing to do so may lead one to 
consider Ibn Arabi’s thesis contradictory and problematic, as the previous chapter 
aimed to show.  
In my interpretation, I examine these three main concepts and the relationships 
between them in order to develop a philosophically consistent, and exegetically 
accurate, representation of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of ultimate reality. In this and the 
following two chapters, the focus is on the first concept, that of ultimate reality as 
existence (wujud). This may be considered the most fundamental concept in Ibn 
Arabi’s metaphysical system, both in general and in terms of his thesis of ultimate 
reality. This concept, known as Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat 
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al-wujud), advocates that existence is one and identical with ultimate reality.22 Ibn 
Arabi’s claims concerning the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) have always 
been open to interpretation. In this chapter, hence, I critically examine two of its 
prominent interpretations. The first was initially developed by Ibn Taymiyyah and 
interprets Ibn Arabi’s thesis in terms of pantheism, in which he critically claims that 
Ibn Arabi identifies God with the actual world. The second was famously developed 
by A. E. Affifi who interprets it as a form of acosmism. He claims that in his thesis, 
Ibn Arabi advances that the only existent is God, and that the world should be 
dismissed as non-existent. I argue, however, that both interpretations are unsuccessful 
as they are exegetically inaccurate.  
5.2 Two Interpretations of Ibn Arabi’s Thesis of the Oneness 
of Existence (wahdat al-wujud) 
 
5.2.1. Ibn Taymiyyah’s Pantheistic Interpretation 
 
In his thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud), Ibn Arabi famously makes 
two main claims: (i) existence is one; and (ii) it is identical with ultimate reality. He 
proclaims that ‘it is impossible to have two existences’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 4, p. 
218), and that ‘the essence of existence is one’ (Ibid., Vol. 4, p. 221). In addition, he 
states that ‘the Real (al-haqq) is existence’ (Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 44). He sometimes 
interchanges the term ‘existence’ with typical terms usually used to indicate God, 
such as Allah and the Real (al-haqq). He comments on a Quranic verse that says, ‘O 
those who believe’ (33: 41), claiming that the verse talks about those who believe in 
existence (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 2, p. 238). A typical understanding of the verse is 
                                                        
22 In this and the following chapters, I will be using the phrases: ‘the concept of 
ultimate reality as existence (wujud)’ and ‘the thesis of oneness of existence (wahdat 
al-wujud)’ interchangeably.  
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that it talks about those who believe in Allah, which Ibn Arabi replaces with 
‘existence’.  
Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) has long been 
considered the cornerstone of his entire doctrine. Peter Coates (2002) states that 
‘[w]ithout doubt, the key to understanding the entire corpus of Ibn Arabi lies in the 
central idea of wahdat al-wujud—the Oneness of Being. For Ibn Arabi, wahdat al-
wujud (also translated as the Unity or Oneness of Existence) is an inescapable 
ontological fact’ (p. 3). Further, William C. Chittick (1994) asserts that ‘Ibn al-Arabi 
is most often characterised in Islamic texts as the originator of the doctrine of wahdat 
al-wujud, the “Oneness of Being” or “Unity of Existence”’ (p. 15). Although Chittick 
stresses that Ibn Arabi never uses the term wahdat al-wujud in his writings, he insists 
that Islamic scholars were correct in ascribing the thesis to him (Ibid., p. 16).  
Despite being his most important and also perhaps most controversial thesis, 
Ibn Arabi never provides a systematic and clear presentation of his views concerning 
the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). As such, the thesis has been rendered 
open to interpretation.   
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence 
(wahdat al-wujud) is best interpreted as a form of pantheism. In criticising Ibn Arabi’s 
doctrine, Ibn Taymiyyah writes: 
 
[Ibn Arabi and some other Sufis say] existence is one; [and that], the 
existence of the creation is the existence of the Creator. They do not confirm 
[that there are] two existents, one created the other. Nay, they say the Creator 
is the creation and the creation is the Creator’ (1995, Vol. 2, p. 364).  
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Throughout history, this has been arguably the most influential interpretation of Ibn 
Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud), even though there is 
little textual evidence to support it. One example of a statement that might be 
considered pantheistic, though, is Ibn Arabi’s claim that: ‘everything you see, that is 
Allah’ (2011, Vol. 3, p. 235). On another occasion, also, Ibn Arabi asserts: ‘[God] is 
the Seer and the seen [in the world]. The world is his picture, and He is the soul of the 
world. He is the entire Cosmos’  (Ibn Arabi, 2009, p. 258). 
However, these statements could also be interpreted in ways other than 
pantheism. For instance, one could consider these to be evidence of panentheism 
instead. At best, the above statements merely affirm that the world is not external to 
God’s existence, a belief shared by several metaphysical doctrines.  
More importantly, there are plenty of instances of exegetical evidence that 
negate Ibn Taymiyyah’s pantheistic interpretation, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter. First, Ibn Arabi frequently posits that existence is actually divided between 
God and the world. He affirms: ‘[E]xistence is divided between the worshipper and 
the worshipped […] [The worshipper] is the world […] And the worshipped is […] 
Allah’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 5, pp. 113–14). Contrary to Ibn Taymiyyah’s 
interpretation, Ibn Arabi here clearly distinguishes God from the world. There is a 
contrast between the Lord on the one hand, and the worshipper (i.e., the world) on the 
other. Second, Ibn Arabi asserts repeatedly that God is the cause and the Creator of 
the world (see for example, Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 19). This, of course, postulates a clear 
distinction between God and the world and is a typically theistic view of the 
relationship that he occasionally asserts in his writings. Accordingly, and contrary to 
the claims of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Arabi explicitly maintains that the Creator is not the 
creation. Third, Ibn Arabi repeatedly defines the world [i.e., creation] as everything 
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other than Allah (see for example, 2011, Vol. 1, p. 174; Vol. 5, p. 99). Hence, the 
world, according to Ibn Arabi, is by definition not God. This fundamentally 
contradicts pantheism. Thus, Ibn Taymiyyah’s pantheistic interpretation of Ibn Arabi 
fails to provide any strong and conclusive textual evidence, while an overwhelming 
number of Ibn Arabi’s statements explicitly negate it. Therefore, the pantheistic 
interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) is 
untenable.  
It might be worth mentioning that a number of key modern scholars have 
employed the term ‘pantheism’ to label, somewhat mistakenly, their non-pantheistic 
interpretations of Ibn Arabi. For instance, A. E. Affifi is well-known for his firm 
assertion that Ibn Arabi’s ontology is best interpreted in terms of pantheism. He 
emphasises that ‘[Ibn Arabi] has a definite philosophical doctrine of pantheism, the 
bearing of which is shown in every part of his system’ (1964, p. xi). He constructs his 
understanding of Ibn Arabi on this claim and proclaims that ‘Ibnul ‘Arabi’s [i.e., Ibn 
Arabi’s] theory of reality is a pantheistic one. It is summed up in his own few words 
“glory be to God who created things, being Himself their essences (a’yanuha)”’ 
(Ibid., p. 54). However, the version of pantheism that Affifi ascribes to Ibn Arabi is 
not pantheism in its typical sense. Pantheism typically states that God and the world 
are identical; everything that exists constitutes a divine unity, much like Ibn 
Taymiyyah’s interpretation of Ibn Arabi. This, however, is not what Affifi meant by 
pantheism, as I will explain below. However, his loose employment of the term 
pantheism seems to have unintentionally contributed to the spread of Ibn 
Taymiyyah’s interpretation. 
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5.2.2. Affifi and Chittick’s Acosmistic Interpretation 
 
The second key interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality (wujud) is 
best viewed as a form of acosmism. Acosmism refers to the doctrine that treats the 
world as non-existent, the only existent being God. Affifi, the key advocate of this 
interpretation, claims that Ibn Arabi professes that there is only one reality, which is 
the reality of God. He explains: ‘God is the unity behind the multiplicity and the 
Reality behind the appearance’ (Affifi, 1964, p. 21). Everything else, on the other 
hand, is unreal (Ibid., pp. 10, 21, 54, 58). He elaborates: 
 
There is a form of pantheism which, starting from the assumption that God is 
an absolute, infinite and eternal being, who is the source and ultimate ground 
of all that is, was, and will be, gradually assumes a form of acosmism 
according to which the Phenomenal World is but a passing shadow of the 
Reality which lies behind it. Everything that is finite and temporal is illusory 
and unreal (Ibid., p.54). 
 
William C. Chittick also frequently appears to defend a similar acosmistic 
interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s thesis. He states that ‘[t]o say that the cosmos is 
“everything other than God” [which is Ibn Arabi’s definition] is to say that it is 
everything other than wujud [i.e., existence]’ (Chittick, 1998, p. 12). In addition, in 
introducing Ibn Arabi’s doctrine of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) in 
particular, he states:  
 
Ibn al-Arabi is known as the founder of the school of the Oneness of Being 
(wahdat al-wujud). Though he does not employ the term, the idea permeates 
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his works. Simply stated, there is only one Being, and all existence is nothing 
but the manifestation or outward radiance of that One Being. Hence 
‘everything other than the One Being’—that is, the whole cosmos in all its 
spatial and temporal extension—is nonexistent in itself, though it may be 
considered to exist through Being (1989, p. 79).  
 
One should be careful, however, when dealing with Chittick’s interpretation of Ibn 
Arabi’s thesis; as mentioned in Chapter Three, he appears sometimes to negate his 
own position here. However, one could safely confirm that, at least according to this 
explicit statement, Chittick forms an acosmistic interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of 
the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud).  
The acosmistic interpretation is, indeed, better equipped to represent Ibn 
Arabi’s own thesis than Ibn Tamiyyah’s pantheistic interpretation, and is arguably the 
most accepted among Ibn Arabi scholars today. Ibn Arabi explicitly dismisses the 
world as non-existent a number of times and declares that the only existent is God. He 
repeatedly states that ‘existence [is nothing] but the essence of the Real (a’yn al-
Haqq) (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 4, p. 218) and that ‘there is nothing in existence but 
Allah’ (Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 410). 23 On another occasion, he states: ‘there is nothing but 
the existence of Allah,’ and hence, ‘every existent other than Allah is a relation not an 
entity’ (Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 461).  
However, Ibn Arabi provides other statements which seem to negate such 
assertions. As previously mentioned when discussing Ibn Taymiyyah’s pantheistic 
interpretation, Ibn Arabi frequently appears to support a duality within reality and 
makes claims that the world exists in addition to the existence of God. Unfortunately, 
                                                        
23 Frequently, Ibn Arabi interchanges the two terms, Allah and the Real (al- haqq) in 
indicating God. 
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the acosmistic interpretation does not account for these statements. It seems, thus, that 
it merely endorses some textual evidence and arbitrarily dismisses others. Therefore, 
the acosmistic interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as existence 
(wujud) is also unsuccessful. 
The main problem with these two interpretations—the pantheistic and the 
acosmistic—is that they never attempt to comprehensively encompass all of Ibn 
Arabi’s various statements on the matter. They attempt, instead, to force, intentionally 
or unintentionally, Ibn Arabi’s very detailed thesis into a somewhat limited and 
particular concept. I maintain that Ibn Arabi’s doctrine tends to revolt against many 
pre-established labels and must be approached in a way that appreciates its 
complexity and originality. In his criticism of pantheistic interpretations of Ibn 
Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud), Chittick (1989) objects:  
 
Stated in these terms, the ‘Oneness of Being’ may appear to some people as 
another brand of ‘pantheism’. But in fact, this simplified expression of what 
the Shaykh [i.e., Ibn Arabi] is talking about cannot begin to do him justice 
[…] When the Shykh himself explains what he means by the statement that 
Being is one, he provides one of the most sophisticated and nuanced 
expressions of the ‘profession of God’s Unity’ (tawhid) to be found in Islamic 
thought (p. 79).    
 
A similar thing could be said of the acosmistic interpretations of Affifi and Chittick. 
Their reading also fails to appreciate the complexity of Ibn Arabi’s thesis and, 
accordingly, seems to fall into the same mistakes present in the pantheistic 
interpretation. Both the pantheistic and the acosmistic interpretations of Ibn Arabi’s 
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concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud) are I maintain exegetically inaccurate, 
and, thus, unsuccessful. I develop in the next chapter an alternative interpretation to 
Ibn Arabi’s concept that aims to be exegetically more accurate and philosophically 
more rigorous. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has marked the beginning of my examination of the concept of ultimate 
reality as existence (wujud). This and two other concepts, the concept of ultimate 
reality as the Divine Self (dhat) and the concept of ultimate reality as God (ilah), 
constitute Ibn Arabi’s thesis of ultimate reality, according to my interpretation. In this 
chapter, I critically examined two of the key interpretations of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of 
the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud), those developed by Ibn Taymiyyah and 
Affifi. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Arabi’s thesis represents a form of 
pantheism. Affifi’s interpretation, on the other hand, claims that Ibn Arabi’s thesis is 
best interpreted in terms of acosmism. I argued however that both interpretations are 
unsuccessful as they are exegetically inaccurate; they fail to include all of Ibn Arabi’s 
statements on the subject.  
 In the following chapter, I introduce my own interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s 
thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). I examine the three components 
that constitute Ibn Arabi’s thesis: the metaphysical nature of ultimate reality as 
existence (wujud), the metaphysical nature of the world, and the relationship between 
ultimate reality as existence (wujud) and the world.  
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Chapter 6: Ibn Arabi’s Concept of 
Ultimate Reality as Existence (wujud) 
(The Thesis of wahdat al-wujud) II: 
My Interpretation 
6.1 Introduction 
 
I began the previous chapter by explaining that Ibn Arabi’s thesis of ultimate reality 
consists of three main concepts: ultimate reality as existence (wujud); ultimate reality 
as the Divine Self (dhat); and ultimate reality as God (ilah). Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven focus on the first concept: ultimate reality as existence (wujud). This is known 
as Ibn Arabi’s thesis of ‘the oneness of existence’ (wahdat al-wujud), in which he 
advances that existence is one and identical with ultimate reality. 
In the previous chapter, I examined two key interpretations of Ibn Arabi’s 
thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud), developed by Ibn Taymiyyah 
and A. E. Affifi. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, in claiming that existence is one and 
identical to ultimate reality, Ibn Arabi upholds a form of typical pantheism. However, 
Affifi asserts that Ibn Arabi’s thesis is best interpreted in terms of acosmism. I argued 
that both interpretations are untenable. They contradict explicit statements by Ibn 
Arabi in which he asserts that the world exists and that it is by definition not God.  
 In this chapter, I develop my own interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the 
oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) that aims to be both exegetically 
comprehensive and accurate, and philosophically coherent. In my interpretation, I 
seek to reconcile Ibn Arabi’s insistence on the reality of the world with his claims that 
existence is one and identical with ultimate reality. 
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In this chapter, I investigate and develop three issues, which I take as 
constitutive of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud): the 
metaphysical nature of ultimate reality as existence (wujud); the metaphysical nature 
of the world; and, finally, the relationship between the two, ultimate reality as 
existence (wujud) and the world (presuming Ibn Arabi’s claims of the oneness of 
existence and the reality of the world). 
Section 6.2 introduces the metaphysical nature of ultimate reality as existence 
(wujud) in which I examine two of Ibn Arabi’s metaphysical views concerning 
existence. The first is his stance concerning the necessity of existence and the 
impossibility of nothingness, and the second is his objection to treating existence as a 
property of the object. I argue that both views are uncontroversial and supported by 
compelling arguments. I also explain that the two views clarify some issues 
concerning the nature of ultimate reality as existence (wujud). The necessity of 
existence provides some grounds for the identification between ultimate reality and 
existence. In addition, I claim that by rejecting existence as something additional to 
the object, one could infer that Ibn Arabi may think of ultimate reality as an individual 
existent which manifests existence in its unlimitedness. This is in opposition to 
scholars who suggest that Ibn Arabi proposes ultimate reality as a sea of 
being/existence. 
Section 6.3 introduces the second component, the metaphysical nature of the 
world, in which I explain that Ibn Arabi in his thesis does not develop novel views 
concerning the concept of God as it is often assumed, but instead, for the most part, 
provides novel views concerning the metaphysical nature of the world. 
When examining Ibn Arabi’s cosmology, one encounters three main concepts: al-
mumkinat; al-a’lam; and al-a’yan al-thabitah. While Ibn Arabi scholars are generally 
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in agreement that al-mumkinat refers to possible entities and al-a’lam to the actual 
realm, there seems to be a lack of clarity with regard to the concept of al-a’yan al-
thabitah. I propose that al-a’yan al-thabitah is best understood as indicating merely 
possible entities that are not actual. In addition, according to my interpretation, Ibn 
Arabi seems to suggest that there is no fundamental metaphysical difference between 
what is actual (al-a’lam) and what is merely possible (al-a’yan al-thabitah). He seems 
to defend a theory of relative actuality. I argue that actualisation in Ibn Arabi’s view is 
best understood as a matter of perceiving and perceivability. The amount of possible 
entities that an individual perceives constitutes his actual realm, while the rest of the 
possible entities constitute the realm of merely possible entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah) 
for him. 
Section 6.4 introduces the third component of Ibn Arabi’s thesis in which I 
explain that in defending a theory of relative actuality, Ibn Arabi paves the way for 
maintaining his claims about the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) and the 
reality of the world. I argue, then, that by identifying the totality of possible entities 
with God’s knowledge of the world, Ibn Arabi would succeed in maintaining all of his 
claims. 
Finally, section 6.5 explains how my interpretation helps in maintaining a 
number of Ibn Arabi’s apparently incompatible claims about ultimate reality and the 
world, some of which were introduced in Chapter Three. 
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6.2 The Metaphysical Nature of Ultimate Reality as 
Existence (wujud) 
 
6.2.1. The Impossibility of Nothingness and the Necessity of Existence 
 
The first component of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-
wujud), according to my interpretation, concerns the metaphysical nature of ultimate 
reality as existence (wujud). Ibn Arabi introduces two views which I hold to be crucial 
to understanding his position on the metaphysical nature of ultimate reality as 
existence (wujud): (i) He asserts that existence is necessary and that nothingness is 
impossible; and (ii) that existence is not a property of the object.  
Ibn Arabi repeatedly affirms that existence is necessary and that nothingness is 
impossible; there can never have been nothingness and we cannot fall into 
nothingness. Rejecting the possibility of nothingness is a foundation of Ibn Arabi’s 
metaphysics in general and his conception of ultimate reality in particular. His view is 
not particularly controversial among philosophers throughout history; such a position 
was stated as early as Parmenides (500 BC) and continues into the thought of key 
philosophers today (e.g., David Lewis, (1983; 1986) and D. M. Armstrong (1989)). 
Ibn Arabi, however, never develops an argument for his stance, perhaps because he 
feels that his position is too obvious to need argumentation. In fact, a number of 
philosophers tend to dismiss the concept of nothingness as meaningless or 
philosophically incoherent. Parmenides seeks to demonstrate that nothingness is 
impossible because the concept itself is meaningless or incoherent. Bertrand Russell 
expounds Parmenides’ argument against nothingness, stating: ‘You say there is the 
void; therefore; the void is not nothing; therefore it is not the void’ (2005, p. 69). In 
developing a similar approach to the problem, P. L. Heath (1967) explains the 
logicians’ way of rejecting nothingness: 
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The logicians, of course, will have nothing of all this. Nothing, they say, is not 
a thing, nor is it the name of anything, being merely a short way of saying of 
anything that it is not something else. ‘Nothing’ means ‘not-anything’; 
appearances to the contrary are due merely to the error of supposing that a 
grammatical subject must necessarily be a name. (Vol. 5, p. 524) 
 
Armstrong’s rejection of nothingness could also be considered part of this approach: 
 
I believe that the idea that there could have been nothing at all is really a 
superficial idea. It is attractive at a relatively shallow level of reflection. But 
when we think more deeply about the nature of possibility, then, it seems, it 
has to be given up (1989, p. 25). 
 
However, I maintain that the apparent incoherence and meaninglessness associated 
with the concept of nothingness, which the above approach clearly manifests, does not 
stem necessarily from the concept itself but, in fact, arises because existence is 
necessary and comprises the only ultimate metaphysical state of affairs. Existence 
underlies and governs our language, metaphysics and even modal logic to the extent 
that it does not permit the representation of any non-existential state of affairs 
(nothingness par excellence). This is why we fail to utilise any modality to establish 
something non-existential, an idea that Parmenides utilises in his argument to dismiss 
the concept of nothingness. The same applies to language; it cannot refer to 
nothingness because referentiality in its essence presumes existence. Needless to say, 
it likely makes little difference which position one takes with regard to the ontology 
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of meaning or which modal theory one endorses. All metaphysical or linguistic 
propositions, at some level, would have to treat nothingness as something in order to 
be able to deal with it. It is, hence, useless to attempt to utilise logic, metaphysics or 
language, all of which presume existence, to determine the possibility or even the 
meaning of nothingness. The problem is introduced neatly in Leucippus’ (370 BC) 
definition of the void, or ‘nothingness’, as presented by Russell: ‘the void is a not-
being, and no part of what it is is not being’ (1967, p. 68). Or as Ibn Arabi puts it: ‘it 
is impossible that we fall into nothingness because Allah, who is the absolute 
existence, surrounds us’ (2011, Vol. 7, p. 21). Our metaphysics, language and logic 
can only function through, and occur as part of, existence. 
One might ask whether this should be considered some kind of metaphysical 
incapability on our part rather than a problem with nothingness; one may wish to 
argue that nothingness may be possible but we fail to grasp or modalise this 
possibility. Alternatively, in order to avoid the problem of coherence and 
meaningfulness surrounding the term ‘nothingness’, one might ask whether there 
could be other options besides existence in which the metaphysical conditions are 
completely different. 
 Even if we ignore the fact that thinking or asking about other options is 
unavoidably an existential question in itself, since we are asking whether there exists 
something other than existence, the problem nevertheless remains. At best, answering 
such a question is epistemically impossible and is consequently of very little practical 
value. Considering that our language and logic are essentially tied to existence, we are 
incapable of knowing anything beyond this metaphysical framework. This question is 
on a par with asking whether there are other metaphysical options in which logical 
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rules are inapplicable; for example, the principle of non-contradiction.24 In fact, in his 
criticism of Alexius Meinong’s doctrine, which endorses non-existent objects, Russell 
states that ‘the chief objection [to Meinong’s doctrine] is that such objects [i.e., non-
existent objects], admittedly, are apt to infringe the law of contradiction’ (1905, p. 
283). 
This might explain why contemporary metaphysicians tend to alter (and limit) 
the scope of ‘nothingness’ to include only the absence of concrete objects, which is 
known among philosophers today as ‘metaphysical nothingness’ or ‘metaphysical 
nihilism’. Defending the scope of his well-known subtraction argument for the 
possibility of metaphysical nothingness, Thomas Baldwin states: 
 
It may be objected that, at least as far as the subtraction argument goes, the 
domain of wnil [i.e., the nothingness domain] still includes plenty of abstract 
objects, such as the natural numbers, so that its existence cannot properly be 
regarded as the possibility of there being nothing at all. This must indeed be 
conceded; but whatever view one takes about the existence or not of such 
objects as the natural numbers, the focus of most […] is on the possibility of 
there being no ‘concrete’ objects, in a sense still to be specified. So it is, I 
think, legitimate to concentrate primarily on this case while remaining, so far 
as possible, detached from presumptions concerning the existence or not of 
abstract objects (1996, pp. 232–233).25 
                                                        
24  For the current debate on impossible worlds and non-classical logic, see for 
example: J. Hintikka (1978); D. Lewis (1986); J.C. Beall and Bas C. van Fraassen 
(2003); G. Priest (2008); B. Krakauer (2013); D. Nolan (2013); B. Brogaard and J. 
Salerno (2013); J. Bjerring (2014) and F. Berto (2014). 
25 For further discussions on metaphysical nihilism, see: D. Lewis and S. Lewis 
(1983); P. Van Inwagen and E. J. Lowe (1996); T. Baldwin (1996); G. Rodriguez-
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This kind of nothingness, I maintain, should be dismissed as irrelevant to my 
discussion of Ibn Arabi’s views on nothingness. One can assume that metaphysical 
nihilism is not what Ibn Arabi and other medieval philosophers likely meant when 
they referred to nothingness. As they did not limit their concept of nothingness in any 
way, we should also refrain from doing so. Baldwin and E. J. Lowe (both 1996) seem 
to disagree; Baldwin maintains that most people are speaking of the absence of only 
concrete objects when they talk of nothingness (1996, p. 233). In addition, in defence 
of a similar point, Lowe states: 
 
I do not think that the question that people have actually intended to ask when 
they ask why anything at all should exist could be answered by pointing out 
[…] that the number 510 would exist no matter what. If the notion of an 
abstract object makes sense at all, it seems evident that if everything were an 
abstract object, if the only objects were abstract objects, there is an obvious 
and perfectly good sense in which there would be nothing at all (1996, pp. 95–
96). 
 
I do not find Baldwin and Lowe’s position compelling. Creating a stark division 
between what is concrete and what is abstract is a modern approach, as many ancient 
and medieval philosophers may not have noted this essential difference between 
objects that exist. As such, it is illegitimate to assume that they were actually thinking 
of the absence of concrete objects when they used the term ‘nothingness’. Likewise, 
even if one agrees with Lowe that they might not have thought of the absence of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Pereyra (1997) E. J. Lowe; D. Efird and T. Stoneham (2005, 2009); and G. Coggins 
(2010). 
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number 510 per se when they thought of nothingness, we cannot conclude from this 
that they only had concrete objects in mind. It is fair to assume that they were 
thinking about the absence of everything without thinking exactly of a particular kind 
of object. In fact, it is not impossible that they were knowingly thinking of the 
absence of some typical abstract objects familiar to them; for instance, Plato’s ideas. 
In addition, it is hardly useful to claim that they were thinking of the absence of only 
concrete objects when there is still disagreement today as to what it means to say that 
something is concrete. One philosopher might consider something concrete that which 
another philosopher considers abstract. Hence, it would be legitimate for a 
contemporary philosopher to set his own criteria for concreteness and abstractness to 
determine what he means by nothingness. However, by no means could he say that 
Ibn Arabi’s concept of nothingness follows his own criterion and thereby his own 
concept of nothingness. I maintain, thus, that Ibn Arabi’s concept of nothingness must 
be kept unconditional; it includes the absence of everything: absolute nothingness.  
 I now move to examine Ibn Arabi’s second view on existence.  
6.2.2. Existence is not a Property 
A. E. Affifi claims that Ibn Arabi sees existence as a property of the object. He 
critically explains: 
 
The fundamental error the Ishraqis and Ibnul ‘Arabi [i.e. Ibn Arabi] seem to 
have made is in interpreting the existential proposition ‘S exists’ as equivalent 
to the proposition ‘S has the quality e’ (e = existence), i.e. treating the 
existential proposition as a predicational one (Affifi, 1964, p. 6). 
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William C. Chittick also seems to ascribe a version of this view to Ibn Arabi (1989, p. 
6). I maintain, however, that Affifi and Chittick are mistaken in attributing this view 
to Ibn Arabi, as Ibn Arabi unequivocally rejects it. Rather, he states that ‘[t]he illuded 
[mind] imagines that existence and non-existence are properties of the existent or the 
non-existent’ (2009b, p. 140). In fact, he explicitly announces that ‘existence is not a 
property of the existent’ (Ibid., p. 142, my italics). Instead, he embraces the idea that 
existence does not add up to the existent object. 
Although Ibn Arabi’s position on the matter seems unequivocal, whether or 
not existence is a property of the object is a topic of much disagreement among 
philosophers. Thomas Aquinas and Alexius Meinong, as well as a number of 
medieval philosophers, support the idea that existence is indeed a property. Aquinas 
notably offers an argument for treating existence as a property, reasoning that one can 
have a grasp of something without knowing whether or not it exists. If existence were 
something essential to the concept, one would be unable to comprehend something 
without knowing whether or not it exists. Hence, Aquinas concludes that existence is 
something additional to the essence of the object (Aquinas, 2007, Chapter Four). 
Other philosophers, including Aristotle, Hume, Kant and many contemporary 
philosophers affirm, like Ibn Arabi, that existence is not a property of the object. In 
the following paragraphs, I examine three arguments in favour of this view. The first 
was developed by Ibn Arabi, the second by Immanuel Kant, and the third by Bertrand 
Russell. 
Ibn Arabi argues that an object cannot be described as both having and lacking 
a property at the same time, and that this is consistent for all properties; for instance, 
if something is red all over, it cannot be not red all over at the same time. Therefore, if 
existence were a property, the object could not possess and lack existence at the same 
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time. However, Ibn Arabi argues, this is not the case, as one could be said to possess 
both existence and non-existence; therefore, he concludes, existence is not a property. 
Ibn Arabi offers an example to clarify his claim: if Zayd is in the market and not at 
home, we could say that he exists at the market, and does not exist at home at the 
same time. On the other hand, if existence were a property, Zayd would be unable to 
possess existence and its negation at the same time; i.e., to exist and not to exist (Ibn 
Arabi, 2009b, p. 141). 
  One might attempt to object to Ibn Arabi’s argument by demonstrating that 
existence is presented relatively in the example of Zayd. Contrary to Ibn Arabi’s 
claim, an object may in fact possess and lack the same property when considered from 
a relative point of view. For example, an object is bright if it is placed under a light, 
while the same object is dim when removed from the light. Ibn Arabi might rebut this 
objection by arguing that the object is not bright and not bright at the same time. The 
condition ‘at the same time’ has not been met by this counterexample; an object could 
have a property and its negation but not at the same time. 
  However, Ibn Arabi’s argument may still be refuted. To begin with, it is 
important to explain that properties are typically divided into intrinsic properties and 
extrinsic properties. Intrinsic properties are essential to the concept of an object. They 
come from the way the thing is, independently of anything else, such as that a cat is 
an animal. Extrinsic properties, on the other hand, are not entirely about the object but 
describe its relation to external reality, such as the property that a cat is owned by me. 
The perfect duplicate of anything will also be a duplicate of its intrinsic properties but 
not necessarily of its extrinsic properties if the external surroundings of the duplicate 
are different from the original object (Lewis, 1983, p. 197). 
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It may be true that an object may not possess and lack an intrinsic property at 
the same time; however, this is not the case with regard to extrinsic properties; Mike 
could be a brother and not a brother at the same time (a brother of Jamal but not a 
brother of his friend Tom). Also, a person could be tall and short at the same time (he 
is tall in comparison to his new born son, but short when compared to a giraffe). 
Hence, contrary to Ibn Arabi’s claim, an object may possess and lack the same 
property at the same time if the property is extrinsic and considered from a relative 
point of view. Returning to the example of Zayd, we can see that he is both an 
existent (in the market) and a non-existent (in his house). An advocate of the view that 
existence is a property of the object could say that ‘existence’ in this example 
represents an extrinsic property. It is determined by the object’s relation to the outside 
world; hence, like other extrinsic properties an object could have it and lack it at the 
same time. Therefore, Ibn Arabi’s argument against treating existence as a property of 
the object fails. 
Ibn Arabi’s failure to provide a compelling argument for his position might 
not be crucial to him because he does not infer his doctrine primarily from 
philosophical argumentation. Arguments are only secondary for him, as he relies 
mainly on other, mostly mystical, sources of knowledge. It is possible that he presents 
arguments only for the sake of people who depend on rational argumentation to form 
their opinions. In addition, though his argument is unappealing, he still stands on solid 
ground; rejecting existence as a property of the object is a powerful position, 
regardless of Ibn Arabi’s argument. There are other compelling arguments that 
endorse Ibn Arabi’s view—namely, rejecting the idea of treating existence as a 
property of the object.  
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In his criticism of the ontological argument, Kant objects to treating existence 
as a property (or a predicate) of the object, as he insists that existence does not add up 
to the existent. He states: 
 
Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could 
add to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain 
determinations in themselves. In the logical use it is merely the copula of a 
judgement. The proposition God is omnipotent contains two concepts that 
have their objects: God and omnipotence; the little word ‘is’, is not a predicate 
in it, but only that which posits the predicate in relation to the subject. Now if 
I take the subject (God) together with all his predicates (among which 
omnipotence belongs), and say God is, or there is a God, then I add no new 
predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its 
predicates, and indeed posit the object in relation to my concept. Both must 
contain exactly the same, and hence when I think this object as given 
absolutely (through the expression ‘it is’), nothing is thereby added to the 
concept, which expresses merely its possibility. Thus the actual contains 
nothing more than the merely possible (A599/ B627). 
 
In explaining his views, Kant goes on to employ the ‘hundred dollars’ example, which 
claims that a possible hundred dollars does not contain less than an actual hundred 
dollars. The possible hundred dollars indicates the concept, and the actual hundred 
dollars indicates the object of that concept. Kant affirms that if the object (in this case 
the actual hundred dollars) contains more than the concept of the hundred dollars, the 
concept would not be of that object (A599/ B627). However, he warns that: 
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[I]n my functional condition there is more with a hundred actual dollars than 
with the mere concept of them (i.e., their possibility). For with actuality the 
object is not merely included in my concept analytically, but adds 
synthetically to my concept (A599/ B627). 
 
Interestingly, one could identify parts of Ibn Arabi’s writing that allude to a similar 
idea. He explicitly asserts that the existence of an object does not add anything to that 
object or its concept. He states: ‘Know that existence and non-existence [al-adam] are 
not something additional to the existent [object] or the non-existent [object], but 
[indeed] the same as the existent [object] or the non-existent [object]’ (2009b, p. 140). 
Kant’s argument seems sufficient to establish Ibn Arabi’s rejection of treating 
existence as a property of the object. 
The third argument, developed by Bertrand Russell, aims at establishing the 
problematic consequences of treating existence as a property. Russell argues that if 
existence were a property of an object, then there would be objects that have the 
property of existence (i.e. existent objects). However, we would also be committed to 
asserting that there are objects that do not have the property of existence (i.e., non-
existent objects), which appears contradictory. In his objection to Meinong, who 
famously upholds that existence is a property of the object, Russell states: 
 
This theory regards any grammatically correct denoting phrase as standing for 
an object. Thus ‘the present King of France’, ‘the round square’, etc., are 
supposed to be genuine objects. It is admitted that such objects do not subsist, 
but nevertheless they are supposed to be objects. This is in itself a difficult 
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view; but the chief objection is that such objects, admittedly, are apt to 
infringe the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent 
present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is 
round, and also not round; etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can be 
found to avoid this result, it is surely to be preferred (1905, pp. 482–83). 
 
Russell’s argument is powerful; for one to escape such an argument, one would have 
to be committed to affirm counter-intuitive propositions, such as that there are non-
existent objects.26 
Therefore, I conclude that Ibn Arabi’s rejection of treating existence as a 
property is compelling and to an extent noncontroversial.27 
6.2.3. Ibn Arabi’s Views on Existence and the Metaphysical Nature of 
Ultimate Reality as Existence (wujud) 
 
Establishing these two issues about existence in Ibn Arabi’s doctrine is crucial to 
understanding the first component of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence 
(wahdat al-wujud): the metaphysical nature of ultimate reality as existence (wujud). 
Affirming the necessity of existence and the impossibility of nothingness is essential 
to justify identifying God with existence. If existence is the ultimate and only 
metaphysical state of affairs there is, then it is justifiably the ultimate reality. Ibn 
Arabi seems to infer from his claim that existence is necessary and absolute his view 
that ultimate reality is identical with existence, and not the other way around. Because 
                                                        
26 Meinong is an advocate of the view that existence is a property and, consequently, 
that there are non-existent things; see Meinong (1960). 
27 For further discussion of considering existence a property of the object see: B. 
Russell (1904, 1905); T. Aquinas (1965); D. Pears (1967); W. J. Rapaport (1978); J. 
Haaparanta (1986) and S. Knuuttila; and J. Hintikka (1986). 
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existence is necessary, it is identical with God; not: because existence is identical with 
God, it is necessary. 
 Furthermore, by claiming that existence is not something other than the object, 
Ibn Arabi seems to think of God (who he claims is identical with existence) as an 
individual rather than a sea of being, as some of his other statements may imply. 
Understanding this is crucial in order to evaluate Izutsu’s interpretation (and similar 
others) of Ibn Arabi’s conception of ultimate reality. As mentioned in Chapter Three, 
Izutsu interprets Ibn Arabi’s conception of ultimate reality in terms of indeterminate 
existence, something comparable to the conceptions of ultimate reality in Eastern 
traditions such as Taoism. Such interpretations must now be dismissed as inaccurate 
in representing Ibn Arabi’s conception of ultimate reality.  
6.3 The Metaphysical Nature of the World 
 
6.3.1. Al-Mumkinat, Al-a’yan Al-thabitah and the World (al-a’lam) 
 
The second aspect of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) 
concerns the metaphysical nature of the world. Contrary to what many of his scholars 
and critics maintain, it seems to me that in his thesis of the oneness of existence 
(wahdat al-wujud) Ibn Arabi does not introduce primarily novel views on the 
metaphysical nature of God. Rather, he presents a novel thesis concerning the 
metaphysical nature of the world and its relationship to ultimate reality as existence 
(wujud). Ibn Arabi maintains that existence is one and identical with ultimate reality 
because he sees the world, not God, differently. 
 When examining Ibn Arabi’s writings on ontology, we encounter three 
metaphysical concepts related to his cosmology: al-mumkinat; al-a’yan al-thabitah; 
and the world (al-a’lam). My focus here is on the metaphysical aspects of these 
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concepts, which I believe may be grasped independently of the mystical and religious 
dimensions that Ibn Arabi tends to inscribe on them. 
First: the concept of al-mumkinat (plural, sing: al-mumkin) or al-a’yan al-
imkaniyah may accurately be translated as ‘contingent possible objects’ or ‘contingent 
possible entities’. A number of scholars define al-mumkin as ‘that which is 
contingent’ (see for example: El-Bizri, 2000, p. 116; Kalin, Ayduz and Dagli, 2014, 
Vol. 1, p. 361). Al-mumkinat incorporate both actual and merely possible objects that 
stand in contrast to the necessary and impossible objects. This term was commonly 
used among Islamic philosophers and theologians, and Ibn Arabi seems to use it in 
much the same way it was used by them. 
Second: the concept of al-a’yan al-thabitah (al-a’yan is a plural term, sing: 
al-a’yn). Ibn Arabi insinuates that he borrowed this concept from the Mu’tazilah 
theological school (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 3, p. 350). However, he seems to introduce 
a unique meaning for the term, and its similarity to the Mu’tazilah technical term is 
probably, for the most part, phonetical. Yet the concept enters common usage in the 
Sufi tradition thanks to Ibn Arabi. Nevertheless, there seems to be a lack of clarity 
with regard to what exactly this concept indicates, particularly in its metaphysical 
aspect. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that there has been disagreement among 
contemporary Ibn Arabi scholars in relation to finding an appropriate translation of 
the term. Some translations include ‘permanent archetypes’ (Izutsu, 1983), ‘fixed 
prototypes’, ‘latent realities’ (Affifi, 1930; Valiuddin, 1977), ‘immutable essences’ 
(McAuley, 2012), and ‘immutable entities’ (Chittick, 1994). 
Despite the disagreement around its translation, there is a consensus 
concerning al-a’yan al-thabitah among Ibn Arabi scholars: there is a metaphysical 
connection between al-a’yan al-thabitah and actual existents in the world. However, 
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only a few have attempted to clarify this connection. Izutsu, for example, claims that 
al-a’yan al-thabitah in Ibn Arabi’s ontology are identical to that which 
metaphysicians today call ‘universals’. He argues: ‘they [al-a’yan al-thabitah] are 
Universals standing over against Particulars. And the relation of the archetypes [i.e., 
al-a’yan al-thabitah] to the world is exactly the ontological relation of Universals to 
Particulars’ (Izutsu, 1983, p. 163). Hence, the relationship of al-a’yan al-thabitah to 
actual objects is similar, according to Izutsu, to the relationship between the colour 
yellow and yellow objects. 
Izutsu’s interpretation, I argue, is incorrect. Ibn Arabi never introduces al-
a’yan al-thabitah as universals or anything akin to them. A universal is typically 
characterised as being exemplifiable, usually by more than one particular. This is 
never the case with al-a’yan al-thabitah; few would argue that an a’yn thabitah could 
be exemplified, for instance, in the same way as the colour yellow may be 
exemplified by yellow objects. In fact, apart from being essentially connected to 
actual objects, it is difficult to find any statement by Ibn Arabi that mentions 
similarities between al-a’yan al-thabitah and universals. 
In a relatively early work, insha al-dawa’ir, written around 1204 (Hartenstein, 
199, p. 268), Ibn Arabi talks about a concept that he calls ‘the third thing’ (al-shay al-
thalith). Parts of his discussion of ‘the third thing’ (al-shay al-thalith) admittedly 
come very close to identifying it with the universals and Plato’s ideas. The third thing 
(al-shay al-thalith) might have been the preliminary version of Ibn Arabi’s concept of 
al-a’yan al-thabitah. However, assuming that the two concepts are related, and 
considering that his discussion of the third thing (al-shay al-thalith) has presumably 
evolved into another concept—the concept of al-a’yan al-thabitah—I argue that his 
views about the third thing (al-shay al-thalith) should be dismissed. This is especially 
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true when those views are incompatible with his presentation of al-a’yan al-thabitah, 
given that the latter is the more mature, and final, concept. 
Contrary to Izutsu’s understanding, al-a’yan al-thabitah are actually 
‘particulars’. The Arabic word ‘a’yan’ literally means ‘entities’. The only distinction 
of al-a’yan al-thabitah is that they seem to refer to special kinds of entities or 
particulars. I propose that al-a’yan al-thabitah are, in Ibn Arabi’s ontology, 
comparable to what metaphysicians today call ‘merely possible entities’—contingent 
entities that are actualisable but not actual. Ibn Arabi’s metaphysical delineation of 
the concept, in numerous aspects, corresponds to the way in which many 
metaphysicians today introduce merely possible objects. Ibn Arabi states that there are 
two kinds of object in the world (or ‘the Kingdom of God’, in his words). The first 
kind is termed al-a’yan al-thabitah, while the second kind is referred to as the world 
(al-a’lam)—the totality of actual objects. He explains that there is an essential 
relationship between the two kinds of objects. All actual objects are part of al-a’yan 
al-thabitah before they become actual. In addition, while he claims that actual objects 
are finite and temporal, he asserts that al-a’yan al-thabitah are actually infinite and 
eternal (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 8, p. 53). In addition, Ibn Arabi asserts that al-a’yan al-
thabitah are part of al-mumkinat (possible entities) (Ibid., p. 204). It is agreed that the 
actual realm—the world (al-a’lam)—is one of the two types of al-mumkinat, and al-
a’yan al-thabitah is the other type, as Ibn Arabi confirms. It seems certain, then, that 
al-a’yan al-thabitah correspond to merely possible entities which are known to be one 
of the two kinds of possible entities (al-mumkinat). 
The metaphysical aspect of Ibn Arabi’s concept of al-a’yan al-thabitah was 
ignored by many of Ibn Arabi’s scholars, probably because he was the first to 
introduce the concept of merely possible entities into Islamic philosophy. Typically, 
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Islamic philosophers and theologians use the term al-mumkinat (possible entities) to 
indicate both actual objects and merely possible objects, without explicitly 
distinguishing between the two. 
Besides being exegetically more accurate, Ibn Arabi’s views on the concept of 
al-a’yan al-thabitah become clearer and more coherent if the term is understood as 
indicating merely possible entities. It is noteworthy, too, that some contemporary 
scholars seem to come close to identifying al-a’yan al-thabitah as merely possible 
entities. For instance, William C. Chittick states: 
 
In this context the entities are called ‘the possible things’ (mumkinat) since 
they may or may not exist in the cosmos. In respect to their own possibility, 
which is their defining characteristic, their relationship to existence and non-
existence is the same. An ‘immutable entity’ [i.e., a’yn thabitah] is a non-
existent possible thing. If God ‘gives preponderance’ (tarjih) to the side of 
existence over nonexistence, it becomes an existent entity, an existent possible 
thing. Like ‘entity’ and ‘thing’ and unlike ‘existent’, the ontological status of a 
possible thing has to be specified (1989, p. 12). 
 
In calling al-a’yan al-thabitah non-existent, Chittick is quoting the exact words of Ibn 
Arabi. However, what Ibn Arabi means by ‘existence’ in such contexts is actuality; 
al-a’yan al-thabitah are non-existent in the sense that they are not actual.28 
Third: the concept of the world (al-a’lam). The world (al-a’lam) in Ibn 
Arabi’s ontology refers to the actual realm or totality of actual entities. 29  As 
                                                        
28 While he uses ‘existence’ occasionally to indicate actuality, he uses ‘stillness’ 
(thbu’t) to indicate mere possibility. Naturally, he tends to contrast the two. 
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mentioned above, the relationship between al-a’yan al-thabitah and the world is 
comparable to a relationship between contingent (i.e., not necessary) actual objects 
and merely possible objects. According to Ibn Arabi, the world (al-a’lam), before 
becoming actual, was among the infinite merely possible entities that he calls ‘al-
a’yan al-thabitah’. Ibn Arabi scholars seem to be in agreement on these issues. 
 
6.3.2. A Theory of Relative Actuality and Mere Possibility 
 
Ibn Arabi divides all possible entities into two categories: actual and merely possible. 
On the face of it, this is comparable to how contemporary metaphysicians divide 
possible entities in terms of actuality and mere possibility. However, while 
mainstream contemporary metaphysicians consider actuality and mere possibility to 
be metaphysically absolute and intrinsic to some objects independent of any observer, 
Ibn Arabi claims that they are rather relative matters. Merely possible entities (al-
a’yan al-thabitah) and actual entities (al-a’lam) originate from the same metaphysical 
realm—the realm of possible entities. As Chittick notes: ‘The immutable entity (a’yn 
thabitah) and the existent entity (a’yn mawjuda) [i.e. actual entity] are the same 
reality’ (1989, p. 84). Although this view is uncommon, theories of relative actuality 
are not completely unfamiliar to metaphysicians today. David Lewis, for example, is 
well-known for his assertion that there is no essential metaphysical difference 
between our actual world and other infinite possible worlds. Actuality, according to 
Lewis, is indexical depending on the context of utterance. A world is actual to 
whomever calls it their world. He states: 
                                                                                                                                                              
29 Ibn Arabi explicitly uses the term al-a’lam (the world) to indicate the actual world. 
However, he sometimes defines the world as ‘everything other than God’. Under this 
definition, the merely possible objects (al-a’yan al-thabitah) are part of the world as 
well. 
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According to the indexical analysis I propose, ‘actual’ (in its primary sense) 
refers at any world w to the world w. ‘Actual’ is analogous to ‘present’, an 
indexical term whose reference varies depending on a different feature of 
context: ‘present’ refers at any time t to the time t. ‘Actual’ is analogous also 
to ‘here’, ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘this’, and ‘aforementioned’ – indexical terms depending 
for their reference respectively on the place, the speaker, the intended 
audience, the speaker’s acts of pointing, and the foregoing discourse (1970, 
pp. 184–85).30 
 
However, it seems that while contemporary metaphysicians, Lewis included, consider 
the distinction between actuality and mere possibility a purely metaphysical notion, 
Ibn Arabi considers it an epistemic notion. Ibn Arabi accordingly tends to employ an 
epistemic language in describing actuality (and mere possibility), which he presents in 
terms of perceiving and witnessing (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 8, p. 13). According to Ibn 
Arabi, when a person perceives some possible entities, they constitute the actual 
realm(s) (al-alam) for that person. On the other hand, the set of possible entities that 
he does not perceive constitute the realm of merely possible entities (al-a’yan al-
thabitah) for him. This means that each person has his own actual realm (al-a’lam) 
and a realm of merely possible entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah). Hence, what is actual to 
one person may be merely possible (a’yn thabitah) to another, and vice versa. We 
may present ‘perceiving’ in Ibn Arabi’s theory of relative actuality as something akin 
to an epistemic frame that is applied to the metaphysical realm of possible entities. 
                                                        
30 For the current debate on actuality see: R. Adams (1974, 1981); D. Lewis (1986); 
D. M. Armstrong (1986, 1989, 1997); J. Divers (2002); A. Plantinga (2003); P. 
Bricker, (2008) and L. DeRosset (2009, 2009b).   
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What is within the frame, in this analogy, is the actual realm, with the rest beyond it 
representing the realm of merely possible entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah). 
Some of Ibn Arabi’s statements seem to introduce his theory of relative 
actuality in terms of a thesis comparable to transcendental idealism. Thus, it may be 
that the minds of people distinguish what is actual from what is merely possible. 
Actualisation as such is completely dependent upon people’s minds; considering that 
there is no fundamental metaphysical difference between the two realms, what the 
mind of the individual perceives (or chooses to perceive) from the metaphysical realm 
of possible entities becomes converted into an actual entity to him. The rest of 
possible entities, moreover, would be merely possible to him. Hence, regarding the 
aforementioned metaphor of the epistemic frame, our minds take on the role of these 
frames. Ibn Arabi might even suggest that we vary in our ability to actualise 
according to our mystical abilities (we have frames of different sizes). He might also 
explain that the actual realm is the same to most people; the variation of perceiving 
(and hence actualisation) might be better seen in terms of classes. That is, ‘ordinary 
people’ would have identical frames that allow them to include a particular amount of 
possible entities; hence, what is ‘actual’ and ‘merely possible’ to ordinary people 
would be much similar. However, mystics (or each class of mystic) have bigger 
frames and, therefore, more actual objects. The mechanism of these frames is 
constituted of our minds and our level in mysticism, Ibn Arabi might propose. 
In alluding to the transcendental idealism thesis, Ibn Arabi sometimes 
considers the actual world to be part of what he calls ‘the realm of imagination’ 
(khayal) (2009, p. 224; 2011, Vol. 3, p. 470). Within his doctrine, the concept of ‘the 
realm of imagination’ is very important, albeit somewhat vague. I am not concerned 
here with Ibn Arabi’s entire epistemological system, to which ‘the realm of 
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imagination’ clearly belongs; however, it should be sufficient to say that ‘the realm of 
imagination’ seems to indicate a particular mental realm. It might be that the 
distinguishing mark of what belongs to the realm of imagination is that it is mind-
dependent (whether or not mind-dependent reality corresponds to something 
external). Hence, he seems to consider dreams an example of ‘the realm of 
imagination’ par excellence. As he sometimes refers to the actual world as part of ‘the 
realm of imagination’, he may consider the actual world to be something that is to 
living people as dreams are to sleeping people. In fact, he employs a metaphorical 
saying that he attributes to the Prophet Mohammed which states that ‘people [when 
they are alive in this world] are [ontologically] asleep and they wake up when they 
die’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 3, p. 470). Thus, as each has their own dreams that depend 
solely on their mind, every person should have their own frame of actualisation. In 
addition, he repeatedly refers to the ability of mystics to see more actual things than 
ordinary people (in their mystical experiences, for instance). Hence, the mystics’ 
world would typically contain more actual objects than an ordinary person’s world. 
This would be explained by an endorsement of this thesis, especially if we take into 
account Ibn Arabi assertion that mystics have far greater cognitive abilities than 
ordinary people. 
There are, however, some difficulties with interpreting Ibn Arabi’s theory of 
relative actuality in terms of transcendental idealism. First, it seems that there is a 
circularity involved. People are considered to be part of the world; if actualisation 
depended completely upon the minds of people, as this thesis suggests, we would still 
have to account for the actualisation of the minds of people, as they are actual things 
too. One may rebut this by asserting that, in being self-conscious, people make their 
own minds, which also are contingent possible entities actual. If the individual is self-
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conscious, he perceives, and hence actualises, himself in the same way that he would 
perceive and hence actualise other contingent possible entities. There are some 
passages from Ibn Arabi’s writing that, with a twist, could be employed to support 
this answer; at one point he claims that the reason why actualisation occurs is so that 
possible entities may be apparent to themselves (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 8, p. 13).  
The second problem regarding the thesis of transcendental idealism is that it 
seems to undermine the theistic doctrine of creation, suggesting that God has no role 
in bringing the world into actuality. If actualisation is completely dependent upon 
individuals’ minds, this seems to remove God (ilah) as necessary to the process. 
However, for Ibn Arabi, God (ilah) has an essential role in creating and sustaining the 
world, as we will see Chapter Nine. This is a high price that Ibn Arabi would likely be 
unwilling to pay, as the concept of the theistic God is indispensable to his doctrine. 
In addition to these problems, the transcendental idealism thesis seems to be 
incompatible with another thesis that Ibn Arabi also proposes for his theory of relative 
actuality. In this second thesis he makes similar claims to those of the theistic doctrine 
of creation; he affirms that God is the one who makes things actual. If we employ the 
same metaphors referenced earlier, God is the one who places the frame and we only 
see within it what He determines for us to see, that is, things that he actualises. The 
actual and merely possible are still in the same metaphysical class. The only 
difference is that God makes some of them visible to us by including them within the 
frame. Ibn Arabi explains: 
 
God wants the things for themselves, not for Him. As there is not a thing but 
that with Him are its depositories. […] Hence, the things [all things] are kept 
[hidden] with Him. Then, when He wants to create them, He brings them 
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down from those depositories, and orders them to wear the garment of 
existence, and thus they appear to themselves (2011, Vol.8, p. 13) 
 
Despite his abstract language and metaphoric expressions, Ibn Arabi here seems to 
introduce actualisation as something dependent upon God; He is the one who makes 
things actual. By asserting that things were hidden with God, he seems to be alluding 
to merely possible entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah) before they are perceived by anyone 
other than God. In addition, in his claim that God brings them down from the 
depositories and makes them apparent to themselves, he indicates the process of 
actualisation and God’s role in it. Positing that God makes things apparent to 
themselves is another way of saying that He makes them actual. Sometimes he uses 
metaphors such as shedding light upon some of the possible entities that are sunk in 
darkness (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 3, p. 105). In most occasions, Ibn Arabi introduces 
actuality according to this thesis. 
The second thesis for Ibn Arabi’s theory of relative actuality has the advantage 
of preserving the role of God (ilah) in bringing the world into actuality, according to 
something similar to traditional theism. The idea that God makes some of the possible 
entities apparent, and thus ‘actual’, seems similar to the theistic doctrine of creation, 
which describes the world as being brought into actuality from God’s knowledge. In 
fact, as the above quote shows, Ibn Arabi uses the term ‘create’ to describe 
actualisation according to this thesis. However, this thesis also faces a number of 
difficulties. First, it seems to undermine the role of people’s minds in actualisation, as 
God is the one who makes things actual. Thus, it seems incompatible with his claim 
that the actual world is part of ‘the realm of imagination’, which means that it is 
mind-dependent. 
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 Another related and more serious implication of this thesis is the problem of 
free will. Let us consider again the analogy of the frame: if God includes only the 
actual objects within the frame, as this thesis suggests, and people cannot perceive 
anything outside it, then this model seems to preclude human free will. People are 
restricted to what God has predetermined for them and what He wills to be within the 
frame. I believe that Ibn Arabi would want to avoid this implication. 
Hitherto, we have two incompatible potential theses for actualisation in Ibn 
Arabi’s relative theory of actuality and mere possibility. The first sees actualisation as 
dependent upon the minds of individuals. The second considers God to be the one 
who actualises things, or makes them visible. Each thesis seems to be supported by 
some of Ibn Arabi’s texts and yet contradicted by others. In fact, one could assume 
that Ibn Arabi himself was aware that he was divided between the two theses; he 
states that the world (the totality of actual entities) is ‘different reflections in one 
mirror; nay, it is one reflection in different mirrors’ (Ibn Arabi, 2009, p. 155). It may 
be the case then that he is unsure whether the actual world is different reflections 
(indicating the first thesis) or one reflection (indicating the second thesis). 
To resolve this problem I propose the following model, which aims to 
incorporate the two theses. I posit that actuality, in Ibn Arabi’s theory, should not be 
seen as solely dependent upon perceiving, but as dependent upon both perceiving and 
perceivability. God determines the realm of perceivable entities and people freely 
choose from them what to perceive. Let us apply this to the analogy of the epistemic 
frame. There is a field of all possible entities and God places an epistemic frame (the 
frame of actualisability) on a certain region of the field to make some possible entities 
perceivable (and hence actualisable). People then choose to perceive (and hence 
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actualise) some of the actualisable entities. The totality of what people perceive from 
the field of actualisable (or perceivable) entities constitutes the actual world for them.  
This proposed model should preserve all of Ibn Arabi’s principal claims 
relating to the matter, including the relationship between the concept of God and the 
world. First, unlike the transcendental idealistic thesis, God has an essential role in 
actualisation, since He is the one who determines the realm of what is perceivable. 
Accordingly, it renders Ibn Arabi’s theory of relative actuality more compatible with 
theism, which he constantly strives to maintain. Second, unlike the second thesis, it 
preserves the role of the human mind with regard to actualisation. People’s minds will 
have essential roles in determining the range of what is perceived from the realm of 
perceivable entities determined by God. 
Of course, according to this model, there will be entities that are actualisable 
but never actualised, as well as entities that are never available for actualisation 
(outside the actualisability frame); this shares some similarities with the typical view 
of actuality. From the typical viewpoint of ontology, there are some merely possible 
entities that are available for actualising, such as the choice between writing and 
going jogging. In addition, there are merely possible entities that are not available for 
actualising on account of restrictions applied to our metaphysical framework, such as 
the possibility of a human being living without oxygen. 
To amend this model to be even more inclusive of Ibn Arabi’s views, we 
could maintain that instead of talking about one epistemic frame applied by God for 
what is realisable, we could posit that God sets different epistemic frames for different 
people according to their level in the mystical hierarchy. It is to be expected that these 
frames overlap; however, some of them may be bigger than others. This idea offers a 
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place for some of Ibn Arabi’s claims, mentioned above, that the realm of the actual 
world might be wider from the perspective of some mystics than that of most people. 
6.3.3. The Metaphysical Nature of Possible Entities 
 
Hitherto, I have explained that actuality and mere possibility have no intrinsic 
metaphysical reality; they are relative notions dependent for a considerable part upon 
the individual. Metaphysically speaking, however, there are an infinite number of 
possible entities. The question now arises about the metaphysical nature of these 
possible entities, whether they are abstract or concrete.  
Even if one ignores the fact that metaphysicians are far from agreeing upon a 
criterion to differentiate what is abstract from what is concrete (as mentioned above), 
I do not think that the concrete/abstract categorisation is useful in the case of Ibn 
Arabi’s ontology who holds a relative theory of actuality and mere possibility. To 
clarify, let us say that I maintain that the criterion for concreteness is temporality; 
anything that is temporal is concrete, and anything that is not temporal is abstract. 
Accordingly, merely possible entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah) would be considered 
abstract and actual entities—the world (al-a’lam) would be considered concrete. This 
however is problematic. According to my interpretation of Ibn Arabi, some of the 
possible entities would be perceived by some people and hence appear to them, in 
particular, actual. The same entities, however, might not be perceived by other people 
and hence will remain merely possible (a’yan thabitah) to them. The same entities 
would hence be both temporal and atemporal. Following the criterion, this would 
mean that the same entities are both abstract and concrete. Concreteness and 
abstractness, however, are supposed to be intrinsic to the entities. Metaphysicians 
would maintain that it is impossible for an object to be both concrete and abstract. 
Yet, applying standard criteria to Ibn Arabi’s concept of possible entities seems to 
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lead to this conclusion. Since Ibn Arabi’s theory of relative actuality is at least 
plausible, it is important to note that failing to comply with the binary division of 
concrete/abstract is not due to a fault in Ibn Arabi’s theory. The problem, I maintain, 
originates from the narrowness of the binary division that fails to extend to 
incorporate relative actuality. The binary division seems to presume that actuality and 
mere possibility must be absolute. 
Interestingly, David Lewis, who shares some similarity with Ibn Arabi in 
defending a theory of relative actuality, also complains about failing to find the 
concrete/abstract division useful in expressing his own doctrine. He states:  
 
Because I said that other worlds are of a kind with this world of ours, 
doubtless you will expect me to say that possible worlds and individuals are 
concrete, not abstract. But I am reluctant to say that outright. Not because I 
hold the opposite view; but because it is not all clear to me what philosophers 
mean when they speak of ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ in this connection. Perhaps 
I would agree with it, whatever it means, but still I do not find it a useful way 
of explaining myself (1986, p. 81, my italics).  
 
I also think that it is better for Ibn Arabi’s ontology to be viewed apart from the 
binary division of concrete and abstract. I am not necessarily saying that possible 
entities in Ibn Arabi’s ontology are a third thing (neither abstract nor concrete). My 
contention is that this binary division as it is does not seem to be suited to perfectly 
incorporate relative actuality and mere possibility; it does not seem to be helpful in 
determining the metaphysical nature of possible entities as such. 
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However, if one insists on determining the metaphysical status of possible 
entities according to the binary division of concrete and abstract, I would say that the 
same entity could be both relatively concrete and relatively abstract. A perceived 
computer is relatively concrete, to the one who perceives it, and hence actualises it. 
The same computer is relatively abstract to someone who does not perceive it. The 
concreteness and abstractness of the computer, in this context, are obviously not 
intrinsic to the entity but dependent upon the perceiving.  
6.4 The Relationship between Ultimate Reality as Existence 
(wujud) and the World 
 
6.4.1. Possible Entities and God’s Knowledge of the World 
 
Now we have an understanding of the metaphysical nature of ultimate reality as 
existence (wujud), and of the metaphysical nature of the world. The remaining task is 
to determine the relationship between the two presuming Ibn Arabi’s claim that 
existence is one and identical with ultimate reality. 
Ibn Arabi’s theory of relative actuality provides a different outlook towards 
the potential duality of reality in Ibn Arabi’s ontology; instead of having a clear 
distinction between God and the metaphysically intrinsic actual world, which is the 
typical theistic worldview, the opposition is now between Ibn Arabi’s concept of 
possible entities and God. Still, the coexistence of God and possible entities appears 
to undermine Ibn Arabi’s claims about the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). 
 I propose that the way to maintain both the reality of possible entities and Ibn 
Arabi’s claim that existence is one and identical with ultimate reality is to identify the 
totality of possible entities with God’s knowledge of the world. Some of Ibn Arabi’s 
texts insinuate as much (see for instance, Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 5, p. 70). By being 
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identical with God’s knowledge and hence intrinsic to His existence, possible entities 
do not breach Ibn Arabi’s claims of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). 
 This proposition shares some similarities with ‘theistic activism’, a doctrine 
advanced by Thomas Morris and Christopher Menzel (1986) to solve the apparent 
inconsistency between Platonism and the theistic doctrine of absolute creation, which 
states that everything, whether abstract or concrete, is ultimately dependent upon God. 
In their presentation of their proposition, Morris and Menzel state: 
 
God traditionally is thought of as personal. A dominant model of deity is that 
of mind or active, creative intellect. In line with that model, we suggest, to 
begin with, that all properties and relations are God’s concepts, the products, 
or perhaps better, the contents of a divine intellective activity, a causally 
efficacious or productive sort of divine conceiving […] [D]ivine concepts are 
those very properties themselves; and unlike what is assumed in standard 
Platonism, those properties are not ontologically independent, but rather 
depend on certain divine activities ( p. 355). 
 
 
Ibn Arabi however is required to justify the identification between the totality of 
possible entities and God’s knowledge. He does not address this issue at length, but I 
believe there are plausible reasons for one to uphold the identification of the two. 
Before I explain my view, it is essential to bear in mind that we do not know all there 
is to know about the nature of God’s knowledge. All I seek to offer hence is that the 
identification has some merit based on what we know about God’s knowledge and the 
nature of possible entities and that it is not, therefore, a completely unjustified 
equivocation. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that God’s knowledge is 
 117 
essentially different from human knowledge. God’s knowledge is necessary and 
perfect, while our knowledge is neither necessary nor perfect. Considering that we 
know of a fundamental difference between the two kinds of knowledge, we should not 
expect that what we know about our own knowledge must always apply to God’s 
knowledge. At least, we should not reject a plausible claim made about God’s 
knowledge merely on the basis that it is not the case with human knowledge. 
Nevertheless, I acknowledge that, all things being equal, being compatible with what 
we know about knowledge is definitely an advantage of any view or proposition.  
 With this in mind, let us ask the following question: if God’s knowledge of the 
world is complete, perfect and necessarily true, what would be the relationship 
between the world and God’s knowledge of it? There are two main perspectives 
through which we can represent the relationship. The first approach is to maintain that 
God’s knowledge of the world, like our knowledge of things, is distinct from the 
world. This is comparable to the relationship between my knowledge of my computer 
and the computer itself. The second way to represent this relationship is to maintain 
that God’s knowledge of the world is identical with the world, as some propose (e.g., 
Mander, 2000).  
The first approach has the advantage of being more intuitive and compatible 
with our conceptions of human knowledge. The second, however, has the advantage 
of providing a clear model for the infallibility, perfection and completeness of God’s 
knowledge; unlike in the first approach, it is clear that it is metaphysically impossible 
for God’s knowledge of the world to be fallible, imperfect or incomplete if it is 
identical with the world itself. In addition, as stated above, the fact that God’s 
knowledge as such may be essentially different from human knowledge should not 
pose a serious problem. I believe that it is more beneficial to read Ibn Arabi’s 
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ontology through this second perspective. 
 However, Ibn Arabi should not, like Mander, identify God’s knowledge of the 
world with the actual world. This is because God’s knowledge is eternal, while the 
actual world is finite; its existence had a beginning and will have an end. If God’s 
knowledge were identical to the actual world, this would mean that it started to be and 
will cease to be; this is far from being perfect or complete. 
Ibn Arabi, however, would identify God’s knowledge with the totality of 
possible entities instead. When identifying God’s knowledge of the world with the 
totality of possible entities, it is possible to bypass the problem facing Mander’s 
proposition. God’s knowledge of the possible entities is a direct knowledge of the 
world, and yet remains unaffected by the finitude of the actual world. Also, Ibn 
Arabi’s theory of relative actuality and mere possibility will be the most helpful here. 
As explained above, there is no metaphysical difference between actual entities and 
merely possible entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah); the actual world coming into existence 
therefore does not impact God’s knowledge. The finitude of the actual world is 
relative and concerns the minds of individuals who start to perceive (and hence 
actualise) some of the possible entities. That is not the case with God, who perceives 
all of the possible entities from eternity. Moreover, Ibn Arabi maintains that possible 
entities are eternal, as is typically thought with regard to God’s knowledge. By being 
identical with the totality of possible entities, God’s knowledge of the world is 
perfect, complete and infallible. It is metaphysically impossible for anything to escape 
the possible entities; therefore, in being identical with them it is also metaphysically 
impossible for God’s knowledge to be imperfect or to be the subject of error in any 
sense. 
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This model seems to manage to represent what we know about God’s 
knowledge of the world (i.e., necessary, perfect and complete), and hence to offer a 
justification for the identification between the totality of possible entities and God’s 
knowledge in my interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s thesis. In fact, it seems to come very 
close to some of the common sayings among Islamic theologians and scholars about 
God’s knowledge, such as Ibn Taymiyyah’s well-known statement: ‘God knew [from 
eternity] what was, is, will be, and what will never be if it had been how it would be’ 
(1995, Vol. 8, 286) Ibn Arabi would describe possible entities in a similar way; they 
encompass from eternity what was, what will be and what will never be, as well as 
how they would have been if they had come into actuality.  
However, one might wonder whether or not the second model is plausible, as 
how God’s knowledge could be of the possible entities when they do not have an 
externally independent existence from His knowledge. In standard cases, when 
knowledge is of something, the thing is usually considered independent of the 
knowledge. For example, my computer has an independent existence, distinct from 
my knowledge of it.  
Ibn Arabi would answer that it is not necessary that, in order for knowledge to 
be of something, what is known must be distinct and independent of the knowledge. 
One’s knowledge of his consciousness or pain, for instance, is still of something even 
though it is not of something independent and distinct from the knowledge. At least 
there seems to be some overlap between the knowledge and that which is known in 
the case of self-consciousness and pain. Therefore, Ibn Arabi could assert that God’s 
knowledge of possible entities is of something even though he postulates that they are 
not independent of His knowledge. In fact, in some of his statements, Ibn Arabi 
 120 
asserts that God’s knowledge of the world is part of His knowledge of Himself; by 
knowing Himself God knows the world (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 1, p. 141).  
As he identifies the totality of possible entities with God’s knowledge of the 
world, Ibn Arabi seems to come very close to panentheism. In fact, some of 
contemporary Ibn Arabi scholars defend such interpretation (Sharify-Funk and 
Dickson, 2014). However, this does not seem to be accurate if we accept the common 
definition of panentheism. According to this definition, panentheism is the ontological 
view that the actual universe is subsumed by God. Panentheism, thus, maintains that 
the actual universe is an ontological entity that is included in God’s existence. Ibn 
Arabi, however, would not accept that. As explained above, actuality according to Ibn 
Arabi is primarily an epistemic notion. The actual world does not represent absolute 
metaphysical reality in his ontology. I believe that Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of 
existence (wahdat al-wujud) should be placed somewhere between acosmism and 
panentheism.   
 
6.4.2. Identifying God’s Knowledge with the Totality of Possible Entities 
and the Problem of God’s Foreknowledge 
 
The problem of God’s foreknowledge and free will is one of the oldest challenges for 
the doctrine of divine omniscience. Most theists would confirm that God has given 
human beings free will. In addition, they would also uphold that God is omniscient, 
and hence He has foreknowledge. The two claims appear inconsistent, as God’s 
foreknowledge seems at the first sight to preclude human free well.31 Endorsing a 
realist position with regard to human free will is important for theism, for 
                                                        
31 For further discussions of the problem of God’s foreknowledge and free will see: 
A. Plantinga (1974); J. Hoffman and G. Rosenkrantz (1980); W. Alston (1985); W. L. 
Craig (1986); and T. A. Warfield (1997).  
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philosophical as well as theological reasons. Philosophically, dismissing free will 
seems a counter-intuitive position that negates personal experiences. In addition, 
many theists believe that God will reward righteous people for their good deeds and 
may punish others for their sins. Without free will, the doctrine of reward and 
punishment would be problematic to many. The debates among philosophers (and 
theologians) on this problem are longstanding.  
Ibn Arabi’s views on the doctrine of human free will and God’s 
foreknowledge seem unclear to many. Landau and Affifi claim that Ibn Arabi is a 
proponent of determinism, albeit a unique version. They claim that it is not the case 
that God replaces human free will with His own will. Instead, the actions of 
individuals are predetermined by their own preparedness (istidad); i.e., by their own 
nature or ontological status. Ibn Arabi’s concept of preparedness (istidad) is obscure 
but it seems to be related to some kind of ontological status that the individual 
exemplifies, which predetermines his destiny. Even God, they say, cannot change the 
preparedness (istidad) of any existent. Rom Landau states: 
 
Ibn ‘Arabi disagrees with the doctrine of Jabar [Islamic theological doctrine 
of determinism] as a compulsion forced upon man from an outside agent. Yet 
it was obviously impossible for him to accept free will, for this would have 
left him no alternative but the opposition of man’s will to that of God, and 
thereby have introduced dualism […] [F]ree will as ordinarily understood, can 
have no place in his system (1959, p. 49). 
 
Affifi further asserts that Ibn Arabi’s deterministic view should not hold a person 
responsible for their actions, as much as it should not hold a stone responsible for 
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reacting to the laws of gravity. Hence, he proposes that Ibn Arabi’s form of 
determinism shares crucial similarities with what he calls ‘scientific determinism’. He 
explains: 
 
All actions, including the so-called volitional actions, are, according to this 
doctrine, determined by internal and external laws which (modern determinists 
would say) can all be calculated and accounted for scientifically. Ibnul ‘Arabi 
agrees with the deterministic side of such a theory, but adds: (a) that the so-
called scientific laws are nothing but God’s Laws, and (b) that God’s laws in 
Man are determined by Man’s own nature, and in this lies Man’s moral 
obligation (1964, p. 155). 
 
It is fair to say that indeed some of Ibn Arabi’s texts allude to determinism. He says: 
‘[The belief] that Allah is the [real] doer of things [i.e., everything], without any 
contribution from anyone or any apparent cause, is the heart of [true] belief’ (Ibn 
Arabi, 2011, Vol. 4, p. 232). However, Ibn Arabi presents other statements in which 
he seems to resist determinism as understood by Landau and Affifi. He explicitly 
states that ‘the expert mystic [muhaqiq] [would] resist determinism because it 
contradicts human [free] actions’ (Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 70). One needs to incorporate all of 
Ibn Arabi’s statements on the matter in order to be exegetically faithful, something 
both Landau and Affifi fail to do. 
 Another contemporary interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s views on the relationship 
between God’s foreknowledge and free will has been developed by Bakri Aladdin 
(2011). Aladdin rejects Affifi’s deterministic interpretation. He claims that Ibn Arabi 
indeed recognises an incompatibility between God’s foreknowledge and human free 
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will, upholding that the issue cannot be resolved. Ibn Arabi’s solution, he argues, is to 
accept that there is no way around this. He explains: 
 
He [Ibn Arabi] prefers to adopt the idea of ‘participation’ (ishtirāk) in the act 
by both God and human being. Quranic texts do not resolve the matter in 
favour of one party, although out of courtesy they do attribute the acts to God, 
according to the verse: ‘Say, all is from God’. Ibn 'Arabi says that ‘In acts 
there must be ḥaqq and khalq’, and in Chapter 350 of the Futūḥāt that ‘the 
correct opinion regarding this is that it is linked to both ḥaqq and khalq, 
without being exclusive to either side’. This original solution to the issue 
confirms that Ibn 'Arabi is not a determinist (2011, p. 140). 
 
When one reads Ibn Arabi carefully, it seems that he is indeed puzzled by the issue. 
He wants to preserve the free will of the individual, following certain parts of the 
scriptures that appear to ascribe free will to human beings, while at the same time 
maintaining the other, seemingly deterministic, parts of the scriptures. In fact, some of 
his texts show clearly his puzzlement and dividedness between embracing 
determinism or non-determinism (see for instance, Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 3, p. 104). 
 I believe, however, that Ibn Arabi’s thesis could offer a promising solution to 
the problem of God’s foreknowledge and human free will. Thus, Ibn Arabi needs not 
to be puzzled.  
 A person’s free will, regardless of how significant it is, is ultimately tied to the 
realm of possible entities (or in fact some of it). In addition, I argued above for the 
plausibility of the identification between God’s knowledge and the totality of possible 
entities. Hence, as long as possible entities (by which one’s actions are limited) do not 
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undermine one’s free will, neither should God’s knowledge. Even though God’s 
knowledge is eternal and complete, it is also infinite and unlimited as it is identical 
with all possible entities, according to my interpretation of Ibn Arabi. Even though a 
person would have a significant range to choose from, his choice would still be 
incorporated within the realm of possible entities and, hence, God’s knowledge. 
Further, if we endorse Ibn Arabi’s view that actuality is relative, then the 
relative actual realms do not have any significance to God’s knowledge. Each 
relatively actual world concerns epistemically only the one(s) to whom it is actual. 
The knowledge that one acquires of the relatively actual world, as such, is a form of 
knowledge de se, similar to my knowledge that I am walking (not that Nader is 
walking). Some might claim that knowledge de se also pose a potential problem to the 
doctrine of God’s omniscience, but this is not my concern here. 32 
Thus, by identifying God’s knowledge with the totality of possible entities, 
and by upholding a relative theory of actuality and mere possibility, Ibn Arabi’s thesis 
offers a way to maintain God’s complete and eternal knowledge of the world without 
infringing on human free will. 
At one point, Ibn Arabi alludes to a similar solution to the problem of free will 
and God’s foreknowledge (2011, Vol. 7, p. 91), which he considers to be revealing of 
‘the secret of preordainment [qadar]’ or divine foreknowledge (Ibid., p. 90). He 
confirms that what he reveals on this issue is the ultimate unveiling [kashf] (Ibid., p. 
91). 
                                                        
32 Knowledge de se is the type of knowledge that is only available to the knower. 
Knowing that I am home might be different from knowing that Nader is home. If, for 
some reason, I forget my name, I may know that I am home but not that Nader is 
home. In addition, if I do not know where I am or who I am, and yet I heard someone 
saying Nader is home, I would know that ‘Nader is home’ but not that I am home. For 
further discussions of knowledge de se and God’s Omniscience see: R. Swinburne 
(1977); E. R. Wierenga (1989, 2002); W. L. Craig (2000); Y. Nagasawa (2003); and 
S. Torre (2006). 
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6.5 Maintaining Ibn Arabi’s Statements 
My interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud) 
offers a way of coherently maintaining his claims concerning the oneness of existence 
and the reality of the world. In holding that there is no metaphysical difference 
between what is actual and what is merely possible, we find a way to eliminate the 
acute duality of existence represented by the intrinsically actual world and God. 
Hence, we pave the way to maintaining Ibn Arabi’s claim that existence is one and 
identical with ultimate reality. Then, by identifying possible entities with God’s 
knowledge of the world, we actually maintain Ibn Arabi’s claims. 
 If my interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s thesis proves successful, it will also help us 
to understand a number of his apparently problematic statements regarding the 
relationship between ultimate reality and the world. As noted in Chapter Four, Ibn 
Arabi defends four apparently incompatible claims: (i) the world does not exist; (ii) 
the world is identical with God; (iii) the world actually exists and is, by definition, 
everything other than God; and (iv) the world is a mixture of existence and non-
existence.  
My interpretation may help to reconcile these four statements. When Ibn Arabi 
proclaims that the world is non-existent, he seems to refer to the actuality of the 
world, referring in particular to his view that actuality is not a metaphysically intrinsic 
reality. According to Ibn Arabi’s ontology, the actual world does not exist from an 
independently metaphysical point of view. 
In addition, when he identifies the world with God, Ibn Arabi is likely 
focusing on the fact that the totality of possible entities are identical with God’s 
knowledge and, thus, are intrinsic to his existence. The fact that the actual world is 
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metaphysically part of the realm of possible entities makes it thus part of God’s 
knowledge and, hence, existence. 
Furthermore, with regard to his insistence on the existence of the world, Ibn 
Arabi appears to be speaking from the perspective of someone who perceives the 
world as actual. As actuality is a relative reality, Ibn Arabi would accept that the 
actual world exists to those who perceive it as such.  
Finally, when Ibn Arabi claims that the world is in an intermediate state that 
lies between, or combines, existence and non-existence, he seems to hint at the 
limitedness of possible objects as finite and contingent. He considers limitedness to be 
a form of non-existence, as will be explored in the following chapter. By being 
limited, possible objects are affected by non-existence. Ultimate reality that is 
identical with existence (i.e., exists in the full sense) is necessary and unlimited, and 
so anything that is not so must have a deficient form of existence. 
In addition, my interpretation also preserves another important aspect of Ibn 
Arabi’s doctrine concerning the relationship between God and the world. This is the 
religious relationship with God, including the acts of worshipping and praying, and 
many aspects of mysticism. All forms of religious practice would be doomed to suffer 
if one endorsed pantheism or acosmism; the traditional interpretations of Ibn Arabi’s 
thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). With regard to the acosmistic 
interpretation, it is clear that worshipping is not possible if there is no one to worship, 
as the only existent is ultimate reality. Worship and prayer are also incompatible with 
pantheism. Michel P. Levine explains: 
 
[W]orship is an expression of another’s superiority […] There is nothing in 
pantheism that corresponds to this inferiority/superiority dichotomy taken as 
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essential to worship. […] The theist claims that ‘It is necessarily true that God 
(if He exists) is worthy of worship.’ The pantheist […] will reject its 
applicability to the pantheistic Unity […] Indeed, for the pantheist, it is more 
likely necessarily false […] In short the properties that according to theists 
make God worthy of worship are not constitutive of the Unity, and there are 
no other proper objects of worship for the pantheists (1994, pp. 317–18). 
 
Of course, Ibn Arabi would categorically reject any doctrine that deprives His 
ultimate reality of being transcendent or worthy of worship, as this eliminates 
essential aspects of his doctrine. The existence of the world and some kind of 
otherness of ultimate reality are essential for maintaining any mystical or religious 
relationship. Many aspects of religion are essentially dependent on the fact that the 
world exists and that it is not God. My interpretation affirms the reality of the possible 
entities as explained above, and, therefore, makes room for worshipping and 
mysticism. Yet, at the same time, it avoids undermining Ibn Arabi’s claim that 
existence is one and identical with ultimate reality. 
 But what about Ibn Arabi’s mystical poems in which he celebrates forms of 
personal identification and unity with God? In these poems, he appears to propose that 
a mystic may become one with God. How, then, can one reconcile such statements 
with my interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s thesis? 
 To begin with, while Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as existence (his 
thesis of the oneness of existence—wahdat al-wujud) is metaphysical, his statements 
concerning the personal unity with God are epistemic and mystical. When he and 
other mystics express views that allude to a personal unity with God, they are usually 
describing their personal mystical experiences rather than expressing metaphysical 
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views. The views expressed in such contexts are not necessarily a description of what 
there is and how it is, but of how certain experiences appear to them. Hence, one is 
justified on these bases to dismiss such statements as irrelevant to Ibn Arabi’s 
metaphysical thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). 
Furthermore, mystics are vulnerable to what is known among Sufis as shatah, 
a state in which a mystic engages in expressing theistically controversial (and 
probably heretical) views due to the influence of a dense religious experience. Ibn 
Arabi seems to compare being in shatah to being drunk. He quotes al-Shibly, a 
Muslim mystic: ‘Al-Hallaj [another Muslim mystic known for shatah] and I drank 
from the same glass. [However,] while I sobered up, he became drunk, and 
[consequently] engaged in unruly behaviour [a’rbadah] until he got arrested’ (Ibn 
Arabi, 2011, Vol. 4, p. 263). Drinking here is figurative, and indicates religious 
experiences. ‘Being drunk and engaging in unruly behaviour’ seems to indicate 
engaging in shatah and expressing statements and views that many theists would 
deem heretical. Ibn Arabi considers shatah to be a deficiency and a weakness of the 
mystic. He sometimes also seems to suggest that shatah statements should be 
dismissed. In his discussion of potentially unacceptable claims made by some 
mystics, he asserts the following: 
 
Whichever of the people of Allah [i.e., the mystics] stated something different, 
he stated it as an outcome of shatah and not as [his] real [view]. [The shatah 
view stemmed from] the overwhelming [mystical] state that possessed him. It 
came from the tongue of his state rather than from his own tongue. And when 
he sobered up [or woke up from this overwhelming state], he said: ‘Glory be 
to Thee! To Thee I turn in repentance’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 4, p. 203). 
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Thus, mystics may not mean what they say during shatah and may even attempt to 
retract it after they wake up from these dense mystical states, just as someone may 
regret when sober what they had said when intoxicated. Inasmuch as we should 
dismiss a drunk person’s statements, I uphold that we should also dismiss shatah 
statements. Ibn Arabi actually makes a similar point when he accepts on one occasion 
al-Shibly’s claim over al-Hallaj’s on a disagreement between the two; Ibn Arabi’s 
justification is that al-Shibly was sober while al-Hallaj was drunk. Of course, here he 
is using ‘sober’ and ‘drunk’ metaphorically. Mystics, ideally, should have control 
over themselves when they engage in religious experience; for the mystic to be 
‘sober’ is a sign of perfection, Ibn Arabi affirms (Ibid., p. 26). However, even the 
great mystics may occasionally engage in shatah. 
 Interestingly, the mystical statements defending personal union with God 
(ittihad) are usually expressed under the influence of mystical experiences, most 
probably as shatah. In fact, al-Hallaj’s famous saying: ‘there is nothing in my cloak 
but Allah’, which apparently advocates a thesis of personal identification with God, is 
considered in the Islamic literature an example of shatah par excellence. In a 
statement in which Ibn Arabi defends a thesis of personal identification with God, he 
merely employs al-Hallaj’s aforementioned statement. He says: ‘there is nothing in 
the cloak except what al-Hallaj once said’ (Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 481). If al-Hallaj’s 
statement is shatah, as has long been accepted, then Ibn Arabi’s statement should also 
be considered shatah. In fact, I propose that the few statements in which Ibn Arabi 
defends mystical union with God should all be dismissed as shatah, and we should 
give them little weight in analysing his metaphysical thesis. In general, any of Ibn 
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Arabi’s mystical statements, which are arguably vulnerable to shatah, should not be 
considered a legitimate source for his metaphysical views in relation to ontology. 
Finally it seems that my interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate 
reality as existence (wujud) seems to have a number of advantages over the 
interpretations examined in the last chapter. First, it represents Ibn Arabi’s texts 
accurately. It does not dismiss the world as non-existent, as Affifi and Chittick seem 
to do, nor does it identify ultimate reality with the world, as Ibn Taymiyyah’s 
interpretation does. As demonstrated in previous chapters, both of these claims are 
negated by some of Ibn Arabi’s texts.  
Second, my interpretation complements two more of Ibn Arabi’s concepts of 
ultimate reality: the concept of ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat), and the 
concept of ultimate reality as God (ilah). The latter concept indicates ultimate reality 
in his relationship to the world (as its Creator and Sustainer). Identifying the world 
with ultimate reality, or dismissing it as non-existent, leaves no place for the concept 
of God (ilah). Yet this concept plays a very important role, not just in Ibn Arabi’s 
conception of ultimate reality, but also in his metaphysics in general.  
Third, Ibn Arabi strives to make his thesis compatible with theism, and with 
Islam in particular, both of which are incompatible with pantheism and acosmism. By 
establishing that the novel views and concepts developed by Ibn Arabi in his thesis of 
the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) primarily concern the metaphysics of the 
world and not the concept of God, my interpretation renders Ibn Arabi’s thesis more 
compatible with theism. Even though many theists may disagree with Ibn Arabi 
concerning his theory of relative actuality and mere possibility, and even perhaps the 
identification between God’s knowledge of the world and the totality of possible 
entities, they would probably be more tolerant of disagreements around these issues 
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than of the concept of God (around which, for instance, Ibn Taymiyyah’s 
interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s thesis revolves). 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have sought to develop a philosophically coherent interpretation of 
Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). I analysed the three 
components that I maintain constitute Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence 
(wahdat al-wujud): (i) the metaphysical nature of ultimate reality as existence 
(wujud); (ii) the metaphysical nature of the world; and (iii) the relationship between 
ultimate reality as existence (wujud) and the world.  
Firstly, I analysed the first component of Ibn Arabi’s thesis: the metaphysical 
nature of ultimate reality as existence (wujud). I examined two of Ibn Arabi’s most 
important metaphysical views on existence, both of which are crucial to his concept. 
The first is his position on the necessity of existence and the impossibility of 
nothingness. I addressed some potential arguments in favour of his position, 
concluding that it is indeed tenable. Second, I examined his rejection of the idea that 
existence is a property of the object. I then outlined three arguments that aim to 
demonstrate his stance. The first argument was originally developed by Ibn Arabi 
himself: if existence were a property of the object, then the object cannot 
simultaneously possess it and lack it. However, it is possible for a thing to be 
considered existent and non-existent at the same time, at least relatively; therefore, 
Ibn Arabi concludes, existence is not a property. The second argument was famously 
proposed by Kant, who argued that existence cannot be a predicate of the object as it 
differs from all predicates insofar as it does not add up to the concept of the object. 
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The third argument was developed by Russell, who refuted the idea that existence is a 
property of the existent by showing that, if this were the case, it would be coherent to 
claim that there are non-existent objects. By establishing that existence is necessary 
and the only ultimate metaphysical state of affairs, Ibn Arabi justifies his 
identification between ultimate reality and existence. In addition, by maintaining that 
existence is not a property of the object, Ibn Arabi appears to uphold that ultimate 
reality is an existent rather than an indeterminate state of being, as some 
interpretations of Ibn Arabi’s conception of ultimate reality suggest. 
  Secondly, I turned to the second component of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the 
oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud): the metaphysical nature of the world. I 
proposed that in his thesis, Ibn Arabi does not develop a novel concept of God, as has 
long been assumed. Instead, he seems to develop novel views on the metaphysical 
nature of the world. In examining Ibn Arabi’s cosmology, I introduced three 
metaphysical concepts: al-mumkinat; the world (al-a’lam); and al-a’yan al-thabitah. 
Al-mumkinat indicates the totality of possible entities. In addition, the world (al-
a’lam) refers to the actual realm. However, while there is a consensus among Ibn 
Arabi’s scholars concerning the meanings of al-mumkinat and the world (al-a’lam), 
the meaning of al-a’yan al-thabitah is a matter of some dispute. I hold that al-a’yan 
al-thabitah correspond to what metaphysicians today call merely possible entities, 
which are not actual. It was my contention that for Ibn Arabi, actual entities (al-
a’lam) and merely possible entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah) originate from the same 
metaphysical realm. Contrary to the common conception, Ibn Arabi seems to uphold 
that there is no metaphysical difference between what is actual and what is merely 
possible. Both actual and merely possible entities have the same metaphysical reality 
as possible entities. Actuality and mere possibility, according to him, are not intrinsic 
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and metaphysical but rather relative and, for a considerable part, epistemic. I proposed 
that his theory of relative actuality is best represented in terms of perceiving and 
perceivability. 
Thirdly, I developed the third component of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness 
of existence (wahdat al-wujud): the relationship between ultimate reality as existence 
(wujud) and the world. Despite asserting that actuality is a relative matter, Ibn Arabi’s 
claim that existence is one and identical with ultimate reality has not yet been firmly 
established. There was a potential incompatibility present when affirming the reality 
of possible entities while still maintaining that existence is one and identical with 
ultimate reality. To overcome this problem, I argued that possible entities could be 
identified with God’s knowledge of the world, as some of Ibn Arabi’s texts actually 
suggest. Thus, the apparent duality within existence is resolved.  
Finally, I explained how my interpretation coherently maintained Ibn Arabi’s 
claims associated with his thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). In 
addition, I showed how my interpretation clarifies some of Ibn Arabi’s supposedly 
incompatible statements, particularly those introduced in Chapter Three regarding the 
reality of the world.  
In the following chapter, I will examine a number of potential and existing 
objections to Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) and 
address some potential responses to them. 
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Chapter 7: The Concept of Ultimate 
Reality as Existence (wujud) (the 
Thesis of wahdat al-wujud) III: 
Potential Objections 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I presented my interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the 
oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). The chapter investigated three issues: the 
metaphysical nature of ultimate reality as existence (wujud); the metaphysical nature 
of the world; and the relationship between ultimate reality as existence (wujud) and 
the world. In line with Ibn Arabi’s views on the metaphysical nature of ultimate 
reality as existence (wujud), I argued: (i) that nothingness is impossible and that 
existence is necessary; and (ii) that existence is not a property of the object but the 
same as the existent object. By maintaining these views, Ibn Arabi justifies 
identifying God with existence and also implies the individuation of ultimate reality 
as existence (wujud). In addition, in outlining Ibn Arabi’s views on the metaphysical 
nature of the world, I introduced Ibn Arabi’s concepts of possible entities (al-
mumkinat), of merely possible entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah) and of the actual realm 
(al-a’lam). With regard to the relationship between ultimate reality and the world, I 
argued that a theory of relative actuality results in the duality of existence being 
between God and possible entities. However, to preserve Ibn Arabi’s claim that 
existence is one and identical with ultimate reality, I proposed that he could identify 
the totality of possible entities with God’s knowledge of the world. 
The current chapter constitutes the third and final part of my discussion of Ibn 
Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud). Advancing that existence is 
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one and identical with ultimate reality (whahdat al-wujud) has prompted a number of 
objections and theistic concerns throughout history. In this chapter, I examine four 
potential objections to Ibn Arabi’s thesis.  
In section 7.2, I analyse the objection levelled at Ibn Arabi’s depiction of the 
relationship between God and the world. Ibn Taymiyyah argues that Ibn Arabi’s 
claims concerning al-a’yan al-thabitah undermine God’s omnipotence and 
omniscience. I argue, however, that Ibn Taymiyyah’s objections are based upon a 
misunderstanding of Ibn Arabi’s concept of al-a’yan al-thabitah.  
In section 7.3, I examine the objection that there is a contradiction in 
maintaining, as Ibn Arabi does, that reality is both one and many. I argue however 
that existence in Ibn Arabi’s doctrine is ‘one’ from a metaphysical point of view and 
‘many’ from epistemic points of view; thus, the apparent incompatibility is resolved. I 
also explore the related complaint that we fail to experience existence as one, and that 
this undermines Ibn Arabi’s thesis. I postulate, however, that an epistemic failure to 
conceive a metaphysical status (the oneness of existence, for instance) does not 
undermine the reality of that metaphysical status. In addition, I argue that the 
limitations of our cognitive abilities dictate that we perceive existence only as limited 
objects.  
In section 7.4, I assess the criticism of Ibn Arabi’s conception of ultimate 
reality as existence (wujud) pertaining to the problem of evil. Some argue that the 
presence of evil in the world undermines the thesis that existence is identical with 
God. If God is identical with existence, they say, then no aspect of existence should 
include evil. Ibn Arabi stresses, however, that existence, which is identical with 
ultimate reality, is absolute goodness. The world is limited and finite, and as such is 
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affected by non-existence, the source of evil. No forms and aspects of non-existence 
concern ultimate reality, and hence neither does evil.  
Section 7.5 addresses Ibn Arabi’s apparent unfaithfulness to Islam. In this 
section, I examine whether or not Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as existence 
(wujud) is unislamic both in a strong and a weak sense.  
7.2 The First Objection: The Objection from the 
Relationship between God and the World 
 
One of the most contentious subjects in Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence 
(wahdat al-wujud) is the relationship between God and the world. Ibn Taymiyyah is 
one such critic of this subject. As we saw in Chapter Five, Ibn Taymiyyah interprets 
Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) in terms of 
pantheism. Accordingly, he accuses Ibn Arabi’s thesis of being heretical and entailing 
atheism. He states: ‘[Ibn Arabi believes] that God is [identical with] Creation […] 
What he says implies denying Allah and His divine names and attributes […] as he 
affirms only the existence of creation [and not the existence of God]’ (Ibn Taymiyyah, 
1995, Vol. 2, p. 215).  
Despite its popularity, the objection that Ibn Arabi’s thesis connotes a 
pantheistic relationship between God and the world is based on a misunderstanding of 
his thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). As argued in Chapter Five, 
and contrary to the assertions of Ibn Taymiyyah and others, Ibn Arabi does not 
identify the world with God. In fact, he explicitly and unequivocally affirms that the 
world is not God, as he repeatedly defines it as everything other than God.  
 Ibn Taymiyyah provides a further version of the first objection to the 
relationship between God and the world in Ibn Arabi’s thesis. Unlike the first version, 
this objection seems to avoid presuming that, according to Ibn Arabi, the world and 
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God are identical. He claims that Ibn Arabi’s concept of al-a’yan al-thabitah 
undermines God’s omnipotence. Ibn Taymiyyah criticises that according to Ibn Arabi, 
God’s creation is limited to al-a’yan al-thabitah and thus God cannot create anything 
beyond them. However, if God is unable to create anything beyond al-a’yan al-
thabitah, then his power is immensely limited. As such, Ibn Arabi contradicts the 
theistic doctrine of God’s omnipotence (Ibn Taymiyyah, 1995, Vol. 2, p. 212).  
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, furthermore, Ibn Arabi’s concept of al-a’yan al-
thabitah undermines not only God’s power but also His knowledge. Firstly, Ibn Arabi 
holds that God’s knowledge of the world is limited to al-a’yan al-thabitah, and, 
hence, it is incompatible with the belief that God’s knowledge is infinite and 
complete. Secondly, by maintaining that al-a’yan al-thabitah are the cause of God’s 
knowledge, Ibn Arabi contradicts the theistic belief that God’s knowledge is active 
rather than passive. Theists generally assume that God’s knowledge causes the world, 
rather than being caused by the world. Things exist externally because they existed 
first in God’s knowledge, not the other way around (Ibid., pp. 210–211).   
 This version of the objection is based in part upon a misunderstanding of Ibn 
Arabi’s concept of al-a’yan al-thabitah. Ibn Taymiyyah seems to think that the actual 
world exhausts al-a’yan al-thabitah and vice versa. This is incorrect; contrary to the 
beliefs of Ibn Taymiyyah, the actual world constitutes a very small part of al-a’yan 
al-thabitah (merely possible entities) according to Ibn Arabi. When Ibn Arabi 
identifies God’s knowledge, or power of creation, with merely possible entities (al-
a’yan al-thabitah), he indicates the state prior to any perceiving, and hence 
actualisation, of any possible entity by people. At that point the realm of merely 
possible entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah) encompasses all contingent possible entities. 
Therefore, limiting God’s power of creation to al-a’yan al-thabitah (merely possible 
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entities) as such should not be considered an actual limitation, because accordingly 
God can create any possible thing. This is identical with the theistic doctrine 
concerning God’s power of creation. Aquinas, for instance, states: ‘God is called 
omnipotent because He can do all absolutely possible things’ (2007, Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 
138). The only thing that escapes al-a’yan al-thabitah and, hence God’s power, is the 
impossible. Many theists dismiss the impossible as irrelevant to God’s omnipotence. 
In fact, Ibn Taymiyyah himself argues that the inability to create impossible things 
does not undermine God’s omnipotence, because impossibilia are mere nothing 
(1995, Vol. 8, p. 512). Hence, contrary to Ibn Taymiyyah’s claim, Ibn Arabi’s concept 
of al-a’yan al-thabitah does not undermine God’s omnipotence.  
A similar response could also be made in light of Ibn Taymiyyah’s claim 
regarding al-a’yan al-thabitah and God’s knowledge. Al-a’yan al-thabitah do not 
limit God’s knowledge, since, as mentioned above, they incorporate the totality of 
possible entities. Hence, there is nothing beyond al-a’yan al-thabitah that can be 
known about the world. 
 It is unclear though what Ibn Taymiyyah means when he talks of rejecting al-
a’yan al-thabitah as the source of God’s knowledge. Yet, there is a potential problem 
with Ibn Arabi’s discourse on God’s knowledge of the world, and this might be what 
Ibn Taymiyyah wishes to indicate. For God to know something, it might seem prima 
facie that His knowledge depends upon what is known, given that, in standard cases, 
what is known causes the knowledge of it. For example, my knowledge of the glass of 
water in front of me depends upon, and is caused by, the glass being there. This 
cannot be applied to God. There is a potential incompatibility with the notion that the 
actual world came into existence if one accepts that God’s knowledge is eternal. This 
would mean that God had new knowledge when the world came into existence, which 
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would undermine the completeness of God’s eternal knowledge. It seems that Ibn 
Arabi is required to develop a model that preserves the following: (i) God’s 
knowledge, which is eternal and complete, is of the world as knowledge must be of 
something; otherwise the meaning of knowing becomes unclear. (ii) God’s knowledge 
does not depend upon the world; rather, the world depends upon God’s knowledge.  
 Fortunately, Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud), 
according to my interpretation, provides a promising model that seems to meet both of 
the conditions outlined above. By maintaining that God’s knowledge of the world is 
of possible entities, Ibn Arabi meets the first condition. As he upholds that there is no 
metaphysical difference between what is actual and what is merely possible, Ibn 
Arabi maintains that God’s knowledge is of the world, without committing it to the 
temporality of the actual world as mentioned in the previous chapter. As actuality is 
relative insofar as it relates only to the individual to whom the world is actual, the 
temporality of the actual world is also relative and depends upon the individual to 
whom it is temporal. As a result, Ibn Arabi avoids the problem of God obtaining new 
knowledge when the actual world came to be. 
However, one might say that if God’s knowledge is of the eternal possible 
entities, would that not mean that possible entities do not depend upon God, and that, 
accordingly, the second condition would not be met? Ibn Arabi would answer in the 
negative. As discussed in the last chapter; in identifying the totality of possible 
entities with God’s knowledge of the world, the possible entities are ontologically 
dependent upon God’s existence in the same way that one’s knowledge is dependent 
upon his existence. In Ibn Arabi’s ontology, possible entities do not have an 
absolutely independent status. Thus, Ibn Arabi also meets the second condition. 
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Therefore, Ibn Arabi’s thesis according to my interpretation bypasses the first 
objection. 
7.3 The Second Objection: The Problem of the One and the 
Many 
 
Version 1  
Ibn Arabi states that existence is simultaneously one and many (2011, Vol. 5, p. 407). 
Some might argue that such claims include an inconsistency. For instance, in his 
criticism of pantheism, Owen complains that it infringes ‘our pervasive sense of 
individuality or personal distinctness’ to affirm that existence is both one and many 
(1971, p. 74). At times Ibn Arabi appears to be aware of this issue in his thesis, almost 
celebrating its apparently paradoxical state. In fact, a number of Ibn Arabi scholars 
accept that his ontology is, in essence, a fusion of contradictions with regard to this 
issue. In his discussion of the one and the many in Ibn Arabi’s ontology, Toshihiko 
Izutsu states that ‘[o]nly by a simultaneous affirmation of contradictions can we 
understand the real nature of the world. […] Close to the relation between the 
“inward” and the “outward” is the contradictory relation between the One and the 
Many’ (1983, p. 74). 
 
Response to Version 1 
In some places, Ibn Arabi attempts to resolve the apparent incompatibility of the one 
and the many in his thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). In what 
follows, I address two of these attempts, neither of which, I argue, succeeds. I then 
develop my own response to the objection.  
 First, Ibn Arabi argues that the relationship between the one and the many in 
his ontology is comparable to the relationship between any natural number and the 
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number one. Any natural number is ultimately made of many ‘one’s. Number three, 
for instance, is no more than the number one duplicated three times. Hence, while one 
could say that ten thousand is ‘many’, another one focusing on the number one, of 
which the ten thousand is composed, could say that it is merely ‘one’.  
This analogy, I wish to argue, is flawed. Though it may succeed in 
demonstrating that something could be one and many at the same time, it cannot be 
applied to Ibn Arabi’s ontology. Ibn Arabi’s analogy says that the number one is 
comparable to ultimate reality and other numbers are comparable to existents in the 
world. Moreover, the number one is a constituent of other natural numbers. However, 
Ibn Arabi would not want to say that ultimate reality is a constituent of existents. 
Existents in the world are not God repeated many times in the sense that the number 
seven is the number one repeated seven times. Ultimate reality is supposed to be 
identical to the infinite and sheer existence that incorporates limited existents. 
Therefore, this example is not actually analogous with the one and the many in Ibn 
Arabi’s doctrine.  
  In the second attempt to resolve the apparent paradox, Ibn Arabi claims that 
the concept of the one and the many in his ontology is comparable to the one and the 
many of the human body. The human body may be seen as one (a unified body), or as 
many (its parts and organs). Ibn Arabi claims that existence is also one when 
considered as a unified whole and many when we consider its parts: the limited 
existents. Limited existents constitute unlimited existence, just as parts and organs 
constitute a human body (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 6, p. 184).  
 This analogy, however, is also flawed. While the human body is comprised of 
parts, and its identity could be considered merely the totality of these parts, ultimate 
reality, in Ibn Arabi’s doctrine, is not. God is absolute, unlimited and sheer existence, 
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and claiming that He is constituted of parts is inconsistent with this definition. In 
addition, if we take worldly objects to be proper parts of God, their absence (or 
existence) should affect His existence just as the proper parts of any object would do 
so. Ibn Arabi would reject such an implication since it undermines the absoluteness of 
ultimate reality as existence (wujud). 
 Therefore, both analogies provided by Ibn Arabi fail to resolve the apparent 
incompatibility of the one and the many in his thesis of the oneness of existence 
(wahdat al-wujud). I maintain, however, that there is no real contradiction within his 
doctrine of the one and the many; I believe that my interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s 
concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud), developed in the previous chapter, 
offers a solution.  
 Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) becomes 
compatible if we affirm that existence is one from a metaphysical perspective, and at 
the same time many from epistemic perspectives. Metaphysically speaking, we have 
ultimately only one reality: the reality of God. Epistemically speaking, however, 
existence is many when seen from the different perceptions and actualisations of 
individuals. In other words, even though existence is ultimately one, people 
experience it as many. There is no contradiction when Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the 
oneness of existence is interpreted in this way. 
 
Version 2  
One might object to Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) 
by questioning why we do not experience it as such, assuming that existence is one. 
We only experience existence as many, as distinct existents. In developing the same 
objection to pantheism, Owen explains:  
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Our total experience of both personal and sub-personal entities is pervaded by 
the conviction that each is an independent form of existence. This conviction 
is immediately and uniquely present in each person’s self-consciousness, 
whereby each is aware of himself as distinct from (and therefore capable of 
relating himself to) other persons (1971, p. 72). 
 
However, I do not find this objection compelling. The epistemological failure to know 
a metaphysical status does not necessarily prove the non-existence of that 
metaphysical status. People throughout history have held arguably inaccurate 
metaphysical beliefs about existence; their failure to hold correct beliefs has nothing 
to do with reality itself. The failure to perceive the unity of existence is not enough to 
prove that it is not there.  
Ibn Arabi, furthermore, could maintain that the reason behind this failure to 
experience existence as one is that, while existence in its oneness is unlimited and 
infinite, people’s minds are limited and finite. Humans therefore apply their own 
limits to their perception of existence in order to conceive it, and by this means it is 
conceived as many limited objects, rather than as one unlimited existence. It is as 
though we are small telescopes only capable of observing minor stars or galaxies, but 
not the entire universe. However, Ibn Arabi claims, alongside a number of mystics 
throughout history, that it is possible to realise the oneness of existence through 
mystical experiences. What is more, he has prescribed ways of attaining such 
knowledge.  
Therefore, the second objection to Ibn Arabi’s conception of ultimate reality 
as existence (wujud) is also unsuccessful.  
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7.4 The Third Objection: The Objection from Evil  
 
Another objection to Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud) is 
rooted in the presence of defects and evil. The objection rests on the notion that the 
world is deficient and contains a significant amount of evil and ugliness, while God is 
holy and good. Any perspective that allows the flawed world and God to overlap 
serves to undermine God’s holiness and goodness. Ibn Taymiyyah alludes to this view 
in his criticism of Ibn Arabi, arguing that Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of extence 
(wahdat al-wujud) entails identifying God with ugly and disgusting things in the 
world (1995, Vol. 2, pp. 124, 126). 
 This objection, I argue, is unsuccessful. It seems to infer that, because the 
world as a single and limited entity within unlimited existence is deficient, then 
existence as a whole is deficient. This is invalid as it involves the fallacy of 
composition. This fallacy is committed when one infers that something is true of the 
whole because it is true of some or all of its parts. In a response to a similar objection, 
R. Oakes explains: 
 
This objection succeeds only on the condition that any property which can 
truly be predicated of an aspect or modification of some individual can truly 
be predicated of that individual as such. Clearly, however, this is mistaken. 
My eyes are brown and some of my beliefs are tenuous, but I am neither 
brown nor tenuous. Hence, that God is (essentially) perfect is in no way 
incompatible with our existing as aspects or modifications of God (1983, pp. 
110–11). 
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The objection, however, could still be revised as follows: the evil in the world, which 
is part of existence, undermines the goodness of ultimate reality as existence (wujud) 
because no part or aspect of ultimate reality should incorporate evil. Any dirt that 
stains a part of a clean shirt undermines the cleanliness of the whole shirt. A theist 
may claim that there is a difference between, on the one hand, saying that the world 
which is distinct from God’s existence incorporates evil, and, on the other, saying that 
the world which is not distinct from God’s existence incorporates evil. The former 
concerns God’s actions, while the latter concerns God’s essence.  
Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud), according to 
my interpretation, seems to offer a plausible response to this issue and, indeed, a 
promising solution to the problem of evil in general. The response could be 
considered a version or a variation of the deprivation response to the problem of evil. 
In his presentation of the deprivation response (or one version of it), John Hick states: 
‘Evil is […] loss and lack, a deprivation of good, and instead of having any positive 
goal or function of its own it tends by its inherently negative character towards nullity 
and non-existence’ (2010, p. 180). 
Ibn Arabi likewise advances that existence is pure good and that evil is always 
associated with the lack of existence rather than with existence itself (2011, Vol. 6, p. 
338). Therefore, the evil in the world derives not from the fact that the world exists, 
but rather from its failure to exist in the full sense. By being contingent, limited and 
finite, the world’s existence is deficient, and it is therefore vulnerable to evil. Ibn 
Arabi considers contingency, limitedness and finitude to be aspects of non-existence 
in the world. For anything to exist in the full sense, and hence be free from evil, it has 
to be unlimited, necessary and infinite. What people consider evil—such as natural 
disasters, pain and moral evil—stem from those elements of non-existence in the 
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world (such as its being limited). As long as the world is a combination of existence 
and non-existence, as Ibn Arabi sometimes describes it, the world will also contain a 
mixture of goodness and evil. 
In addition, as God is identical with existence in its full sense, He has no 
association or relationship with evil whatsoever. The evil in the world does not come 
from Him as existence; rather, it arises from the fact that the world is partly distinct 
from Him by having particular limits that distinguishes it from God.  
 Therefore, the third objection to Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as 
existence (wujud) is unsuccessful.  
7.5 The Fourth Objection: The Apparent Unfaithfulness to 
Islam 
 
A number of Islamic scholars and theologians throughout history have dismissed Ibn 
Arabi’s doctrine as un-Islamic. Ibn Taymiyyah, for instance, condemns Ibn Arabi’s 
thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) as displaying an infidelity and 
error (1995, Vol. 2, pp. 122, 127, 128, 129). In addition, A. E. Affifi, a contemporary 
Ibn Arabi scholar, dismisses the Islamic elements of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine as 
irrelevant. He states:  
 
It was imperative, therefore, that Ibnul ‘Arabi, having totally altered the 
conception of the God of Islam and having replaced it with a fundamentally 
different one, should have left […] all the ethical attributes which make God a 
personality and avoided using language which describes Him as such. 
However, he does not always do that. He sometimes tries to bring into 
harmony the two different notions of God, the pantheistic and theistic, with the 
result that he utterly fails (1964, p. 57). 
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In fact, Affifi finds Ibn Arabi’s doctrine utterly un-Islamic, and goes so far as to say 
that he finds it curious that Ibn Arabi insists on the faith of Islam (Ibid., p. 110).  
Ibn Arabi himself, however, seems to think that his doctrine is indeed Islamic. 
One of the most obvious features of Ibn Arabi’s writing is his constant attempt to 
substantiate his ideas with quotations from Islamic scriptures. His writings include 
hundreds of Quranic verses and Hadiths, to the extent that William. C. Chittick dares 
to claim that Ibn Arabi’s great book al-Futuhat al-Makkiyyah, as well as his other 
works, are merely commentaries on the Quran (1989, p. xv).  
The objection to Ibn Arabi’s supposed unfaithfulness to Islam can be 
understood in two senses—one strong, the other weak. The strong objection maintains 
that Ibn Arabi explicitly contradicts established Islamic views that are clearly 
displayed in the Quran. This is probably what Ibn Taymiyyah and other theologians, 
as well as Affifi, have in mind when they dismiss Ibn Arabi’s doctrine as un-Islamic. 
However, Ibn Taymiyyah’s objection is mostly based upon his inaccurate 
interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud) in terms 
of pantheism. Something similar could be said of Affifi’s claims, for he believes that 
Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud) is best interpreted in 
terms of acosmism and that acosmism contradicts Islam. Again, as established in 
Chapter Five, Affifi’s interpretation can be seen as inaccurate.  
Putting these misunderstandings to one side for the moment, one may wonder 
whether any part of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud), 
according to my interpretation, is vulnerable to a similar objection (namely that of 
contradicting Islam). One potential issue is Ibn Arabi’s unique and original doctrine 
of creation. According to my interpretation, creation in Ibn Arabi’s doctrine is 
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represented by the epistemic frame that is placed upon a set of possible entities. This 
epistemic frame makes some of the possible entities available to perceiving and, 
hence, actualisation (as discussed in detail in the previous chapter). Of course, this is 
different from the typical theistic thesis that defends a realistic and metaphysically 
absolute view of actuality and creation. This perhaps is a vulnerable aspect of Ibn 
Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud).  
The Quran and Hadith speak of God creating the universe. The external 
realistic interpretation of creation is the apparent interpretation of such Quranic verses 
and Hadiths. However, in responding to this objection, Ibn Arabi might appeal to his 
very flexible style of interpretation in approaching such Quranic verses and Hadiths. 
He might deny that the external realistic interpretation is the only viable 
interpretation. The soundness of this response depends on whether or not Ibn Arabi’s 
unique ways of interpreting the scriptures are legitimate. I argue against Ibn Arabi’s 
unique style of interpretation in Chapter nine. 
The weak sense of the objection takes the following form: Ibn Arabi’s concept 
of ultimate reality as existence (wujud) is un-Islamic insofar as it is not inferred or 
obtained from Islamic scriptures. Though Ibn Arabi makes every attempt to base his 
views upon Islamic scriptures, I admit that a number of his principal views and 
concepts are not directly inferred from them. Examples of such views include his 
doctrine 
 of al-a’yan al-thabitah and his theory of relative actuality and mere 
possibility. To the best of my knowledge, such views are in neither the Quran nor the 
Hadith. However, this is hardly an objection, since it does not seem to undermine Ibn 
Arabi’s thesis in any sense. Ibn Arabi is not contradicting Islam by seeking 
knowledge outside the scriptures. His thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-
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wujud) mainly concerns purely metaphysical issues rather than religious or Islamic 
ones. Parts (or perhaps all) of Ibn Arabi’s thesis thus have not been discussed or 
addressed in the Islamic scriptures. It is therefore inappropriate to argue that his views 
therein are Islamic or indeed un-Islamic, just as one could not describe the topic of 
modal logic or quantum mechanics as being Islamic or un-Islamic. Indeed, Ibn Arabi 
is not so different from other theists in this regard. In their detail, many theistic 
debates concern issues that have never been explicitly addressed in the scriptures.  
Before concluding this section it is important to assert that there are other 
concepts and views in Ibn Arabi’s doctrine in general that could be considered un-
Islamic in the strong sense, some of which will be addressed in the following 
chapters. The focus of this section is merely on Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality 
as existence (wujud) according to my interpretation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have examined four potential objections to Ibn Arabi’s concept of 
ultimate reality as existence (wujud). The first objection derived from the relationship 
between God and the world as presented in Ibn Arabi’s doctrine. I examined two 
problems raised by Ibn Taymiyyah against Ibn Arabi’s views on the matter. First, Ibn 
Taymiyyah claims that Ibn Arabi’s identification between ultimate reality and the 
world is a form of infidelity. However, as I have shown, this issue stems from a 
misunderstanding of Ibn Arabi’s concept. Second, Ibn Taymiyyah claims that Ibn 
Arabi’s concept of merely possible entities (al-a’yan al-thabitah) undermines God’s 
omnipotence and omniscience, as it considers His power and knowledge of the world 
to be limited to al-a’yan al-thabitah. In response, I demonstrated that identifying 
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God’s knowledge and His power of creation with merely possible entities (al-a’yan 
al-thabitah) does not undermine God’s power or knowledge. There is nothing beyond 
the totality of possible entities to be created or known, with the exception of 
impossible objects. Ibn Taymiyyah himself agrees that creating impossible objects 
does not concern God’s omnipotence.   
The second objection related to the problem of the one and the many in Ibn 
Arabi’s thesis. I explained that there are two versions of this objection. The first aims 
to show that Ibn Arabi’s thesis is incoherent, as existence cannot be one and many. 
However, I argued that, in Ibn Arabi’s ontology, the one indicates ultimate reality that 
is identical with existence, while the many is indicative of people’s various 
perceptions, and hence actualisations, of existence. The second form of this objection 
related to the fact that people fail to experience existence as one; if existence is one, 
why would people not be able to experience it as such? I argued that the epistemic 
failure to recognise any metaphysical status, including the oneness of existence, does 
not undermine that metaphysical status. In addition, Ibn Arabi argues that great 
mystics have experienced the oneness of existence and has prescribed the means by 
which one can achieve such an experience.  
The third objection attacked Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as 
existence (wujud) in relation to the presence of evil. It stated that if God is identical 
with existence, no aspect of existence should incorporate evil, and yet the world, 
which is part of existence, includes a significant amount of evil. In response, I argued 
that Ibn Arabi’s doctrine actually provides a promising solution with regard to this 
issue and probably to the problem of evil in general. Ibn Arabi claims that goodness is 
identical with existence and that evil is associated with non-existence. Absolute 
existence is absolute goodness because it is free from any form of non-existence. The 
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evil of the world comes from the non-existence affecting it, which takes the form of 
limitedness, finitude and contingency.  
The fourth objection pertained to the problem of Ibn Arabi’s unfaithfulness to 
Islam in his concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud). It held that Ibn Arabi’s 
thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) conflicts with established Islamic 
concepts and beliefs. In response, I argued that Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality 
as existence (wujud) might be in conflict with the theistic doctrine of creation. In 
general, however, Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) is 
constituted of views and concepts that are not explicitly addressed in the scriptures 
and, as such, it does not seem appropriate to refer to these as either Islamic or un-
Islamic.  
 In the following chapter, I will examine the second concept of ultimate reality 
in my interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s thesis, namely the concept of ultimate reality as 
the Divine Self (dhat), which indicates ultimate reality in Himself with no association 
or relationship with anything else.  
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Chapter 8: The Concept of Ultimate 
Reality as The Divine Self (dhat) 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter Five, I explained that Ibn Arabi’s thesis of ultimate reality is best 
represented through three concepts: ultimate reality as existence (wujud), ultimate 
reality as the Divine Self (dhat) and ultimate reality as God (ilah).  
The previous three chapters examined the first concept, ultimate reality as 
existence (wujud), in which Ibn Arabi claims that existence is one and identical with 
ultimate reality. In the last chapter, I examined four potential objections to Ibn Arabi’s 
concept. The first objection concerned the relationship between ultimate reality and 
the world; the second concerned the problem of the one and many in Ibn Arabi’s 
ontology; the third regarded the problem of evil; and the final objection arose from 
Ibn Arabi’s apparent unfaithfulness to Islam.  
 In this chapter, I move on to examine the second concept of ultimate reality in 
Ibn Arabi’s thesis, that of ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat). In section 8.2, I 
address the meaning of dhat. I explain that this concept indicates ultimate reality in 
Himself with no relationship or association with anything else. In addition, I critically 
examine the claim made by some key scholars that Ibn Arabi’s concept of dhat can be 
identified with the Aristotelian concept of substance. I argue that this correlation is 
unwarranted. I posit, following the standard technical terminology of Islamic 
philosophy and theology and Ibn Arabi’s own texts, that the Arabic term dhat is 
different, albeit comparable, to the Aristotelian concept of substance. I propose that 
the Arabic term dhat is best translated as ‘self’ and, when it is used in reference to 
ultimate reality in particular, as ‘the Divine Self’. Selfhood, unlike the Aristotelian 
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concept of substance, indicates the distinctive identity of the individual without 
committing one to the binary structure of substance and accidents.  
 In section 8.3, I examine Ibn Arabi’s treatment of the knowability of the 
Divine Self (dhat). I maintain that what is knowable about the Divine Self (dhat) 
comes from its relationship to the concept of God (ilah).  
8.2 The Focus and the Meaning of the Concept of Ultimate 
Reality as the Divine Self (dhat) 
 
As with the other two concepts of Ibn Arabi’s thesis (ultimate reality as existence 
(wujud) and ultimate reality as God (ilah)), the concept of ultimate reality as the 
Divine Self (dhat) indicates a unique scope. It encompasses ultimate reality in 
Himself with no relationship or association with anything else. It signifies the 
absolute independence of God from anything and everything. Ibn Arabi seems to 
consider any kind of external relationship or reference a form of dependence. In his 
discussion of the absolute independence of dhat, he tends to appeal to the Quranic 
verse: ‘Allah is surely independent [ghani] of all creatures’ (3:97). Thus, ultimate 
reality as dhat is not even meant to indicate Him as a Creator or a Lord, as being a 
Creator implies that He has an external relationship with something else (His 
creation); hence, as the Divine Self (dhat), ultimate reality is independent even of 
these titles, Ibn Arabi confirms (Ibn Arabi, Vol. 5, pp. 105–106).  
Following his assertion that ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat) is 
absolutely independent of everything, Ibn Arabi claims that He does not, as such, 
concern people’s religious belief in God. He explains that one may be able to infer 
this concept from reflecting upon the concept of ultimate reality as God (ilah). By no 
means, however, could one obtain a direct relationship with dhat. He explains that ‘no 
religion has considered the oneness [ahadiyah] of the Divine Self [dhat] explicitly’ 
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(Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 2, p. 145), and upholds that reflecting upon the metaphysics of 
the concept of dhat is merely a luxury of thinking (fudhul al-‘aql) (Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 
436). Ibn Arabi confirms that worshipping and related religious practices concern the 
concept of ultimate reality as God (ilah) rather than the Divine Self (dhat). This will 
be examined in the following chapter. 
In fact, the term dhat is never used in the Quran in association with God. It has 
been used, however, in some of the prophet’s sayings, and perhaps Ibn Arabi borrows 
the term from this source (see for example: al-Albany, 1988, Hadith: 5202; Ibn Hajar, 
2003, Vol. 5, p. 475).  
I posit that Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat) is 
most accurately interpreted as a distinct concept. Some of Ibn Arabi’s key scholars, 
however, fail to distinguish it from the concept of ultimate reality as existence 
(wujud). For instance, when discussing ultimate reality as existence (wujud), 
Toshihiko Izutsu states: 
   
The Absolute viewed from this standpoint is called by Ibn ‘Arabi dhat or 
‘essence’. The world [sic] dhat in this context means absolute Being (wujud 
mutlaq), Being qua Being, or absolute existence, that is, existence viewed in 
its unconditional simplicity. As the epithet ‘absolute’ indicates, it should not 
be taken in the sense of a limited and determined existent and existence; it 
means Something beyond all existents that exist in a limited way, Something 
lying at the very source of all such existents existentiating them. It is Existence 
as the ultimate ground of everything (1983, p. 25). 
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William C. Chittick also states the following: ‘By “Being” is meant wujud inasmuch 
as it designates God’s own Reality and Essence [dhat]’ (1989, p. 80).  
However, this appears to be a mistake. As we saw in the last chapter, the 
concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud) incorporates everything that exists, 
including possible entities. Nothing in existence escapes its scope. Ibn Arabi 
explicitly states that ‘the existent[s] and existence is nothing but the Real [al-haqq] 
himself’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011,Vol. 7, p. 58). On the other hand, Ibn Arabi unequivocally 
asserts that the concept of the Divine Self (dhat) indicates ultimate reality where He is 
independent of anything other than Himself and where there is no reference to 
anything other than Himself, including the possible entities. He explicitly states: ‘the 
Divine Self (dhat) is independent of everything’ (Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 171). Ibn Arabi 
repeatedly and overtly stresses this idea with regard to the Divine Self (dhat), and 
there seems to be no dispute among Ibn Arabi scholars concerning this issue. 
Therefore, the concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud) cannot be identical 
with the concept of ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat). While the inclusion of 
everything (including the possible entities) is essential to the concept of ultimate 
reality as existence (wujud), the exclusion of everything (including the possible 
entities) other than ultimate reality is essential to the concept of ultimate reality as 
dhat. A question hence arises: what is dhat? 
 One plausible answer is that dhat indicates ultimate reality prior to the 
existence of the world. At one point, there was only God and nothing else, and at that 
point God had no relationship or association with anything other than Himself. 
However, Ibn Arabi would disagree with this interpretation of the concept of dhat, 
arguing that the existence of the world does not change anything with regard to 
ultimate reality as dhat. He states that ‘whatever is confirmed of Him [ultimate 
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reality] without the world will [still] be confirmed with the world being there’ (Ibn 
Arabi, 2011, Vol. 2, p. 476). The scope of ultimate reality as dhat appears not to 
concern anything external to ultimate reality but, instead, something essential to Him.  
 Izutsu and Chittick, among others, seem to maintain that dhat in Ibn Arabi’s 
writing is comparable to the Aristotelian concept of substance (or essence). According 
to the Aristotelian metaphysics, an object is not constituted of the totality of its 
material parts, rather there is an intrinsic substance or essence that constitutes the 
identity of that object; this also forms its accidental attributes into a unity (Erismann, 
2012, p. 172). There are several criteria that aim to determine whether something is a 
substance or not. Among these criteria are: (i) being ontologically basic; (ii) being 
independent; (iii) being the bearer of properties and the subject of predication; and 
(iv) being able to exemplify changes (Robinson, 2014). The metaphysical theory of 
substance and accidents (or accidental attributes) originates from Aristotle’s 
Categories and was mainly endorsed by medieval philosophers (including Islamic 
philosophers and theologians).  
Izutsu and Chittick seem to maintain that dhat is God’s substance or ‘essence’ 
and that everything else comprises the accidents (or accidental attributes) of dhat. In 
discussing why it is misleading to translate a’yn (another technical term in Ibn Arabi) 
as ‘essence’, Chittick aligns ‘essence’ with dhat. He says: 
 
 
[I]n English the term essence is employed to differentiate between the reality 
of the thing and its phenomenal or accidental appearances. In contrast, the 
‘ayn of a thing is no different from what appears to us, and it is not irrelevant 
here that one of the standard meanings of the term in Arabic and in Ibn 
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‘Arabi’s vocabulary is ‘identical with.’ […] The second reason for avoiding 
‘essence’ is that we need a word in English to render dhat which is rarely 
synonymous with ‘ayn. ‘Essence’ is well established as the English rendering 
of dhat, and it is an appropriate translation (1998, p. 389, note. 9). 
 
Evidently, Chittick defines ‘essence’ in the same way the Aristotelian substance is 
typically defined; he even endorses the binary relationship between the essence and its 
accidents.  
 Izutsu (1984) also builds his whole interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s ontology on a 
similar understanding of the term dhat. He claims that Ibn Arabi’s ontology is 
constructed using two aspects: the essence (dhat) on the one hand, and the 
manifestations (or phenomena) of the essence (dhat) on the other. Like Chittick, 
Izutsu appears to consider dhat to be the equivalent of the Aristotelian substance, and 
the manifestations of the essence (dhat) equivalent to the accidents (or accidental 
attributes) of the substance in the Aristotelian and medieval metaphysics.   
 However, I maintain that it is a mistake to equate Ibn Arabi’s concept of dhat 
to the Aristotelian concept of substance as Izutsu and Chittick seem to do. Throughout 
the history of Islamic philosophy and theology, the Aristotelian concept of essence or 
substance has generally always been considered the equivalent of the Arabic technical 
term jawhar (see for instance, Morewedge, 2016, p. 16). This seems to be a matter of 
general agreement in Islamic philosophy and theology, and it is unlikely that either 
Izutsu or Chittick would debate this issue. In fact, both Izutsu (1964, p.142) and 
Chittick (1998, pp. 63, 66, 68, 85, and others) translate jawhar as ‘substance’.  
Although jawhar and dhat are comparable to an extent, throughout the history 
of Islamic philosophy and theology, there has always been a distinction between 
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them. Explaining the relationship between dhat and jawhar according to the standard 
terminology of Islamic philosophy and theology, Abu Nasr al-Farabi (872–950) 
states:  
 
 [The term dhat] is used to indicate everything jawhar signify, as well as 
things that jawhar is not. […] The dhat of something […] indicates the 
whatness [or quiddity] of that thing or parts of its whatness. And, in general, it 
is used to indicate everything that could be the answer [to the question:], what 
is this thing? (1970, p. 107). 
 
In the book, al-Farabi discusses dhat and jawhar at considerable length, and confirms 
the similarities and partial overlapping of the two terms. However, he asserts that they 
are different. Al-Farabi meant in his book to define the philosophical technical terms 
according the understanding of mainstream philosophical scholarship. Thus, by 
identifying dhat with jawhar (Aristotelian substance), Izutsu and Chittick are 
contrasting the standard usage of the two terms in Islamic philosophy literature. 
Furthermore, identifying dhat with Aristotelian substance (jawhar) seems to 
contradict the focus of dhat in Ibn Arabi’s thesis. As explained above, Ibn Arabi 
maintains that dhat indicates ultimate reality when He has no relationship or 
association with anything other than Himself. On the other hand, identifying dhat with 
God’s substance (jawhar) implies that everything else (i.e., the world) is dhat’s 
accidents (or accidental attributes), as Izutsu seems to put it. Accordingly, ultimate 
reality as dhat would actually have relationship with something else: the world, as His 
accident.  This is in direct opposition to Ibn Arabi’s own views on dhat.  
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  I propose that dhat is best interpreted as ‘self’ and, in the case of ultimate 
reality, the Divine Self. My proposition here follows the standard usage of the 
technical term among Islamic philosophers and theologians as well as Ibn Arabi’s 
own usage in his discussion of the concept of ultimate reality as dhat. 
 Al-Farabi explains that dhat is a technical term typically used by philosophers 
and theologians, and that the equivalent term for dhat in everyday language is the 
Arabic term nafs (1970, p. 110). Al-Farabi’s assertion of a synonymous relationship 
between dhat and nafs is also seemingly confirmed by Ibn Arabi, as he frequently 
interchanges dhat and nafs. For instance, he says: 
  
Allah commanded us to know His oneness. He did not command us to know 
his dhat [dhat ih]. Nay, He forbids us from doing so by saying ‘And Allah 
warns you of Himself [nafs’-ahu]’ [3:28], and the prophet of Allah, peace be 
upon him, forbids meditating over Allah’s dhat, Exalted is He (Ibn Arabi, 
2011, Vol. 1, p. 409). 
 
The identification between dhat and nafs substantiates my proposition, as nafs is 
widely translated as ‘self’. Hence, if dhat and nafs are equivalent, as confirmed by the 
common philosophical usage of the two terms and by Ibn Arabi’s own usage, then 
both should be translated as ‘self’. In addition, unlike the Aristotelian ‘substance’, 
selfhood indicates one’s essence and distinctive identity, and does not commit one to 
the binary structure of substance and accidents. In addition, the term ‘self’ seems to 
have a mental reflective element that is absent from the term ‘substance’; the same 
thing is found in the Arabic terms dhat and jawhar. Perhaps this element is what 
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distinguishes the concept of self (dhat) from the Aristotelian substance (jawhar). We 
can clearly talk about an individual’s self or God’s self, but not a chair’s self.  
 Furthermore, interpreting dhat as the Divine Self clearly and accurately 
presents the scope of Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as dhat. The scope of 
dhat, as such, identifies God independently of everything else. It concerns merely His 
own distinctive identity. God’s self is also never affected by the existence or non-
existence of the world. This complements Ibn Arabi’s affirmation that dhat 
encompasses ultimate reality in Himself with no relationship to the world, regardless 
of its existence or non-existence. 
 Other writers endorse a similar interpretation, such as Nader El-Bizri (2000, p. 
154) and Michael M. J. Fischer (2004, p. 140), both of whom translate dhat as the 
essential self. Even Chittick himself, who identifies dhat with the Aristotelian essence 
or substance, uses ‘the Divine Self’ to indicate dhat on a few occasions (1989, p. 56). 
Thus, interpreting Ibn Arabi’s concept of dhat as the Divine Self can be seen to be 
both technically and exegetically accurate. 
8.3 Knowing Ultimate Reality as the Divine Self (dhat) 
 
Ibn Arabi scholars seem to be in agreement as to the unknowability of the Divine Self 
(dhat). Izutsu states that dhat ‘cannot be an object of human knowledge and cognition 
[…] it is Something unknown and unknowable. It is forever a mystery, the Mystery of 
mysteries’ (1983, p. 21).33 Chittick also affirms that the Divine Self (dhat) is unknown 
and unknowable (1989, pp. 60, 62).  
                                                        
33 In his interpretation of Ibn Arabi, Izutsu coins the concept of ‘the Absolute in its 
absoluteness’, which he says is identical with Ibn Arabi’s concept of dhat as we saw 
in Chapter Three. This quote is part of his presentation of the concept of the Absolute 
in its absoluteness.   
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 Both Izutsu and Chittick base their stance on an explicit claim made 
repeatedly by Ibn Arabi that the Divine Self (dhat) is unknown and unknowable (see 
for instance, Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 4, p. 339). However, Ibn Arabi is inconsistent in 
reference to knowing the Divine Self (dhat). For instance, when it comes to religious 
experience as the most important channel for obtaining knowledge of God, he states at 
times that the Divine Self (dhat) is not available for religious experiences at all (Ibid., 
p. 353). Sometimes, however, he seems to claim the opposite by asserting that 
religious experience could actually provide some knowledge of the Divine Self (dhat) 
(Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 1, p. 248).  
It seems that there are aspects of the Divine Self (dhat) that are knowable and 
others that are not. All that may be known about the Divine Self (dhat) comes from its 
relationship to the concept of God (ilah). The relationship between the Divine Self 
(dhat) and the concept of God (ilah) is similar to the relationship between the title 
‘King’ and the person who holds that title. As much as one could infer that there is a 
person behind the title of ‘the King of Belgium’, for example, one should be able to 
infer that there is the Divine Self (dhat) behind the title of ‘God’ (ilah). In addition, 
what one knows about the King of Belgium is actually part of knowing the person 
who holds this title. In the same sense, anything that one could know about ultimate 
reality as God (ilah) is also part of knowing ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat). 
Ibn Arabi states that knowing the concept of God (ilah) is actually part of knowing 
the Divine Self (ilah) (Ibid., Vol. 4, p. 27).  
On the other hand, we do not and cannot know the reality of the Divine Self 
(dhat). The impossibility of knowing the reality of the Divine Self (dhat) fits with Ibn 
Arabi’s other metaphysical and epistemological views. He explains that limitation is 
necessary for anything to be known by us (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 6, p. 151); our 
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epistemic capabilities dictate that which is known must be limited. If one considers 
that the Divine Self (dhat) is absolutely unlimited, it is clear that it cannot be known.  
Consequently, Ibn Arabi repeatedly affirms that a human relationship with 
ultimate reality (including knowing Him) is through Him as God (ilah). As Ibn Arabi 
affirms, godness (uluhah) prevents us from seeing beyond it, and as the Divine Self 
(dhat) is beyond the title God (ilah), it is not available to be known (Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 
160). This is similar to saying that you have a connection with the king merely as a 
king but not as a person. As much as the title ‘the King of Belgium’ does not, by 
itself, reveal the distinctive identity of the king, neither does the title ‘God’ (ilah) 
reveal the distinctive identity of God. Ibn Arabi would argue that dhat, and not God 
(ilah), incorporates the distinctive identity of ultimate reality. I will discuss the 
analogy of the king further in the following chapter. 
In discussing what is knowable and unknowable about the Divine Self (dhat), 
Ibn Arabi states: 
 
The knowledge [of Allah] is divided between two things. The First is knowing 
the Divine Self (dhat), and the second is knowing Him as God (ilah). When 
we have searched the logical arguments and listened to the religious scriptures, 
we have proven the existence of the Divine Self (dhat), and Its [relationship to 
the concept of] God. However, we are [still] ignorant of its reality. [Thus, by 
knowing dhat’s relationship to the concept of God,] we have acquired half of 
Its knowledge. Furthermore, by knowing that it exists, we have obtained a 
quarter [more] of its knowledge. The fourth [and last] quarter of the Divine 
Self’s [dhat] knowledge, however, is knowing its reality, which we have not 
obtained and cannot obtain. (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 2, p. 493). 
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Here, he maintains that knowledge of the existence of the Divine Self (dhat) and its 
relationship to the concept of God (ilah) constitutes three-quarters of the knowledge 
of the Divine Self (dhat). The only thing that is left unknown and unknowable is the 
reality of the Divine Self (dhat). 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the second concept in Ibn Arabi’s thesis of ultimate 
reality: the concept of ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat). I explained that, 
according to Ibn Arabi’s thesis of ultimate reality, this concept encompasses ultimate 
reality in Himself with no relation or association with anything else. In addition, I 
critically examined a number of interpretations of Ibn Arabi’s concept of dhat 
developed by contemporary scholars. Izutsu, and Chittick seem to maintain that the 
Arabic concept of dhat is identical to the Aristotelian concept of essence or substance. 
I pointed out the possible inaccuracy of this, as the Arabic term dhat is considered by 
Islamic philosophers and theologians to be different from the Aristotelian concept of 
essence or substance, albeit comparable to an extent. I proposed that dhat should be 
translated as ‘self’ and, in the case of Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as dhat, 
as ‘the Divine Self’. I explained that this accurately follows the standard usage of the 
term in Islamic philosophy and theology, as well as in Ibn Arabi’s own texts. In 
addition, it characterises the concept more accurately as it represents the distinctive 
identity of ultimate reality without being committed to the binary structure of 
substance and accidents. I also examined Ibn Arabi’s portrayal of the knowability 
(and unknowability) of ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat). I explained that the 
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relationship between the concept of the Divine Self (dhat) and God (ilah) is 
knowable, but that the reality of the Divine Self is unknown and unknowable. 
 In the following chapter, I will examine the third and final concept in Ibn 
Arabi’s thesis of ultimate reality, that of ultimate reality as God (ilah). I will explain 
the scope of the concept and its relationship to religion, religious practice and 
concept(s) of God. I will also explain its relationship to natural theology and to Ibn 
Arabi’s views concerning religious diversity.  
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Chapter 9: The Concept of Ultimate 
Reality as God (ilah) 
9.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as the 
Divine Self (dhat), which indicates ultimate reality in Himself with no relationship or 
reference to anything else. I critically examined the dispute over the meaning of dhat 
and its implications. I also analysed Ibn Arabi’s views on the knowability of ultimate 
reality as the Divine Self (dhat). 
 In this chapter, I introduce the third and final concept in Ibn Arabi’s thesis of 
ultimate reality: the concept of ultimate reality as God (ilah). In section 9.2, I explain 
the scope of Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as God (ilah). Ibn Arabi postulates 
that the term ‘God’ indicates a title that ultimate reality holds rather than signifying a 
proper name for Him (something akin to ‘the King’). For Ibn Arabi, the concept of 
God (ilah) designates ultimate reality in His relation to the world as its Creator and 
Sustainer. 
In section 9.3, I examine Ibn Arabi’s views with regard to knowledge of 
ultimate reality as God (ilah). He explains that ultimate reality as such is known and 
knowable. He introduces three channels through which one can obtain knowledge of 
God (ilah): the rational faculty; the scriptures; and religious experience. Ibn Arabi 
evaluates these channels according to their degree and accuracy of knowledge of God 
(ilah).  
In section 9.4, I analyse Ibn Arabi’s view on the relationship between ultimate 
reality as God (ilah) and religions. He argues that ultimate reality as God (ilah) is the 
concern of religions, religious beliefs and practices. But Ibn Arabi tends to 
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differentiate between the metaphysical God and religious concepts of Him. Religious 
concepts of God are constructed by religions of ultimate reality as God (ilah), here as 
a metaphysical entity. Further, he states that different religious concepts of God vary 
in how accurate they are in representing ultimate reality as God (ilah), and argues that 
the Islamic concept is the only correct and accurate representation. However, he also 
adopts a form of inclusivism with regard to the believers of other religions, whom he 
says are forgiven as they unknowingly worship the real God.  
Because of the disagreements among Islamic theologians over the Islamic 
concept of God, Ibn Arabi introduces his thesis on the matter. He holds that one 
should follow the dictates of the Islamic scriptures precisely in this matter, which 
introduces God by declaring simultaneously the transcendence and incomparability of 
God (tanzih) and the partial similarity between God and his creation (tashbih).  
In section 9.5, I examine another explanation developed by Ibn Arabi of the 
relationship between ultimate reality and religion, though one which could seem 
incompatible with his inclusivism (as presented in section 9.4). In this thesis, Ibn 
Arabi argues that religious concepts of God are not different notions of the 
metaphysical God (ilah) developed by religions, but actually different self-
manifestations of ultimate reality, each revealing a different aspect of Him. 
Accordingly, Ibn Arabi advocates a pluralistic attitude towards the diversity of 
religions in which he seems to maintain that all religions are equally true and 
authentic. I posit, however, that Ibn Arabi’s pluralistic thesis potentially alienates him 
from theism in general, and from Islam in particular, a consequence which he 
constantly seeks to avoid. It also may undermine the potential systematic structure of 
Ibn Arabi’s thesis of ultimate reality. 
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9.2 The Scope and the Meaning of the Concept of Ultimate 
Reality as God (ilah) 
 
Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat), as examined in the 
previous chapter, indicates ultimate reality in Himself with no relationship or 
reference to anything else. The concept of ultimate reality as God (ilah) indicates 
ultimate reality in His relationship with something other than Himself: the world.34 
Ibn Arabi considers the concept of ‘God’ (ilah) not as a proper name for ultimate 
reality but as a title and position that ultimate reality holds. Consequently, he seems to 
follow the Islamic scriptures on this issue, which is explicit in differentiating between 
the term ‘God’ (ilah) and God’s name, Allah. The Quran talks about many gods 
(a’lihah) and merely asserts that Allah is the real God (ilah). Ibn Arabi also 
introduces the term godness (uluhah), which he says is comparable to the position of 
kingship or sultanship. The concept of godness (uluhah) cannot be translated to 
Godhead, though, as while the latter indicates the divine nature of God, the former 
indicates a particular position that God occupies. Further, Ibn Arabi affirms that for 
ultimate reality to be God (ilah) there must be that which is ‘godded over’ (ma’luh) 
(i.e., the world) (2011, Vol. 5, p. 106). As kingship implies the existence of a 
kingdom, godness (uluhah) also implies the existence of the world; it is as 
meaningless to say that Philippe is a king without a kingdom as it is to call ultimate 
reality God (ilah) without any reference to the world, Ibn Arabi seems to maintain. In 
addition, in the same way that a man is a king when he has a particular relationship 
with a kingdom, ultimate reality is God (ilah) when He has a relationship with the 
                                                        
34 When I use the term ‘God’ followed by its Arabic equivalent (ilah), I mean to 
indicate this technical term in Ibn Arabi’s writing: ‘ultimate reality in his relationship 
with the world’, and not to indicate ultimate reality simpliciter.  
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world. William C. Chittick explains this aspect of Ibn Arabi’s metaphysical thesis of 
ilah and ma’luh: 
 
From this principle arises Ibn al-'Arabi's well-known doctrine of the ma'luh or 
‘divine thrall.’ The word is a past participle derived from the same root as ilah, 
‘god.’ Literally it means that which is ‘godded over,’ or the object in respect 
of which a god is a god (1989, p. 60).  
 
In addition, being the God of the world implies being its cause, Creator and Sustainer, 
Ibn Arabi seems to uphold.  
There is an essential relationship between Ibn Arabi’s concept of the Divine 
Self (dhat) and his concept of God (ilah). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
relationship between the two concepts is comparable to the relationship between 
Philippe as a person and Philippe as the King of Belgium. The former is comparable 
to the Divine Self (dhat), while the position ‘the King of Belgium’ is comparable to 
the position ‘God’ (ilah). Dhat is the Self that occupies the position of godness 
(uluhah). Although in reality there is an overlap, the denotations of the two terms, the 
Divine Self (dhat) and God (ilah), are different. This is comparable to the difference 
between the word ‘Philippe’ and the phrase ‘the King of Belgium’; each has a 
linguistically different denotation even though the two overlap in reality (Philippe is 
the King of Belgium). When explaining the difference between the concept of the 
Divine Self (dhat) and the concept of God (ilah), Ibn Arabi says that ‘it is like when 
we talk about the Sultan as a Sultan rather than as a human being’ (2011, Vol. 2, p. 
95).  
 169 
9.3 Knowing Ultimate Reality as God (ilah) 
 
Ibn Arabi repeats that God (ilah) created the world so that the world may know Him 
(Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 196). Hence, he posits that while ultimate reality as the Divine Self 
(dhat) is mainly unknown and unknowable, ultimate reality as God (ilah) is, to an 
extent, both knowable and known. He states the following: ‘the world never knew 
anything about the Real [ultimate reality] except [what is associated with] His title, 
which is being God [ilah]’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 3, p. 101). Considering that 
limitation is a necessary condition for anything to be known by a human being, Ibn 
Arabi explains that by being God (ilah), ultimate reality enters into limitation in order 
for people to know Him (Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 106). The limitation associated with the 
position of ‘godness’ (uluhah) is contrasted with the unlimitedness essential to the 
Divine Self (dhat) (Ibid., p. 105).  
 One should not, however, be confused by Ibn Arabi’s occasional claim that it 
is impossible for that which is ‘godded over’ (ma’luh) to know God (ilah) (Ibid., Vol. 
3, p. 97). What he means in such instances is perhaps that it is impossible for us to 
know what it is like to be God (ilah), as we must become God to gain this type of 
knowledge. This is metaphysically impossible as we (that which is godded over) are 
by definition not God; as I mentioned in earlier chapters, Ibn Arabi defines the world 
as everything other than God.   
In his thesis of ultimate reality, Ibn Arabi introduces three channels through 
which one could obtain knowledge of God (ilah). They are: the rational faculty; the 
scriptures; and the religious experience.  
The rational faculty indicates what people may come to know about God 
(ilah) based on reasoning and logical investigation. This includes all of the 
metaphysical arguments for the existence of God. The arguments that Ibn Arabi 
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develops and endorses for ultimate reality as God (ilah) are the same as those put 
forward by theologians and philosophers of religion with reference to God in natural 
theology. This is partly because Ibn Arabi’s concept of God (ilah) is almost identical 
with the theistic concept of God. Hence, the ontological argument, the cosmological 
argument and the argument(s) from design are applicable to (and employable in) Ibn 
Arabi’s concept of God (ilah). For example, Ibn Arabi defends the cosmological 
argument several times in his writings. The version that he seems to advocate is 
similar to al-Ghazali’s version (i.e., the kalam cosmological argument). Ibn Arabi 
begins his argument by affirming that contingent beings begin to exist (muhdathat). 
Anything that begins to exist must require a cause for its existence, and all causes 
need a first cause which does not have a beginning. This beginning-less cause is what 
we call God (ilah) (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 8, p. 209).35  However, Ibn Arabi does not 
seem to display a great deal of enthusiasm for metaphysical arguments pertaining to 
the existence of God. This attitude stems from his tendency to evaluate such 
arguments epistemically. He even sometimes attempts to reduce the metaphysical 
arguments to epistemic ones. Occasionally he proposes the argument that there are 
two things in existence: God and the world. Knowing the latter leads one to knowing 
the former (Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 140). For Ibn Arabi, the value of an argument is 
determined by the amount of knowledge it provides about God. He does not seem to 
think that metaphysical arguments for the existence of God provide much knowledge 
of Him. The cosmological argument, for instance (if it succeeds), establishes only that 
there is a Being that causes the universe to be and sustains it. This amount of 
knowledge does not seem to greatly excite Ibn Arabi. He once complained that if one 
                                                        
35 For further discussion of the arguments for the existence of God see: A. Plantinga 
(1966, 1982); W. L. Rowe (1998); W. L. Craig (2001); R. Swinburne (2004) and Y. 
Nagasawa (2011). For detailed discussions of al-Ghazali’s kalam cosmological 
argument in particular see Craig (1979, 1997) and Craig and Sinclair (2009).   
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used only philosophical arguments, one would know of God but would never be able 
to know God, (which is for him of course the more important issue) (Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 
392).36 Thus, he sometimes undermines metaphysical arguments that require one to 
take a long journey through a chain of contingent beings (causes) to reach God (the 
first cause). Instead, Ibn Arabi suggests, one should reflect directly upon God Himself 
(Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 1, p. 212). In fact, on a few isolated occasions he even seems to 
recommend that one should abstain from intellectual reflection and investigation 
altogether and submit totally to the scriptures and religious experience in order to gain 
knowledge (Ibid., Vol. 4, p. 227).  
The rational faculty also has the role of maintaining the coherence of the 
concept of God, which Ibn Arabi considers part of knowing God. Theistic 
philosophers of religion have long been concerned with the coherence of the concept 
of God and, accordingly, deciding what should be applicable and inapplicable to Him. 
There has been a long debate among Islamic theologians over how to coherently 
maintain Islamic claims about the concept of God. Questions include, for instance, 
whether God, as an omnipotent being, is able to do evil, or whether this is precluded 
by God’s absolute goodness.    
Ibn Arabi finds that the rational faculty, in its two ways, provides warranted 
knowledge of God, yet he accuses the knowledge of being limited. He seems to 
consider knowledge obtained through the rational faculty similar to the knowledge 
one may gain about a building by limiting oneself to its blueprints. The actual 
building extends beyond these blueprints. If one’s conception of the building is 
limited to the blueprints, he is still warranted in his knowledge but he is undoubtedly 
                                                        
36 Ibn Arabi’s phrase could be translated literally as: ‘His status [as God], not his 
essence [a’ynhu], is known through theoretical [philosophical] evidences’ (Ibn Arabi, 
2011, Vol. 5, p. 392).  
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missing a lot. Ibn Arabi continually points out that reasoning and philosophy limit our 
understanding of God, as His vastness revolts against and extends beyond them. He 
says that those who wish to truly know God must leave their reasoning behind (Ibn 
Arabi, 2011, Vol. 6, p. 319). Further, he posits that one is not warranted in objecting 
to an affirmation of God obtained through other channels of knowledge merely on the 
basis that it undermines reason; it is unjustifiable to prioritise the rational faculty over 
other channels of knowledge that may have a wider scope (e.g., religious experience).  
Ibn Arabi’s views on rational investigations with regard to knowing God in 
particular are implicitly summarised in the dialogue that he has with the great 
philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes) in their famous meeting while Ibn Arabi was a 
young man. Ibn Arabi delineates the story of the meeting in detail. He states: 
  
And so one fine day, I went to Cordova, to the house of Abu’l Walid Ibn 
Rushd (Averroes). He had expressed the desire to meet me personally, because 
he had heard of the revelations that God had accorded me in the course of 
spiritual retirement, and he had made no secret of is astonishment at what he 
had been told. For this reason my father, who was one of his friends, sent me 
to his house one day, pretexting some sort of errand, in reality to enable 
Averroes to have a talk with me. At that time I was still a beardless youth. 
When I entered, the master arose from his place, received me with signal 
marks of friendship and consideration, and finally embraced me. Then he said: 
‘Yes.’ and I in turn said: ‘Yes.’ His joy was great at noting that I had 
understood. But then taking cognizance of what had called forth his joy, I 
added: ‘No.’ Immediately Averroes winced, the color went out of his cheeks, 
he seemed to doubt his own thought. He asked me this question: What manner 
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of solution have you found through divine illumination and inspiration? Is it 
identical with that which we found from speculative reflection? I replied: Yes 
and no. Between the yes and no, spirits take their flight from their matter and 
heads are separated from their bodies.’ Averroes turned pale, I saw him 
tremble; he murmured the ritual phrase ‘There is no power save in God’—for 
he had understood my allusion (as quoted in Corbin, 1997, pp. 41–42). 
 
This was an astonishing meeting as it paired probably the most important 
figure in Islamic philosophy with probably the most important figure in Islamic 
mysticism. Ibn Arabi does not explicitly state what the topic of the dialogue between 
him and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) was. He seems to leave it intentionally vague. Michael 
Chodkiewicz asserts that the subject of the discussion between the two was the 
resurrection of the body (as quoted in Addas, 1993, p. 37, note 17). He claims that the 
connection is made clear in the pages preceding the passage where Ibn Arabi tells the 
story. Chodkiewicz, however, does not seem to explain what that connection is. 
Chodkiewicz’s interpretation, I posit, is inaccurate for two reasons. First, the 
preceding pages discuss various things, including the creation of human beings (see 
Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 1, pp. 232–34). The mention of the resurrection comes only in 
one short sentence within the discussion (Ibid., p. 234). It seems arbitrary to infer the 
topic from this particular sentence alone. In addition, Ibn Arabi tends to jump from 
one subject to another in his writings without a clear connection between the subjects. 
Hence, even if we assume that the preceding pages were in fact discussing the 
resurrection of the body, unless there is a clear connection between them and the 
story, it is perfectly possible that Ibn Arabi has moved on from the subject by 
introducing this story. Second, it is highly unlikely that Ibn Rushd (Averroes) would 
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refer to such a specific topic (i.e., the resurrection of the body) in this enigmatic way. 
Ibn Rushd definitely assumed that Ibn Arabi understood what he was referring to; 
why would he think that Ibn Arabi knew from the word ‘Yes’ that Ibn Rushd was 
referring to resurrection rather than any other topic? More importantly, how could Ibn 
Arabi have reckoned that this was what Ibn Rushd (Averroes) meant? This seems 
highly implausible.  
 I propose that what Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and Ibn Arabi were referring to in 
their mysterious dialogue was something more general, concerning the outlining of 
their respective disciplines. They seem to discuss the essential difference between 
philosophy and mysticism in knowledge, and knowing God in particular. This is a 
topic that is of great importance for both traditions, yet they have completely different 
approaches to it. While Ibn Rushd (Averroes), as a philosopher, is known for 
defending rational investigation, Ibn Arabi, as a mystic, is known for prioritising the 
other mystical ways of knowledge. It seems that Ibn Rushd (Averroes), who was a 
religious man, wanted to compare the knowledge that he obtained of God through 
philosophical investigation with what Ibn Arabi obtained through mysticism. He 
wanted to discover whether or not the content of the two knowledges are the same; 
Ibn Arabi replied ‘yes and no’. Ibn Arabi’s answer seems to fit well with his position 
on the knowledge obtained through the rational faculty. As I explained above, he 
endorses the rational faculty as a warranted channel for obtaining knowledge of God 
(ilah), yet he affirms that the amount of knowledge obtained is limited and is 
exceeded by mystical knowledge. I posit that reading the dialogue above in this way 
makes it clearer and more coherent.  
 In fact, Ibn Arabi tends to make similar comparisons between philosophy and 
mysticism in his writing (see for instance, Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 5, p. 149). 
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 Moreover, in his description of his meeting with Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Ibn 
Arabi apparently wanted to demonstrate the superiority of mysticism over philosophy. 
This is manifested in every aspect of the story, starting from Ibn Arabi’s assertion that 
Ibn Rushd (Averroes) is the one who asked to meet him. Further, he explains in detail 
how Ibn Rushd (Averroes) received the young mystic with high regard and 
consideration. Also, he clearly shows that the philosopher is the one who wanted to 
learn from the mystic and not the other way around. Finally, Ibn Arabi attempts to 
show the inferiority of the knowledge of the philosopher by saying it is far from 
similar to the knowledge of mystics.  
The scriptures refer to any knowledge of God obtained from the Quran and 
the Hadith. Ibn Arabi celebrates any knowledge that is provided through the scriptures 
and advocates its unconditional acceptance. He also rejects any form of figurative 
interpretation of the verses and espouses an acceptance of them without reservation or 
condition. Islamic theologians and philosophers of religion sometimes provide forms 
of reinterpretation (ta’wil) of the scriptures in order to maintain a philosophically and 
theologically coherent understanding of them. Ibn Arabi claims, however, that when 
theologians reinterpret the scriptures for such purposes, they give precedence to their 
own intellects over the scriptures. This he condemns outright (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 4, 
pp. 51, 53–54). Ibn Arabi proposes however that one should endorse the meanings of 
the Quran and Hadith without reinterpretation (ta’wil) (Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 171). 
However, one must take care with Ibn Arabi claims in such contexts. According to 
Ibn Arabi, the literal meanings of the scriptures are not necessarily immediate or are 
able to be inferred from analysing the texts directly. Instead, he often advocates an 
understanding of the scriptures inspired by religious experiences (Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 
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139–140). He once states that mystics appeal in understanding some parts of the 
scriptures to a special faculty that is beyond the rational faculty (Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 173). 
However, I maintain that if the meanings of the texts are inferred from an 
external source (i.e. religious experience), Ibn Arabi’s position is not significantly 
different from the theological reinterpretation (ta’wil) that he condemns. While Ibn 
Arabi appeals to religious experience to determine the meaning of these texts, 
theologians appeal to linguistics, philosophy and theology.37 Hence, both of them 
indeed give precedence to something over the scriptures. One may even claim that the 
theologians’ appeal to linguistics and philosophy is more systematic and settled than 
religious experiences, which are greatly subjective and personal.  
Ibn Arabi, thus, often introduces completely novel interpretations for the 
scriptures that are far from the immediate meaning of the text. These sometimes even 
directly oppose the literal meaning. For instance, the Quran states:  
 
Then seest thou such a one as takes as his god his own vain desire? Allah has, 
knowing (him as such), left him astray, and sealed his hearing and his heart 
(and understanding), and put a cover on his sight. Who, then, will guide him 
after Allah (has withdrawn Guidance)? Will ye not then receive admonition? 
(45: 23) 
 
Obviously this verse condemns one who worships his own desires, as it is understood 
by probably all Muslim scholars. Ibn Arabi, however, introduces a completely 
different meaning. For him, the verse praises the person in question; when the Quran 
states that God ‘sealed his hearing and heart’, Ibn Arabi believes that this was so that 
                                                        
37 I discuss reinterpretation (ta’wil) further below. 
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his heart would then be filled with the belief and remembering of God. His hearing 
was sealed also to prevent him from hearing any words except the words of Allah. 
Hence, he maintains that God is not punishing this person, as it first seems, but 
actually blessing him (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 3, p. 202).  
 Ibn Arabi also proposes another meaning for the Arabic word a’thab, which 
unequivocally means ‘punishment’ and is used frequently in the scriptures to threaten 
disbelievers. He suggests that this word might in some cases be equivalent to uthubah, 
which means ‘purity’ and ‘sweetness’. Therefore, some parts of the scriptures that 
many have long believed to be divine threats of ‘punishment’ could actually be divine 
promises of ‘purity’ and ‘sweetness’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 3, p. 202). This alternate 
definition of a’thab does not seem to have any linguistic basis and may be considered 
an unfounded claim.  
There are other similar examples in which Ibn Arabi ignores not just the literal 
meaning of the scriptures but often any plausible meaning. Affifi hence complains 
that ‘[i]n theory Ibnul ‘Arabi condemns ta’wil (interpretation) but in practice he 
indulges in a far worse method of understanding the Quran than ta’wil. He interprets 
the Quran in such a way as to fit within his […] doctrine even at the cost of violating 
its language and grammar’ (1964, p. 192). 
The religious experience is the third channel through which one may obtain 
knowledge of God (ilah). Ibn Arabi uses many technical terms to indicate various 
kinds of religious experience. This includes tasting (dhawq), witnessing (shuhud) and 
unveiling (kashf), amongst others. According to Ibn Arabi, religious experience is the 
most important channel for obtaining knowledge of God (ilah). It is difficult to give 
an exhaustive description of his thesis on the matter due to the breadth of this topic, to 
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which he devotes a great deal of attention throughout his writings. I will, however, 
attempt to give a brief introduction that may suit the purposes of this chapter.  
It seems that most of the religious experiences that Ibn Arabi discusses can be 
categorised into three kinds. The first are those which include sensory experiences of 
other beings; Ibn Arabi repeatedly talks about his perceptual experiences of God 
(ilah), and of prophets, mystics and other key figures (see for instance, Ibn Arabi, 
2011, Vol. 1, p. 235). He may claim that through these experiences he engages in 
conversations with those figures. The second type is typical mystical experience; Ibn 
Arabi on several occasions addresses the mystical experiences of unity with God and 
of freedom from the individual ego (Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 290). It is not clear what type of 
knowledge Ibn Arabi thinks these experiences may provide though. The third and 
final category of religious experience consists of particular messages or inspired 
understanding. For instance, Ibn Arabi tends to interpret the scriptures based on the 
understanding that he believes has been given to him through a religious experience, 
and often attempts to settle debates on theological issues or validate some of his 
unusual views by claiming that he was inspired by religious experiences (see for 
example, Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 148). 
The three kinds of religious experiences occasionally overlap. For instance, 
Ibn Arabi might introduce a personal religious experience that involves meeting the 
Prophet Mohammed, who gives him a particular message. For instance, he claims that 
his book Fusus al-Hikam was actually given to him by the prophet Mohammed in a 
religious experience and that he was asked to share it with others (Ibn Arabi, 2009, 
pp. 44–45).  
Another issue that seems to concern Ibn Arabi with regard to religious 
experiences is their epistemic value. It is common among mystics to consider the 
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knowledge obtained from their religious experiences to be true, regardless of whether 
or not they can support their claim with arguments and evidence. Ibn Arabi is no 
exception. Like mystics from all traditions, he places religious experience at the 
highest level when it comes to obtaining knowledge, particularly knowledge of God. 
The mystics’ certainty and trust of religious experiences might be because such 
experiences are, to them, similar to other direct experiences where one is certain of 
the knowledge obtained even if it is not possible to provide arguments or clear 
evidence for it, such as experiencing pain (Donovan, 1979, p. 56).  
However, it is important to note that Ibn Arabi thinks that religious 
experiences vary with regard to the amount and the truthfulness of the knowledge 
they can provide. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, he places mystics on different 
levels. The amount and the accuracy of any knowledge obtained from religious 
experience are typically dependent on the level of the mystic who has the experience 
(Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 1, p. 140). He affirms that not all knowledge obtained through 
religious experience must necessarily be true. Consequently, he occasionally 
addresses disagreement among mystics, and dismisses claims that appear to have been 
obtained from religious experience (see for example: Ibid., pp. 119, 482; Vol. 5, pp. 
316–317). According to Ibn Arabi, the highest level of religious experience, in terms 
of the truthfulness and accuracy of the knowledge, is what he calls ‘unveiling’ (kashf) 
(Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 398). Unveiling (kashf), or some form of it, seems to be available 
only to a small number of elite mystics (Ibid., p. 482). He maintains that this type of 
religious experience may provide definitive knowledge. He seems to consider the 
certainty of the knowledge obtained from unveiling (kashf) to be similar to the 
certainty of a priori knowledge or knowledge of mathematical axioms. This is true at 
least for the individual who experiences it (Ibid., p. 57), to the extent that the 
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experiencer will never be able to reject or even question its content, Ibn Arabi 
confirms (Ibid., p. 482).38  
9.4 The Concept of Ultimate Reality as God (ilah) and 
Religion 
 
9.4.1 Religious Concept(s) of God  
 
As we have seen in previous chapters, Ibn Arabi seems to posit that ultimate reality as 
existence (wujud) and ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat) largely concern 
metaphysics rather than religion. On the other hand, he explicitly introduces ultimate 
reality as God (ilah) as the object of religious belief and worship (Ibn Arabi, 2011, 
Vol. 1, p. 496).  
In his discussion of his concept of God (ilah), Ibn Arabi sometimes appears to 
differentiate between ultimate reality as God (ilah) as a metaphysical entity, and the 
religious concept(s) of Him. According to Ibn Arabi, religious concepts of God 
consist of various formations constructed by religions and religious traditions to 
depict ultimate reality as God (ilah), here a metaphysical entity. Hence, he 
occasionally contrasts the metaphysical God (ilah) with what he calls the ‘god of 
beliefs’ (i.e., the religious concept(s) of Him) (Ibid., p. 949).39 He espouses that no 
one has actually yet worshipped God simplister (i.e., the metaphysical God), as people 
only worship their own concept(s) of Him (Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 195). 
                                                        
38 For further discussion of religious experiences see: W. Proudfoot (1985, 1992); J. 
Runzo and C. K. Ihara (1986); W. P. Alston (1992, 1993); R. W. Hood Jr. (1995); C. 
F. Davis (1999); G. Griffith-Dickson (2000) and W. James (2012). 
39 In this chapter, I am using the phrase ‘ultimate reality as God’ (ilah), and the phrase 
‘the metaphysical God’ (ilah) interchangeably, because ultimate reality as God (ilah) 
is a metaphysical entity in Ibn Arabi’s doctrine, in contrast with the religious concepts 
of God, which are mainly epistemic.  
 181 
In addition, Ibn Arabi evaluates the truthfulness of various religious concepts 
of God by how accurate they are in corresponding to and representing the 
metaphysical God (ilah). At the top of these religious concepts of God sits the Islamic 
concept, which Ibn Arabi believes is the only concept that represents the metaphysical 
God (ilah) perfectly and accurately. All other religious concepts of God, however, are 
inaccurate.  He states:  
‘We [who uphold the correct religious concept of God—Muslims] match the 
name Allah with Allah Himself [i.e., the metaphysical God (ilah)], and 
because of that we are called happy knowers, compared to the unhappy 
ignorants [who uphold incorrect religious concept(s) of God] who do not 
match the name Allah with Allah Himself’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 2, p. 539).  
 
Due to disagreement among Muslim theologians and philosophers on several issues 
concerning the Islamic concept of God, Ibn Arabi introduces his own thesis on the 
matter. He postulates that, as the principal source of the Islamic concept of God is the 
scriptures (i.e., the Quran and Hadith), one needs to submit totally to the dictates of 
the scriptures in constructing the concept of God. If we examine the Quran and 
Hadith, we find that they introduce God in two ways. Sometimes, they affirm the 
transcendence of God and explicitly state that there is nothing like unto Him. At other 
times, however, they confirm that God has some attributes that we humans also have, 
such as being a Hearer and a Seer, or that He laughs or can be happy.40 Ibn Arabi calls 
the former ‘the way of tanzih’, and the latter ‘the way of tashbih’. In Islamic theology, 
tanzih refers to the declaration of Allah’s incomparability with anything, and tashbih 
indicates the declaration of Allah’s (partial) similarity to his creation. Islamic 
                                                        
40 There is also a third way through which the scripture introduces God as an 
OmniGod, which does not concern the discussion here. 
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theologians have different attitudes towards dealing with the Quranic verses and 
Hadiths that adopt tanzih and tashbih.  
Most Islamic theologians embrace the way of tanzih in introducing the 
concept of God and prioritise the Quranic verses and Hadiths that affirm the 
transcendence and incomparability of God (with anything). Accordingly, they 
interpret the other verses that insinuate some similarities between God and human 
beings figuratively through reinterpretation (ta’wil). Applying reinterpretation (ta’wil) 
to these verses by the Islamic theological schools was far from arbitrary. Many Arabic 
words have several meanings (some more prevalent than others). Consequently, if 
such words are used in a Quranic verse or a Hadith and the immediate meaning 
appears incompatible with God’s transcendence and incomparability, theologians 
appeal to the other meanings (if context serves). For instance, the scriptures talk about 
God having a hand (yad). In order to avoid undermining God’s transcendence and 
incomparability, which they think possessing hands seems to do, theologians say that 
yad in such contexts should not be taken to indicate ‘hand’ but, instead, to mean 
‘ability’ (qudrah), the second meaning of the word yad. This method of 
reinterpretation (ta’wil) is primarily practised in Islamic history by three theological 
schools: Mu’tazilah; Asha’rite; and Maturidite.  
The second attitude seems to endorse the way of tashbih and, hence, prioritises 
the verses that ascribe attributes to God that we humans have over the verses that 
embrace His transcendence and incomparability. The advocates of this attitude tend to 
adopt an anthropomorphic approach to divine attributes stated in the scriptures. For 
example, they maintain that the verses stating that God is a Hearer and a Seer should 
be understood, more or less, in the same way that we understand that human beings 
are hearers and seers. This attitude is less common among Muslim theologians; its 
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followers are known as Mujassimah (Anthropomorphists), a term mostly employed 
with negative connotations.  
Ibn Arabi seems to complain that both approaches fail to submit totally to the 
scriptures, and that neither is warranted in prioritising one way of the scriptures over 
another (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 1, p. 437). He therefore proposes that the best way to 
identify the Islamic concept of God (and thus the perfect religious concept of God) is 
to embrace, following the ways of Quran and Hadith, both the incomparability of God 
(with anything) (tanzih), and His partial similarity with His creation (tashbih). Ibn 
Arabi seems to think that the simultaneous affirmation of tanzih and tashbih in the 
scriptures is not accidental at all, but both intentional and essential to God’s concept. 
In this sense, the aim of the scriptures is to account for the vastness and unlimited 
nature of God that neither tanzih nor tashbih alone could account for. Affirming both 
God’s transcendence and His (partial) similarity (with His creation) is a way to make 
the concept less limited, a supposed advantage for any religious concept of God. The 
freer a concept is, the more able it becomes to incorporate and represent ultimate 
reality as God (ilah). Ibn Arabi celebrates the Quranic verse that states: ‘Naught is as 
His likeness; and He is the Hearer, the Seer’ (42:11). This seems to support his 
proposition by affirming simultaneously that nothing is like God and also that He is a 
Hearer and Seer. Ibn Arabi explains that ‘whoever defines Him following the divine 
definition [i.e., Quran], [would define Him by] combining the declaration of Allah’s 
incomparability to anything [tanzih] and the declaration of Allah’s [partial] similarity 
with his creation [tashbih]’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 5, p. 195).  
It is essential to note that the declaration of God’s partial similarity with His 
creation (tashbih) in Ibn Arabi’s thesis is not identical to anthropomorphism which 
Ibn Arabi firmly rejects (Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 140; Vol. 3, p. 362). Tashbih means that God 
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and human beings may share an attribute but not that their attributes are similar per 
se. Even though the Quran attributes hands to God, it does not say that they are 
similar to human hands. The similarity (tashbih) intended in such verses is merely that 
both have hands (which the scriptures affirm) and not that they have similar hands 
(which the scriptures reject). An anthropomorphist interpretation of the divine 
attributes is imposed upon the scriptures rather than inferred from them (Ibid., Vol. 1, 
p. 73). Ibn Arabi stresses that we should follow the scripture strictly and refrain from 
imposing any further interpretations (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 3, p. 362). Because of this, 
he is exceptionally tolerant towards the doctrine of tafwid. As mentioned in Chapter 
Two, he identifies this doctrine with the view of the righteous predecessors (al-salaf 
al-salih), who were the early generations of Muslims (Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 139; Vol. 5, p. 
85). The advocates of tafwid argue that one should not dismiss any part of the 
scriptures concerning God’s ontology or prioritise any part over another. Instead, one 
should endorse everything in them unconditionally, and yet maintain an agnostic 
approach with regard to the specific meanings of the divine attributes stated therein. 
Ibn Arabi seems to uphold that the doctrine of tafwid is the best among the theological 
schools in representing the Islamic concept of God. He seems to encourage common 
Muslims to follow it as it succeeds in preserving the ways of scripture when 
constructing the Islamic concept of God (Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 7, 450; Vol. 5, pp. 84–85).  
However, although he admits that the doctrine of tafwid succeeds in following 
the scriptures, he seems to maintain that a failure to know the exact meanings of these 
attributes is a setback for this doctrine (Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 331–332). He thus affirms 
that some of the elite mystics actually exceed the doctrine of tafwid on this issue. 
Through religious experience, they succeed in knowing the exact meanings of God’s 
attributes, even the more controversial ones such as divine laughter (Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 
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139–140; 331–332). It is notable that he never explains these meanings; they seem 
inexplicable and likely infringe the rules of logic.   
  
9.4.2 Ibn Arabi’s Inclusivism 
 
There are diverse religious traditions in the world, each with its own beliefs about 
divinity, reality, us, and many other essential issues. These religions and religious 
traditions appear inconsistent with each other on a number of key issues, sometimes 
substantially. There are three main philosophical attitudes towards religious diversity: 
religious exclusivism; religious inclusivism; and religious pluralism. 41  Religious 
exclusivism is probably the most widespread attitude among believers in all religions. 
It maintains that there is only one true religion and that all other religions are false. To 
obtain salvation, hence, one needs to follow the one true religion. Religious 
inclusivism, on the other hand, is vast and includes several distinct models, which 
renders it difficult to offer a perfect and all-encompassing definition. Some 
inclusivists seem to uphold that only one religion is true, though virtuous people can 
be saved even if they do not know of the true religion (Zagzebski and Miller, 2009, p. 
443). Others believe that, while only one religion is completely true, other religions 
and religious traditions might be partially true (Runzo, 2011, p. 65). Religious 
pluralism also has several versions but their central belief is that all religions are true 
and that no religion is superior to the others. Every religion reflects ultimate reality in 
its own unique way, a pluralist would claim.  
Exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism hold a realist position towards the 
object of religion—ultimate reality. Inclusivism and pluralism, however, agree on the 
salvation of the followers of all religions. Inclusivism and exclusivism, on the other 
                                                        
41 Non-believers may also adopt atheistic or agnostic attitudes.  
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hand, agree on maintaining a realist attitude towards religious claims and beliefs, and 
also on prioritising one religion over the others. 42  
According to some of his statements, Ibn Arabi seems to be an inclusivist. 
While he maintains that there is a correct and accurate religious concept of God (i.e., 
the God of Islam), he affirms that holders of false religious concepts of God are 
excused and will be saved in the afterlife.  
Ibn Arabi explains that aiming for godness (uluhah) is true of every 
worshipper and worship, including religions with false concepts of God. Worshippers 
of a false god (a tree, for example) only worship it because they think that the 
worshipped object is God. Thus, they attribute godness (uluhah) to the wrong object. 
The worshipper, Ibn Arabi claims, is mistaken in his attribution and not in aiming for 
godness (uluhah). Considering there is only one being who exclusively holds the 
position of godness—the real God—the worshipper’s true aim, though unknowingly, 
is the real God. Furthermore, since God knows that the worshipper aims for godness 
(and not treeness for instance), He accepts the worship (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 2, p. 
539). The following analogy may clarify Ibn Arabi’s view further. Let us say that 
someone goes to a gallery and sees a beautiful painting by an artist called Omar. Let 
us also say that the visitor loves the painting and wants to compliment the painter on 
his fine work. He then goes to the guard of the gallery, thinking he is Omar, and 
compliments him on his fine painting. The visitor attributes the painting to the wrong 
person (i.e., the guard), and consequently pays his compliments to him. Note that the 
visitor does not care about the guard other than that he thinks that he is the painter. 
Hence, the compliment is meant for Omar (the painter) even though the visitor pays it 
                                                        
42 For further discussion of the philosophical approaches to religious diversity see: H. 
Netland (1997); P. J. Griffiths (2001); J. Runzo; Basinger (2002); J. Hick (2007); A. 
Plantinga (2008) and C. Meister (2011).  
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to someone else. Let us say that Omar was actually standing near the guard and hears 
the compliment. Considering that Omar has listened to the compliment, it has thus 
reached its real object. The situation is similar with regard to worshipping anything 
other than God, following Ibn Arabi’s inclusivism. The man who worships a tree or a 
rock is only worshipping them because he thinks they are the ‘being who is worthy of 
worship’. However, considering that God is omniscient, the worship should reach 
Him; he knows that the person worships, and that it is intended for the ‘being who is 
worthy of worship’, even though he mistakenly directs his worship to something or 
someone else.  
I would finally like to address how Ibn Arabi deals with the Quranic verses 
and Hadiths that threaten those who worship a false god with punishment in Hell for 
eternity. The Quran, for example, states: ‘indeed, those who disbelieve and commit 
wrong [or injustice]—never will Allah forgive them, nor will He guide them to a path. 
Except the path of Hell; they will abide therein forever. And that, for Allah, is 
[always] easy’ (4: 168–169). In order to explain how he could reconcile his 
inclusivism with such Quranic verses, Ibn Arabi seems to develop three different 
views. 43 
  First, Ibn Arabi sometimes argues that people are to be punished in Hell for 
worshipping false gods but not for eternity. They will be punished only for a limited 
time. Different versions of this view have also been attributed to several key Islamic 
theologians such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim (1292–1350), as well as to 
                                                        
43 Many Muslim scholars seem to agree on three issues with regard to the situation of 
the disbelievers of the God of Islam in the afterlife: First, they maintain that anyone 
who never knows about Islam will be examined in the afterlife, and then that 
individual will determine his or her destiny. Second, they argue that non-Muslims 
who insist on rejecting Islam, despite their knowledge of it, might be punished in Hell 
in the afterlife. Third, they add that God may, for any reason or without reason, 
pardon whoever He wills to pardon.  
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some of the Prophet Mohammed’s companions (al-Turky, al-Arnaut and Ibn Abi al-
izz, 1997, Vol. 2, p. 626). For Ibn Arabi, though, believers in false gods might be kept 
in Hell for eternity (as the Quran threatens), though their eternal stay in Hell is not all 
a punishment, as staying in Hell and being punished in Hell are two different things. 
After the due punishment is over, Hell will cease to be a bad place and might even 
become a blessed and a good place. He seems to think that there will be metaphysical 
changes to the people in Hell or to Hell itself, through which people in it will find joy 
there (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 6, p. 171). To support his claim, Ibn Arabi affirms that, 
even according to the scriptures, Hell is not necessarily a bad place for everyone in it; 
for instance, the scriptures talk about the Angels of punishment who, of course, would 
not find it painful to be in Hell (Ibid.).  
  Still, if those who believe in false gods were not doing something wrong, as 
Ibn Arabi upholds, why would they be punished at all? Ibn Arabi’s answer to this 
question is rather unconventional. He states that anyone who worships a false god will 
be punished, not for the sake of the real God (i.e., Allah), but for the sake of the false 
god that was worshipped. Ibn Arabi seems to think that worshipping a false god is an 
unjust act and a wrongdoing against that false god. Therefore, God will punish the 
worshipper so as to restore justice for the false god that he has worshipped (Ibid., Vol. 
2, p. 539). This justification is not particularly compelling as it is not clear how 
praying to a false god is an injustice to the false god, and even more so if the false god 
is unconscious or imaginary. It is not clear that a totem, for instance, has moral rights 
as such. Therefore, his first soteriological view cannot be compatible with his 
inclusivism.  
Second, Ibn Arabi provides an alternate view elsewhere. He says that even 
though God threatens disbelievers with the punishment in Hell, He is unlikely to do 
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so. Ibn Arabi justifies his view by saying that failing to fulfil a threat is a quality of 
greatness and benevolence and, when one considers that God is omnibenevolent, He 
may act according to this quality. Ibn Arabi quotes part of an Arabic poem in which 
the poet describes his own greatness and benevolence, stating: ‘When[ever] I threaten 
[someone of something bad] […] I will fail to fulfil my threat’ (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 
4, p. 154). The poet claims that because he is great and benevolent, whenever he 
threatens a wrongdoer, he shall forgive him and not go through with his threat; so 
would God, Ibn Arabi claims. This view seems more tenable than the first one but 
does not seem decisive. His argument here, if it succeeds, establishes that God will 
probably not punish those who believe in false gods but does not guarantee that He 
will not do so. If God’s threats in the Quran to the disbelievers are just, as Ibn Arabi 
most probably maintains, God’s benevolence does not necessarily entail that He will 
not punish them, as fulfilling a just threat is not a breach of benevolence. However, if 
the holders of false concepts of God are not doing something wrong, as Ibn Arabi 
claims, they should not be vulnerable to punishment in Hell at all. Therefore, this 
second view cannot be compatible with Ibn Arabi’s inclusivism either. 
Ibn Arabi sometimes adds a further detail for his view here. He says that the 
Quran follows the ways of Arabs in expressing its views, as is confirmed by the 
Quran itself (26: 195). Considering that abstaining from fulfilling threats is something 
common among Arabs, as the above poem demonstrates, so this must be the intention 
of the Quran as well; namely, that God will abstain from fulfilling the threats of 
punishment in Hell (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 4, p. 154). 
This further justification, however, is also uncompelling. What a single Arab 
poet says in one poem cannot be said to be the norm for all Arabs. What the poem 
demonstrates is that that the poet in particular chooses not to fulfil his threat, and not 
 190 
that it is a norm for all or most benevolent Arabs to do so. Indeed, despite this poem, 
Arabs throughout history have taken the Quranic verses of punishment literally even 
though they believe in God’s benevolence. In addition, even if not fulfilling threats is 
a norm among benevolent Arabs, what the Quran confirms is that it follows the 
Arabic ways of expression, and not that it follows the Arabic social or ethical norms. 
In several cases, in fact, the Quran contradicts the Arabic social norms (such as in the 
case of prohibiting usury (riba) and changing some of the Hajj rituals). 
Third, in what seems to be a revision of his second view, Ibn Arabi at times 
confirms that God will not punish the holders of incorrect religious concepts of God at 
all (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 2, p. 539). He excludes from his assertion, though, 
disbelievers who never seek the true God or who reject their prophets directly; both 
resist the truth and insist on enacting wrong deeds, and so they may be punished. In 
substantiating his view, Ibn Arabi quotes from the Quran: ‘my mercy encompasses all 
things’ (7: 156). He also cites a saying that Prophet Mohammed attributes to God: 
‘my mercy preceded my wrath’ (al-Bukhari, 1980, Hadith: 7422). As God’s mercy 
overcomes and precedes His wrath, the punishment, which is an application of God’s 
wrath, will probably be preceded by God’s forgiveness, an application of God’s 
mercy. Ibn Arabi also appeals to another saying that he attributes to the Prophet 
Mohammed, affirming that the seeker of the truth (mujtahid) will be rewarded even if 
he is mistaken (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 2, p. 539).  
I maintain that this third view is more compatible with Ibn Arabi’s inclusivism 
than the others, though perhaps not totally conclusive. One may object that 
punishment might be the application of justice rather than wrath, and restoring justice 
need not contradict mercy.  
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To summarise, Ibn Arabi maintains that the holders of false religious concepts 
of God are forgiven, as they unknowingly worship God. In addition, God explains that 
his mercy encompasses everything and that it precedes his wrath, so Ibn Arabi 
maintains that God will pardon the believers of false gods despite the threats of 
punishment stated in the scriptures.  
Unfortunately, however, Ibn Arabi seems to introduce another position with 
regard to the relationship between religion and ultimate reality that does not seem 
compatible with his thesis discussed in this section. I will discuss this issue in the 
following section.  
9.5 Ultimate Reality and Religion: Another Thesis 
 
On several occasions, Ibn Arabi appears to depart from inclusivism and develop 
instead a pluralistic thesis that explores the relationship between ultimate reality and 
religion. In this thesis, Ibn Arabi seems to defend some form of aspectual pluralism in 
particular. Peter Byrne, a prominent advocate of aspectual pluralism, states:   
 
[T]he different systems of religious discourses are descriptive of one and the 
same reality because that reality has multiple aspects. There are pluriform 
religious discourses because there is a pluriform religious reality on to which 
each latches. [… I]t must hold that the one transcendent manifests itself in 
diverse ways. What religious discourses do is provide some direct cognitive 
contact with one or other of these manifestations, and thus some indirect 
contact with the transcendent in itself which is displayed in these 
manifestations (1995, p. 153). 
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Ibn Arabi takes a similar stance, as he upholds that ultimate reality manifests Himself 
in (and to) all religions in an infinite number of ways (2011, Vol. 5, pp. 195–96); 
every religion, thus, reflects an aspect of Him. He states: ‘People have formed 
different [beliefs and] creeds of God, and I witness [God] in all of their creeds’ (Ibid., 
Vol. 5, p. 196). Ibn Arabi’s aspectual pluralism seems incompatible with his 
inclusivist thesis (introduced in section 9.4) in three ways.  
First, Ibn Arabi seems to deny that ultimate reality as God (ilah) is the object 
of religious beliefs and practices. He seems to propose, instead, that religions actually 
correspond to the concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud). What people seek 
in their religious beliefs is not ultimate reality in His relationship with the world as its 
God (ilah), Creator and Sustainer, but actually ultimate reality as identical with 
existence (wujud). In such contexts, then, he tends to focus on the world not as an 
object with an independent (or semi-independent) identity in contrast to its Creator, 
but as incorporated within ultimate reality’s existence.  
Second, in his pluralistic thesis, Ibn Arabi proposes that religious concepts of 
God are not different depictions and formations constructed by religions to represent 
ultimate reality as God (ilah) as he states elsewhere. They are, instead, different 
actual manifestations of ultimate reality revealing different aspects of Him (Ibn Arabi, 
2011, Vol. 5, pp. 195–196). While his inclusivist stance seems to consider religious 
concepts of God to be mainly dependent upon religions, his pluralistic thesis 
considers the religious concepts of God to be mainly dependent upon ultimate reality 
Himself, who manifests Himself to every religion in a particular way. Accordingly, he 
proposes alternative meanings for the theological terms tanzih and tashbih discussed 
above. In his pluralistic stance, tanzih and tashbih are employed to differentiate 
between religions rather than the Islamic theological schools. Tashbih indicates a 
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position that claims that ultimate reality is immanent in everything that exists, and is 
therefore endorsed by religions that witness ultimate reality in worldly objects. 
Tanzih, on the other hand, refers to an approach which contends that ultimate reality is 
transcendent and focuses on the aspects of ultimate reality that extend beyond the 
world (Ibn Arabi, 2011, Vol. 3, pp. 8–9). The concepts of tashbih and tanzih in this 
thesis were not meant to evaluate religions but merely to outline from whence their 
religious concepts of God came. 
Third, likely as an outcome of the two points discussed above, Ibn Arabi 
seems to imply in this pluralistic thesis that all religions are equal with regard to their 
truthfulness and authenticity. Contrary to his inclusivist thesis, Ibn Arabi seems to 
assert in his pluralism that there is not one correct religious concept of God (i.e., the 
Islamic concept), but, indeed, that all religions and religious concepts of God are 
equally correct. In one of his famous poems, he states:  
 
My heart has become capable of every form: it is a pasture for gazelles and a 
convent for Christian monks. And a temple for idols and the pilgrim's Kaa'ba 
and the tables of the Torah, and the book of the Quran. I follow the religion of 
love. Wherever its camel mounts turn, that is my religion and my faith (1911, 
Poem XI, p. 67). 
 
Hence, he proposes that if one wants to obtain a better understanding of ultimate 
reality he must seek to see Him through all religions and religious traditions. He 
states: 
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The perfect knower knows Him in every picture in which He manifests 
Himself. The unknower [on the other hand] does not know Him except 
according to his own creed [and religion], and he would reject Him if He 
manifests Himself in any other [creed or religion]. Considering that he [i.e., 
the unknower] ties himself to his own creed [and religion alone], he rejects 
other people’s creeds [and beliefs of God] (Ibn Arabi, 2011 Vol. 5, p. 196).  
 
Ibn Arabi’s pluralistic thesis has the advantage of being attributed to ‘perfect 
knowers’ (i.e., perfect mystics); throughout his writings, he insists that his aspectual 
pluralism is only available to the greatest mystics who can see reality as it is (see for 
example, Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 450; Vol. 4, p. 190). As outlined in Chapter Two, Ibn Arabi 
unequivocally considers himself among the greatest mystics and claims their doctrine 
and views as his own. Whenever he attributes a view to the great mystics, it usually 
means that this view is his own personal opinion on the subject.  
However, two difficulties may undermine Ibn Arabi’s pluralistic thesis. First, 
it is hardly compatible with Islam, or theism in general. It does not give Islam any 
superiority over other religious concepts of God. In considering all religions and 
concepts of God equally true, including paganism, Ibn Arabi explicitly contradicts the 
Quran and Hadith. One of the strongest emphases in the Quran is that there is only 
one God (i.e., Allah), and that all other gods are false. It explicitly states ‘There is no 
god except Allah’ (3: 63), and ‘your god is one God. There is no god [worthy of 
worship] except Him’ (2: 163). Contradicting the Quran and Hadith is a high price 
that Ibn Arabi appears to work hard not to pay in other parts of his work.  
The second difficulty of Ibn Arabi’s pluralistic thesis is that it describes a 
completely different relationship between ultimate reality and the world from his 
 195 
views discussed in the previous sections. According to his pluralism, Ibn Arabi does 
not seem to ascribe any role to his concept of ultimate reality as God (ilah). In 
omitting Ibn Arabi’s concept of God (ilah), however, some of Ibn Arabi’s 
metaphysical views may become unclear, such as his insistence on the metaphysical 
contrast between God and world. He asserts that ultimate reality is God (ilah) only in 
the sense that He is the Creator, the Lord and the Sustainer of the world.  
Unfortunately, I do not have a decisive solution to the inconsistency between 
Ibn Arabi’s pluralistic thesis and his inclusivist thesis. One may propose though that 
while the inclusivist thesis indicates Ibn Arabi’s position as a Muslim, the pluralistic 
thesis may represent his universal position on the matter, which may apply to all 
religions. Nevertheless, there still exists an acute incompatibility between his ‘Islamic 
thesis’ and his ‘universal thesis’. While the former maintains that only one concept is 
correct and accurate, the latter maintains that all religious concepts are equally 
correct. In addition, Ibn Arabi can either maintain that religious concepts of God are 
different concepts constructed by religions in order to depict God, or he can say that 
those religious concepts are different aspects of God, but he cannot maintain both.  
One further suggestion is that maybe Ibn Arabi thinks that Muslims should pursue 
Islamic inclusivism; however, from a trans-religious perspective, pluralism should be 
pursued. Nonetheless, I think that Ibn Arabi’s teaching would be better off without the 
pluralistic thesis. All of Ibn Arabi’s other views and concepts seem to complement 
one another and comprise a consistent and unified thesis of ultimate reality, which 
seems at odds with his pluralistic thesis.  
Having presented the topic of the religious concepts of God according to Ibn 
Arabi, my interpretation of his thesis of ultimate reality is now complete: (i) ultimate 
reality as the Divine Self (dhat) indicates God in Himself with no relationship or 
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reference to anything else; (ii) ultimate reality as God (ilah) indicates ultimate reality 
in relation to the world; and (iii) ultimate reality as existence (wujud) indicates 
ultimate reality as identical with existence, which introduces a deeper metaphysical 
relationship between God and reality.  
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I examined Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as God (ilah). I 
explained that this concept indicates ultimate reality in His relationship with the world 
as its God (ilah). Ibn Arabi treats godness (uluhah) as a position that ultimate reality 
occupies like kingship or sultanship. He affirms that ultimate reality as the Divine Self 
(dhat) holds the title God (ilah), in the same sense that a person may hold the title ‘the 
King’. In addition, ‘that which is godded over’ (ma’luh) (the world) is necessary for 
God to be God (ilah), in the same way a kingdom is necessary for a king to be a king.  
Further, I examined Ibn Arabi’s views on knowing ultimate reality as God 
(ilah). He defends three channels through which one can obtain knowledge of 
ultimate reality as God (ilah). They are the rational faculty, the scriptures and 
religious experience. He considers the rational faculty, though, the least significant of 
these channels.  
Furthermore, I examined Ibn Arabi’s views on the relationship between 
ultimate reality as God (ilah) and religion. He maintains that ultimate reality as God 
(ilah) is the object of religions, religious beliefs and religious practices. He postulates 
that religious concepts of God are different depictions constructed by religions and 
religious traditions in order to represent ultimate reality as God (ilah). Hence, Ibn 
Arabi sometimes contrasts the gods of religions with ultimate reality as God (ilah), 
here a metaphysical entity. Also, he espouses that religions vary in how accurate they 
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are in representing ultimate reality as God (ilah) in their religious concepts of Him. 
He advocates that the Islamic concept represents the perfect, and only correct, 
religious concept of God. However, as there have been disagreements among Islamic 
theologians and philosophers on the exact Islamic concept of God, Ibn Arabi proposes 
that one should prioritise the ways of the scriptures on the matter. He then posits that, 
in following the ways of the scriptures, one must declare both the transcendence of 
God and His incomparability with anything (tanzih), and the partial similarity of God 
with his creation (tashbih). Moreover, Ibn Arabi upholds that though there is only one 
correct religious concept of God, the holders of false religious concepts of God are 
pardoned because they intend to worship the real God; as He is omniscient, He 
receives their worship.  
I concluded the chapter by addressing a thesis that Ibn Arabi seems to propose 
for the relationship between ultimate reality and religion that seems incompatible with 
his inclusivist thesis. According to this thesis, Ibn Arabi seems to maintain a version 
of aspectual pluralism in which he defends that all religious concepts of God are 
actual self-manifestations of ultimate reality, each revealing a different aspect of Him. 
Therefore, all religions and religious traditions are equally true and authentic. There is 
no superiority of one religion over the others, and the best way for one to gain a better 
understanding of ultimate reality is to witness Him through all religions and religious 
traditions. I argued, however, that Ibn Arabi’s pluralism alienates his conception of 
ultimate reality from theism in general, and from Islam in particular. It seems 
explicitly to contradict Quranic verses and Hadiths. I proposed that his thesis of 
ultimate reality would be stronger without his pluralism as the rest of his thesis can be 
seen as unified and coherent; this thesis hardly seems to fit in.     
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 This chapter completes my interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of ultimate 
reality, in which I proposed that Ibn Arabi’s thesis is best presented through three 
concepts: the concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud), ultimate reality as the 
Divine Self (dhat) and ultimate reality as God (ilah).  
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Conclusion 
In my thesis, I have sought to develop a systematic and philosophically coherent 
conception of ultimate reality for Ibn Arabi. I have done this by analysing, developing 
and utilising Ibn Arabi’s various views and concepts that he offers in his writings.  
 I began this thesis by providing a brief biography of Ibn Arabi and the 
historical context of his work. I outlined his relationship and involvement with the 
traditional scholarship of his time, which included among other subjects philosophy 
and theology. In addition, as Ibn Arabi introduced himself solely as a mystic, I 
discussed his outlook on (and relationship to) the Islamic mystical tradition, including 
the metaphysical trend of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). I also 
addressed the various approaches to Ibn Arabi’s doctrine taken by contemporary 
scholars. I highlighted that in my thesis, I have endorsed an analytic philosophical 
approach that seems to be lacking so far in the study of Ibn Arabi. 
In Chapter Two, I examined one of the principal factors behind the obscurity 
of Ibn Arabi’s style, particularly in his presentation of his thesis of ultimate reality. 
Ibn Arabi postulates that people vary in their ability to comprehend the conception of 
ultimate reality; accordingly, he tends to speak at different levels in order to reach out 
to the various comprehension abilities of his audience. He thus presents the thesis of 
ultimate reality according to the understandings of four levels, awarding the highest 
level to the elite mystics. His idiosyncratic style of presentation is highly confusing, 
considering that he presents all levels from a first-person perspective and (or) in an 
approving language, even though the views that belong to the different levels might 
be incompatible with each other at times. I suggested that his adoption of all these 
levels stems from an inclusivist stance towards the different Islamic schools and sects 
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which are represented by the various levels. He appears to believe that each school or 
sect possesses a single facet of the multi-faceted truth of God. It seems that he 
justifies his multi-levelled presentation because of this belief. Furthermore, I argued 
that even though he presents all of the different levels in approving language, only 
some of the levels represent his own opinions on the matter. Accordingly, I developed 
detailed guidelines to distinguish Ibn Arabi’s own views from the sea of the views 
that belong to the various levels. In the guidelines, I argued that as he presents himself 
merely as a mystic, only the views that he attributes to the mystical tradition should be 
taken to represent his own doctrine. In addition, in cases where he presents views in 
an approving language and (or) from a first-person perspective without attributing 
them either to the mystical tradition or to any other school or tradition, I proposed that 
such views should also be considered part of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine. Any other views 
should be discarded as irrelevant to his doctrine even if he appears to adopt them. 
In Chapter Three, I examined two of the key contemporary approaches to Ibn 
Arabi’s doctrine, developed by Toshihiko Izutsu and William C. Chittick. According 
to Izutsu, Ibn Arabi’s ontology is totally encompassed in his concept of divine self-
manifestation (tajalli). Everything there is, is divided between the unmanifested 
ultimate reality on the one hand and its self-manifestations on the other. I argued, 
however, that Izutsu has misunderstood Ibn Arabi’s concept of the divine self-
manifestation (tajalli) and its relationship to his ontology and conception of ultimate 
reality. Contrary to what Izutsu claims, Ibn Arabi’s notion of divine self-manifestation 
(tajalli) indicates a relationship between two parties rather than a one-sided process. 
Ibn Arabi presents divine self-manifestation (tajalli) as a relationship between God 
who reveals Himself and the person who witnesses this revelation. There is an 
epistemic aspect to Ibn Arabi’s concept of divine self-manifestation (tajalli) that is 
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absent from Izutsu’s interpretation. Accordingly, contrary to what Izutsu postulates, 
the concept of divine self-manifestation (tajalli) is not intended to be the fundament 
of ontology but is aimed at representing a particular relationship between God and the 
world.  
I also examined Chittick’s interpretive approach to Ibn Arabi. I argued that he 
attempts to reduce Ibn Arabi’s ontology to epistemology and mysticism. He proposes 
that Ibn Arabi’s key concept of wujud, which has long been understood to indicate 
‘existence’, could accurately be translated as ‘finding’—the literal meaning of the 
Arabic term. As a result, the thrust of many aspects of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine shifts from 
being, as long has been assumed, about the metaphysics and philosophy of ‘existence’ 
to being about ‘finding’ God (through religion and mysticism). According to Chittick, 
even Ibn Arabi’s most celebrated metaphysical thesis of the oneness of existence 
(wahdat al-wujud) could actually be a mystical thesis about ‘the oneness of finding’. I 
argued, however, that Chittick’s claims are based upon linguistic errors and are also 
opposed by Ibn Arabi’s own usages of the term wujud, which in many cases precludes 
Chittick’s proposition. I advanced that ‘existence’ is in fact the accurate interpretation 
of Ibn Arabi’s concept of ‘wujud’. Therefore, the parts of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of 
ultimate reality associated with wujud remain, as has long been assumed, matters of 
metaphysics. 
Chapter Four analysed some of Ibn Arabi’s supposed inconsistencies. In 
gathering Ibn Arabi’s various views on ultimate reality, one would realise that Ibn 
Arabi appears to adopt apparently incompatible theses. At times, he seems to advocate 
a dual theory of reality in which the world is on one side of reality and God is on the 
other. In addition, he advances a personal concept of deity that seems to follow the 
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Islamic scriptures, in which God is believed to be, among other things, a Hearer and a 
Seer. 
On the other hand, he also seems to defend a non-dualistic conception of 
ultimate reality in which he postulates that existence is one and identical with God. In 
addition, he affirms the non-existence of anything other than God. At these points in 
his writing, he appears to endorse an impersonal concept of God, who is defined as a 
sheer and unlimited existence. In this respect, his conception of ultimate reality 
appears to share certain views with Eastern traditions such as Taoism and Advaita 
Vedanta. In Chapter Four, I also looked at some critical responses to the apparent 
incongruity. Some Ibn Arabi scholars are aware of the apparent incompatibility in Ibn 
Arabi’s presentation of his conception of ultimate reality (e.g., Affifi, Izutsu, Landau) 
and they display different attitudes towards it. Some seem to accept that Ibn Arabi’s 
doctrine is actually contradictory, while others maintain that one should dismiss Ibn 
Arabi’s theistic views and consider only the non-dualistic concepts and views to be 
his legitimate thesis. 
Chapter Five marked the beginning of my interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s thesis 
of ultimate reality. I proposed that Ibn Arabi’s fragmented (and sometimes apparently 
incompatible) views and concepts on ultimate reality are best presented across three 
main concepts: the concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud), the concept of 
ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat) and the concept of ultimate reality as God 
(ilah). The three concepts are intended to combine to form one systematic thesis of 
ultimate reality. I explained that the three concepts do not represent different ultimate 
realities or different perspectives of ultimate reality, but, in fact, represent the same 
ultimate reality, each concept with its own scope and encompassment that 
distinguishes it from the other two concepts.  
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 The concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud) is the most fundamental 
and important concept as it incorporates Ibn Arabi’s claims that existence is one and 
identical with ultimate reality which is known as Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of 
existence (wahdat al-wujud). I examined two key interpretations of Ibn Arabi’s 
concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud), developed by Ibn Taymiyyah and A. 
E. Affifi. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Arabi defends a form of typical pantheism 
by maintaining that existence is one and identical with ultimate reality. According to 
Affifi, on the other hand, Ibn Arabi defends a form of acosmism. I argued however 
that both interpretations are exegetically inaccurate. Ibn Arabi explicitly asserts the 
reality of the world and defines it as everything other than God. These assertions are 
at odds with the two interpretations.   
In Chapter Six, I introduced my own interpretation of Ibn Arabi’s concept of 
ultimate reality as existence (wujud). In my interpretation, I have sought to develop a 
systematic thesis that incorporates two essential issues of Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the 
oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). The first is his absolute assertion that 
existence is one and identical with ultimate reality. The second is his claim that the 
world is real. In my interpretation, I examined the three constituents of Ibn Arabi’s 
thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud): the metaphysical nature of 
ultimate reality as existence (wujud); the metaphysical nature of the world; and the 
relationship between ultimate reality as existence (wujud) and the world.  
In introducing the first constituent, I examined two of Ibn Arabi’s 
metaphysical views on existence. The first is his assertion that existence is necessary 
and that nothingness is impossible. The second is his claim that existence is not a 
property of the object. I argued that, despite the fact that Ibn Arabi has not developed 
compelling arguments for the two positions, he is in good company as the two claims 
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are not very controversial, especially among philosophers today. These two views are 
important in understanding Ibn Arabi’s identification of ultimate reality with 
existence. As he considers existence to be the absolute and ultimate metaphysical 
ground, it seems reasonable thus to conclude that existence as such is identical with 
ultimate reality. In addition, in advocating that existence is not a property of the object 
but identical with that which exists, Ibn Arabi seems to suggest a particular 
understanding of the identification between ultimate reality and existence. We may, 
hence, argue that Ibn Arabi sees ultimate reality not as a sea of being, as some of his 
statements seem to allude, but actually as an individual existent who configures 
existence in its absolute sense. 
My interpretation proposes that in his thesis of the oneness of existence 
(whahdat al-wujud), Ibn Arabi does not develop a novel concept of God, but actually 
a novel thesis for cosmology and the relationship of God and the world.  In examining 
Ibn Arabi’s cosmological views, one encounters three concepts: al-mumkinat; al-
a’lam; and al-a’yan al-thabitah. There seems to be agreement among Ibn Arabi’s 
scholars that al-mumkinat indicates possible entities and that the world (al-a’lam) 
indicates the actual realm. The concept of al-a’yan al-thabitah however seems to be 
less clear. I proposed that, in Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence, al-a’yan 
al-thabitah correspond to what is known among metaphysicians today as merely 
possible entities (which are not actual). Furthermore, I proposed that Ibn Arabi seems 
to suggest that there is no essential metaphysical difference between what is actual 
and what is merely possible. The difference between the two realms is mainly 
epistemic. What an individual perceives from the realm of possible entities constitutes 
the actual realm for him with the rest being merely possible (a’yan thabitah) to him. 
By maintaining that actuality is for a considerable part an epistemic matter, Ibn Arabi 
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succeeds in upholding the reality of the world without committing himself to an acute 
contrast between the world and God. However, I argued that it is still necessary to 
explain the coexistence of possible entities and God, which insinuates a duality of 
reality. Such a duality would undermine Ibn Arabi’s claim that existence is one and 
identical with ultimate reality. To overcome this problem, I proposed that Ibn Arabi 
might suggest that the totality of possible entities are actually identical with God’s 
knowledge of the world. As much as one’s knowledge is not external to his existence, 
possible entities also should not be seen as external to God’s existence. I also 
proposed that identifying God’s knowledge of the world with possible entities may 
provide a plausible model for God’s knowledge being perfect, complete and infallible; 
by being identical with the totality of possible entities it is metaphysically impossible 
for God’s knowledge not to be so.  
In Chapter Seven, I examined a number of existing and potential objections to 
Ibn Arabi’s concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud). The first objection 
concerns Ibn Arabi’s depiction of the relationship between ultimate reality and the 
world. This objection has two versions. The first asserts that Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the 
oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud) is a form of atheism and heresy as it identifies 
the world with God. The second version postulates that identifying al-a’yan al-
thabitah with God’s knowledge would undermine God’s omnipotence and 
omniscience. If God cannot do or know anything about the world beyond al-a’yan al-
thabitah then both His knowledge and power are immensely limited. The second 
objection raised the problem of the one and many in Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness 
of existence (wahdat al-wujud). This objection also has two versions. According to 
the first, by maintaining that existence is one and many at the same time, Ibn Arabi’s 
doctrine runs the danger of being incoherent. According to the second version of this 
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objection, if existence is one, people would have experienced it as such; considering 
that people experience it as many, then it is probably so. The third objection 
concentrates on the problem of evil. It states that if God is identical with existence, 
then no part of existence could incorporate or manifest evil, which is apparently not 
the case. The fourth and final objection relates to the unfaithfulness to Islam. It claims 
that in maintaining the doctrine of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud), Ibn 
Arabi is contradicting Islam.  
In Chapter Eight, I examined the second concept in Ibn Arabi’s thesis of 
ultimate reality: the concept of ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat). According to 
Ibn Arabi, the Divine Self (dhat) designates ultimate reality in Himself with no 
relationship or reference to anything else. Contrary to what some of Ibn Arabi’s 
scholars seem to believe, I argued that the concept of ultimate reality as the Divine 
Self (dhat) is not identical to the concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud). 
While the former signifies ultimate reality in His absolute independence of 
everything, the latter indicates ultimate reality as identical with existence and 
encompassing everything there is. In addition, I explained that according to Ibn Arabi, 
the reality of the Divine Self (dhat) is unknown and unknowable, and ultimate reality 
as such is not the aim or concern of religions or religious concepts of God. 
In Chapter Nine, I examined the last concept in Ibn Arabi’s thesis of ultimate 
reality according to my interpretation: ultimate reality as God (ilah). This concept 
indicates ultimate reality in His relationship with the world. Ibn Arabi maintains that 
the term ‘God’ does not signify a proper name for ultimate reality but actually a ‘title’ 
and a position that ultimate reality occupies. Further, the concept of godness (uluhah) 
implies the role of ultimate reality in the world as its God, Creator and Sustainer. Ibn 
Arabi advances that the term ‘God’ is comparable to the term ‘King’. As the term 
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‘King’ implies the existence of a person who holds this title and a kingdom to which 
this person has a particular relationship with, the term ‘God’ implies that there is a 
self (i.e., the Divine Self (dhat)) that maintains this title, and a world whose ultimate 
reality is its God. Ibn Arabi explains that people can seek knowledge of ultimate 
reality only through Him as God (ilah), and he proposes three ways to obtain this 
knowledge: the rational faculty; the Islamic scriptures; and religious experience. He 
seems to evaluate the rational faculty as the least significant of these three channels 
and suggests that one should prioritise the other two channels instead. Furthermore, he 
advocates that ultimate reality as God (ilah) is the object of religious worship and 
beliefs. He seems to see the religious concept(s) of God to be various portraits of 
ultimate reality as God (ilah), who is a metaphysical entity. The best religious concept 
of God, hence, is the one that depicts ultimate reality as God (ilah) perfectly. 
Accordingly, he advocates that the Islamic concept of God is the only correct 
religious concept of God as it corresponds perfectly to ultimate reality as God (ilah). 
However, he maintains an inclusivist stance towards the other religious concept(s) of 
God. He postulates that all religions, whether they have an accurate or a false concept 
of God, aim for the being who is worthy of worship. Considering that the real God is 
the only being worthy of worship, He is the real aim of every worshipper, and, 
therefore, He will accept everyone’s worship regardless of his religious concept of 
Him. 
Ibn Arabi, however, seems to develop another thesis for the religious concepts 
of God that does not seem to be compatible with his inclusivism. In his second thesis, 
Ibn Arabi appears to defend a form of aspectual pluralism, in which he advances that 
the various religious concepts of God are different actual self-manifestations of 
ultimate reality. I argued, however, that Ibn Arabi’s pluralism is incompatible with the 
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rest of his thesis of ultimate reality, and actually undermines his tireless attempt to 
make his doctrine compatible with Islam.  
 Thus, the three concepts in my interpretation of Ibn Arabi represent a 
systematic thesis of ultimate reality. The concept of ultimate reality as existence 
(wujud) incorporates everything there is. The concept of ultimate reality as the Divine 
Self (dhat) indicates ultimate reality in Himself and excludes everything other than 
ultimate reality. The concept of ultimate reality as God (ilah) designates ultimate 
reality in His relationship with the world as its Creator and Sustainer. The various and 
apparently incompatible views that Ibn Arabi develops about ultimate reality would 
make more sense when they are read according to my interpretation, with each view 
distinctly belonging to one of the three concepts.  
Final remarks 
 
I found that employing the methods, theories and style of analytic philosophy to be 
the most helpful and fruitful mean of understanding Ibn Arabi’s thesis. I recommend 
the same methodology is followed to approach other aspects of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine, 
particularly the following.  (i) In his writings, Ibn Arabi presents very detailed views 
and concepts on epistemology, particularly on the epistemology of religious 
experiences. His views seem interesting yet unsystematic and vague and in need of 
through analysis. (ii) As mentioned in Chapter Seven, Ibn Arabi appears to provide 
interesting views with regard to the reality of evil and its relationship to God and the 
world. I believe that his views could be developed into a noteworthy thesis on the 
problem of evil. Identifying goodness with existence and evil with the lack of 
existence may also provide a promising basis for an ethical thesis or a theory of well-
being. (iii) Ibn Arabi’s views on logic and the authority of argumentation also seem 
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interesting and could be examined and analysed in detail. Some of these issues have 
been mentioned briefly in the previous chapters.  
  Indeed, I recommend the same methodology to be followed in approaching 
other subjects, topics and doctrines in Islamic philosophy, theology and mysticism in 
general. It could even benefit the analysis of doctrines of other key Muslim figures 
such as Abu Bakr al-Baqillani (981–1013), Abu al-Ma’ali al-Juwayni (1028–1085), 
Abu Hamed al-Ghazali (1058–1111), Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (1150–1210), Ibn 
Taymiyyah (1263–1328) and many others. 
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